How the numbers are built

Six public datasets, all free to access. The first two carry the bulk of the figures; the remaining four power the policy-exposure, labor-market and demographic signals:

The data is pre-built into static files from local copies of these releases. There are no runtime API calls, no tracking, and no exposed keys — the tool is just data and JavaScript. Null, suppressed (PrivacySuppressed) and blank values are treated as missing, never as zero. Several metrics are projections or scenarios rather than current-period facts: the field-demand outlook (BLS, 2024-34), the enrollment cliff (WICHE projections), Grad PLUS exposure (FSA volume read against the 2025 budget-law scenario), and endowment-tax exposure (a 2025-budget-law scenario, not current law). The closure-risk score is a structural index, not a forecast. Each is flagged as indicative where it appears.

The tool reports student success two different ways, because the federal government measures it two different ways — on different groups of students, over different time windows. They are not directly comparable, and a school can look very different on each. We show both, side by side, on every profile.

Worked example (Harvard University). 97.6% of first-time, full-time students graduate within six years, but only 55.7% finish "on time" within four years — while the all-students completion rate is 98.6% within eight years. The three are all correct; they simply count different students over different windows. Both families are reported by the U.S. Department of Education and lag the current year by roughly two to three years.

A single national percentile would be misleading — a regional teaching college and a research flagship live in different worlds. So every institution is placed in one of 37 peer groups defined by three attributes:

• Carnegie Classification — doctoral/research, master's, baccalaureate, special-focus and so on.
• Control — public vs. private nonprofit.
• Size band — undergraduate enrollment tier.

Example: "R1: Doctoral, Very High Research · Private nonprofit." Percentiles and medians are computed only within an institution's own group, so the comparison is always like-for-like.

For each metric, a school's percentile is the share of peers at or below its value (0–100). Because "higher" is not always "better," we translate the raw percentile into a standing using each metric's direction:

For metrics where lower is better (debt, net price, default rate) the standing is inverted, so "Strong" always means "doing well," never just "a big number." Neutral metrics (e.g. enrollment size, Pell share) get a percentile but no good/bad standing, because more is not inherently better or worse.

The headline financial score is the NACUBO Composite Financial Index (CFI) — the balance-sheet health measure accreditors and institutional boards use, and one whose underlying ratios bond-rating agencies also track. It blends four ratios onto a single strength-factor scale from about −4 (weak) to 10 (strong):

Reading the scale:

Below 3 falls short of the conventional threshold for financial health; below 1 signals acute stress. Institutions that carry little or no plant debt have the viability ratio dropped and the remaining weights re-normalized. The CFI is computed from IPEDS FY2022-23 and lags the current year by two to three years. It is calculated for public (GASB) and private nonprofit (FASB) institutions; private for-profit colleges report under a different FASB standard with no comparable net-asset or reserve concept, so they receive an operating margin, tuition dependency and revenue composition but no Composite Financial Index. Branch campuses that report finances at a parent or system level can show distorted ratios. Where a branch, online division, or other child unit does not file its own IPEDS finance survey at all, its profile shows the parent or system's figures, clearly labeled as such and excluded from rankings and peer percentiles so the same finances are never counted twice. It is for informational benchmarking — not a credit rating, and not financial advice.

The 0–100 gauge on each profile is a lighter IPEDS-finance-based companion to the CFI — a per-student view of financial strength that reads even when the full CFI cannot be computed. It is the mean of within-peer-group percentile ranks on three per-student measures drawn from IPEDS finance: endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per FTE, and instructional spend per FTE. Higher is stronger. Where those inputs are missing, the score is suppressed rather than guessed.

An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) — an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: operating margin (thin or negative), months of operating cushion (low), tuition dependency (high), and the home-state enrollment cliff (a shrinking high-school-graduate pipeline, from WICHE). It is the mean of whichever of those signals are available, with at least two required; where fewer than two can be computed, the score is suppressed. It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that historically precede closures and mergers.

This is a directional structural-risk index — NOT a prediction that any institution will close, not a credit rating, and not a forecast. It is a screening signal to investigate, weighted equally across its inputs.

Two signals model how a school could be affected by the 2025 federal budget law. These are scenario estimates, not current law and not a measure of present-day liability:

• Endowment-tax exposure — models the endowment-per-student tax tiers in the 2025 budget law. A scenario, not a tax bill any school has received.
• Grad PLUS exposure — reads each school's Grad PLUS loan volume from the FSA Direct Loan Dashboard (primarily AY2025-26 year-to-date through Q2; AY2024-25 full year where 2025-26 is not yet reported) against the program's proposed wind-down. A scenario for how reliant graduate enrollment is on that loan, not a prediction of revenue loss.

The projected 10-year (2024-34) change in U.S. employment for the occupations a school's degrees feed, from BLS Employment Projections, mapped via the NCES CIP-SOC crosswalk and weighted by the school's program mix (U.S. all-occupations benchmark +3.1%). Structurally diffuse fields whose crosswalk maps to "any job" — 05 Area/Ethnic/Gender Studies, 24 Liberal Arts & Humanities, and 30 Multi/Interdisciplinary — are excluded because they carry no coherent occupational signal. It is an indicative broad-field demand signal, not a program-specific or placement guarantee.

Cross-metric flags surface patterns a single number hides — for example multi-year enrollment decline, heavy debt-to-earnings burden, or an unusually large endowment draw relative to size. Flags are deterministic rules, color-coded amber (watch) or red (acute), and shown only when the underlying data supports them. They are signals to investigate, not verdicts.

The profile view offers four optional lenses — Enrollment VP, CFO, President, and Board / Trustee. A lens never changes a single number; it only reorders the metric cards and marks (★) the measures that role watches most, and opens on the tab most relevant to that role. It is a presentation layer over identical data, so two colleagues can read the same profile through the lens that matches their job.

The leaderboards rank on one disclosed metric at a time — no weighting, no composite, no editorial judgment. Institutions that do not report the metric are excluded. To avoid distortion from tiny programs, balance-sheet rankings (financial health, endowment per student) require at least 1,000 undergraduates, and enrollment-growth lists require a meaningful starting base. Each list discloses its filter in a note. These are data rankings, not endorsements.

• It is not a credit rating or investment advice. The CFI tracks ratios similar to those agencies use, but it is not a rating and carries no opinion on any security.
• It is not a "best colleges" ranking. There is no overall quality score and no weighting of one metric against another.
• The data lags. Scorecard figures trail the current year by ~2 years; IPEDS finance by 2–3. Each metric is labeled with its source year.
• System reporting can distort. Branch campuses that file finances at a parent/system level may show ratios that don't reflect the individual campus. Where a child unit files no finance of its own, its profile shows the parent/system figures, labeled as such and excluded from rankings and peer percentiles.
• Small cohorts are suppressed. Federal privacy rules withhold earnings and debt for small programs; those cells show as missing, not zero.

Disclaimer. This tool is for informational benchmarking and education planning only. It is not financial, investment, or accreditation advice. Data may lag, be revised, or contain errors, and all figures are point-in-time snapshots of the most recent public releases. Several metrics are projections (BLS field-demand outlook, WICHE enrollment cliff) or 2025-budget-law scenarios (endowment-tax and Grad PLUS exposure), and the closure-risk score is a structural index, not a prediction.

Source: College Scorecard (2024-25) & IPEDS finance (FY2022-23), U.S. Department of Education; BLS Employment Projections (2024-34); WICHE "Knocking at the College Door" (11th ed.); FSA Direct Loan Dashboard (AY2025-26 YTD, AY2024-25 full year where not yet reported); and U.S. Census ACS. Compiled by Ibex Insights.