How the numbers are built
Every number in this tool comes from public data. Seventeen public data sources, no private surveys, no black box. This page shows where each figure comes from, how it is calculated, and where it stops being reliable. Every score is worked through on a real college, with the arithmetic in plain sight.
Type a metric, a term, or a plain question. Suggestions appear as you type, and we will take you straight to the answer.
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The example school
Definitions are easy to nod along to and hard to check. So every score below is worked through on the same real profile: the University of Vermont, a public university in Burlington with 11,743 undergraduates. Nothing here is invented. Each figure is the one the tool actually publishes, and you can open its live profile and check every one.
We picked a school with a full set of data, not a flattering one. Where Vermont has no value for a metric (it pays no endowment tax, it awards no short-term certificates) we work the example on a different real school and say which.
University of Vermont, the facts every score starts from
| Type | Public, R2: Doctoral, High Research |
| Undergraduates | 11,743 |
| Peer group | R2: Doctoral, High Research · Public (93 schools) |
| Financial Health Index (CFI) | 5.1 out of −4 to 10 |
| Financial Resilience | 90 out of 100 |
| Closure-risk index | 32 out of 100 |
Where the data comes from
Seventeen public data sources, thirteen of them official federal collections, all free to access. The first two carry most of the figures. The rest add the policy, research, labor-market, safety and demographic signals. OpenAlex, Wikipedia and Wikidata are community-maintained, and we use them only where the institution matches with confidence:
College Scorecard
U.S. Dept of Education (as-of 2024-25). Enrollment, admissions, cost of attendance, net price (overall and by family-income band), Pell share, retention and graduation rates, the 8-year completion rate for all entering students (IPEDS Outcome Measures), median graduate earnings and debt, the three-year loan-repayment rate, average SAT, undergraduate race/ethnicity, and field-of-study outcomes. Headline values come from the Most-Recent-Cohorts file; trend lines come from nine annual releases (2016-17 through 2024-25). The cohort default rate is shown for the FY2017 borrower cohort. That is the most recent reading whose three-year window closed before the 2020-23 federal payment pause pushed later cohorts to near-zero.
IPEDS
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System. Finance (FY2022-23): revenues, expenses, net assets, endowment, plant debt and reserves. These feed operating margin, revenue mix, the Composite Financial Index and Financial Resilience. Admissions (Fall 2023): the admitted and enrolled counts behind admission yield. Enrollment (fall 2023): full-time-equivalent and student-faculty figures. FY2022-23 is the most recent complete finance release.
BLS Employment Projections
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2024-34). The projected 10-year employment change for the occupations a school's degrees feed. This is the basis for the field-demand outlook, mapped through the NCES CIP-SOC crosswalk.
WICHE, Knocking at the College Door
Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 11th edition. State-by-state projections of high-school graduates. This is the demographic "enrollment cliff" input to the closure-risk index. Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., © WICHE, used under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. The figures shown here are adapted from it; see reusing these figures.
FSA Direct Loan Dashboard
U.S. Dept of Education, Federal Student Aid. Direct Loan portfolio by school, including Grad PLUS and Parent PLUS volume. This is the basis for the Grad PLUS exposure and Parent PLUS cap-gap signals. Values are mostly award year 2025-26, year-to-date through Q2 (December 2025), the most current federal release. Schools that have not yet originated PLUS loans in 2025-26 keep their most recent complete year (2024-25), labeled per institution. The reliance share is stable across the two vintages.
U.S. Census ACS
American Community Survey. State and national median earnings for high-school graduates and bachelor's-degree holders. This is the benchmark behind each program's indicative earnings-premium status.
FSA Financial Responsibility
U.S. Dept of Education, Federal Student Aid. The financial-responsibility composite score (private institutions, −1.0 to 3.0; AY2022-23) and the Heightened Cash Monitoring list (HCM1/HCM2; March 2026). Shown only for institutions that ED scores or flags. These are ED's own figures reproduced as published, not Ibex assessments, and not a credit rating.
Federal Audit Clearinghouse
U.S. General Services Administration. Single Audit filings under 2 CFR 200 Subpart F (audit years 2016–2025), performed by independent CPA firms rather than by ED. Source of the federal-dollar figures in each Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards (total federal, Title IV, Pell, Direct Loan and federal research), and of the auditor's own findings: going-concern doubt, material weakness, material noncompliance, modified program opinions, repeat findings, and low-risk-auditee status. Values come from each school's most recent audit and carry that audit year. Shown only for institutions that file their own Single Audit. A blank here means no audit was filed, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools below the federal expenditure threshold do not appear.
NSF NCSES (HERD)
National Science Foundation, Higher Education Research & Development survey (FY2023). Total research-and-development spending, the basis for the research-spending metric.
Clery Act Campus Safety
U.S. Dept of Education Campus Safety and Security collection (2024). On-campus criminal offenses, the basis for the campus-crime-rate metric, expressed per 1,000 students.
EADA Athletics
U.S. Dept of Education Equity in Athletics survey. Athletics participation and program revenue, the basis for the athletics-participation and athletics-revenue metrics.
NIH RePORTER
National Institutes of Health (FY2024). Total NIH award funding by recipient institution, the basis for the NIH-funding metric.
USAspending
U.S. Treasury (federal fiscal year 2024). Federal funding obligated to each school, broken out by awarding agency. This is the basis for the federal-funding-obligated, federal-funder-count and top-funder-share metrics and the federal-funding composition bar. Matched by the school's own Unique Entity ID(s) from SAM.gov, never by name: a school can hold several UEIs (MIT's Lincoln Laboratory and Caltech's JPL file under the university's own registration), and all are summed. Obligations, not expenditures: USAspending reports what agencies committed in the fiscal year. The Single Audit above reports what the school actually drew down, which also includes student aid disbursed and money from awards committed in earlier years. The two answer different questions and are not meant to match, so we never subtract one from the other. As a rule of thumb, a research university's obligations run close to its expended total (at MIT the two are within about 10%), while a teaching college's expended figure is dominated by federal student aid and can run several times its new-money obligations. How we know the figures are right: no other public source reports federal dollars by agency for a single institution, so there is no outside number to check against. Instead we rebuild every school's total with a second, independent USAspending query, and the two must agree to the cent before the figure is published. Only institutions that pass are shown.
IRS Form 990
Internal Revenue Service, exempt-organization extract (most recent filing per school), retrieved through the ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer API. For private nonprofit institutions: total contributions and grants, bond and mortgage debt, financial leverage, and the share of expenses going to officer and key-employee pay. These are balance-sheet facts IPEDS does not carry. Matched by exact EIN through the Federal Audit Clearinghouse crosswalk, never by name, and shown only where the EIN resolves to the same institution.
OpenAlex
Open scholarly catalog (CC0). Research works, citation counts and the scholarly h-index, matched to each institution and shown only where OpenAlex has a confident match.
Wikimedia & Wikidata
Open, community-maintained sources. Wikipedia pageviews (a rough measure of public attention) and founding year (Wikidata), shown only where a confident match exists. Community-edited, not government-audited.
Reusing these figures. The federal collections above are U.S. Government works and carry no copyright. OpenAlex and Wikidata are CC0. One source is different: WICHE's Knocking at the College Door (11th ed.) is © WICHE and licensed CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. The three figures on this site derived from it (the home-state enrollment cliff, in-state graduating-class size, and the projected shift in the applicant pool's composition) are adaptations of that work: they are offered under the same CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license, and if you reuse them you must credit WICHE, link the license, note that the material was adapted, and license what you build under the same terms. Wikipedia contributes pageview counts read from the Wikimedia REST API, which are facts rather than text, so no share-alike obligation attaches; no Wikipedia prose is republished anywhere on this site. IRS Form 990 figures are retrieved through the ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer API. Nothing here is published with the endorsement of, or in partnership with, any of these providers.
The data is pre-built into static files from local copies of these releases. There are no live API calls at page load and no exposed keys; the site's own analytics and marketing tags are listed in the cookie policy. The tool is just data and JavaScript. Null, suppressed (PrivacySuppressed) and blank values are treated as missing, never as zero. Several metrics are projections or scenarios, not current-period facts: the field-demand outlook (BLS, 2024-34), the enrollment cliff (WICHE projections), Grad PLUS exposure and the Parent PLUS cap gap (FSA volume read against the 2025 budget-law scenario), Workforce Pell exposure (certificate share read against the 2025 budget law's new short-term-Pell eligibility, effective July 1, 2026), and endowment-tax exposure (a 2025-budget-law scenario, not current law). The closure-risk score is a structural index, not a forecast. Each is flagged as indicative where it appears.
Coverage
U.S. degree-granting institutions (four-year, two-year and less-than-two-year) with reportable data.
peer groups by Carnegie type and sector, the basis for every percentile.
years of trend data (2016-17 → 2024-25) behind each sparkline and trend chart.
Peer groups
What it is. The set of schools a college is measured against. Almost every number in the tool is a rank inside this set, so the group decides what the number means.
How it is built. A single national percentile would be misleading, because a regional teaching college and a research flagship do not compete for the same students or the same money. So each school is placed in one of 70 peer groups, built from two facts it reports to the federal government:
- Carnegie Classification, what kind of school it is: doctoral/research, master's, baccalaureate, associate, special-focus and so on.
- Sector, who runs it: public, private nonprofit, or private for-profit.
Combine those two and you get the group. Percentiles and medians are computed only inside a school's own group, so the comparison is always like-for-like.
Real example: the University of Vermont
Vermont reports Carnegie class R2: Doctoral, High Research and sector Public. Those two facts put it in the group "R2: Doctoral, High Research · Public", which holds 93 schools. Every percentile on its profile is a rank inside that group, not among all 5,787 institutions in the tool. It is never ranked against Harvard, and never against the community college down the road. (On any single metric the rank runs against the schools in the group that actually report it, which is 93 or fewer. See Percentiles.)
When a group would be too small. A rank against four other schools is noise, so a group needs at least 10 schools. If a Carnegie-and-sector combination has fewer, its members are moved to a wider group, in two steps:
- 1Regroup by region and sector, for example "Public institutions in the Southeast region".
- 2If that is still under 10, regroup by sector alone, for example "All private nonprofit institutions".
When Carnegie has not classified a school. Roughly a third of the institutions in the tool carry no Carnegie classification: newer schools, single-campus branches, and much of the certificate sector. They used to be pooled into one residual "unclassified" bucket, which is not a peer group, it is a leftover. They are now grouped by institutional level and sector instead: four-year, two-year or less-than-two-year, crossed with public, private nonprofit or private for-profit. A two-year public is compared against other two-year publics.
There are 70 peer groups in all. 55 are a straight Carnegie-and-sector match, covering 3,563 institutions. 9 group the institutions Carnegie has not classified, by level (four-year, two-year, less-than-two-year) and sector, covering 2,108. 3 fall back to region and sector (40 institutions) and 3 to sector alone (76). The smallest group holds 10 institutions, the largest 1,323. Every profile names its own group and its size, so you can always see which rule applied.
The honest limit. A peer group is a starting point, not a claim that 93 schools are interchangeable. Size, state funding and mission still vary inside a group. The tool also offers a separate "nearest neighbors" set on each profile, matched on size, selectivity, cost, outcomes and student mix, for when the fixed group is too coarse.
Percentiles & standing
What it is. A percentile is a class rank. It answers one question: what share of this school's peers it sits above on this measure. A 97th percentile means it is ahead of about 97% of the group.
Real example: Vermont's endowment per undergraduate
Vermont holds $71,130 of endowment per undergraduate. Of the 93 schools in its group, 90 report an endowment figure. Line those 90 up and count how many sit strictly below Vermont: 86. Count how many sit at or below it: 87, because Vermont itself is in the line. The percentile is the midpoint of those two counts, which is what makes it a fair rank rather than a rank that always flatters the top. For context, the median reporting school in the group holds $13,300, so Vermont carries more than five times the peer median.
Why the midpoint, and not simply "at or below". Counting a school against itself guarantees that whoever holds the highest value in a group scores exactly 100, and makes 0 impossible for anyone. It also means a hundred schools all reporting the same number would each be told they beat all hundred. Splitting ties down the middle fixes both: a school tied with everyone lands at 50, and both ends of the scale are reachable by someone.
Note the denominator: the schools that report the measure, not the whole group. It changes from metric to metric. In this same group of 93, endowment is reported by 90 schools, while net tuition revenue and instructional spend are each reported by 92. A school is never ranked against a blank, and a missing figure is never counted as a zero.
Percentile is not the same as good. Higher is not always better: a high median debt or a high net price is bad news. So we translate the raw percentile into a standing using each metric's direction:
Top third of peers on the favorable side of the metric.
Middle third, roughly typical for the peer group.
Bottom third on the favorable side of the metric.
For metrics where lower is better (debt, net price, default rate) the standing is flipped, so "Strong" always means "doing well", never just "a big number". Some metrics are neutral (enrollment size, Pell share). Those get a percentile but no good/bad standing, because more is not inherently better or worse.
When we publish no percentile at all. Two cases, both deliberate:
- Fewer than eight schools report the measure. A rank against one or two peers is arithmetic, not information. The value and the peer median still show; the rank does not.
- Every school in the group reports the same value. If a thousand schools all report 0%, no ranking among them means anything, whatever number you print. The shared value is shown as the peer median instead.
Where the rank rests on a thin group (eight to nineteen schools), the peer count under the card is shown in amber rather than grey.
Metrics with no direction get a mark, not a bar. About half the metrics here are neither good nor bad: enrollment size, share of students over 25, research volume, published tuition. Those cards show a small tick on an empty track, saying where the school sits, rather than a filled bar, which would read as a score. Only metrics with a stated direction are filled in and tagged Strong, Average or Below peers.
Which benchmark you are reading against
What it is. Every median and every rank on a profile is computed inside that school's peer group by default. The buttons above the metric cards move the reference: to the school's home state, to the whole national universe, or to a peer set you build yourself. A number does not change when you switch. What it is being measured against does, and that is usually the argument.
Real example: Vermont's net price against three references
The University of Vermont charges an average net price of $19,343. That one figure reads three different ways depending on who it is set beside. The bar under each median is the reference group's spread: the track runs from its 10th to its 90th percentile, the shaded box is its middle half, the pale line is its median, and the gold marker is Vermont.
R2: Doctoral, High Research · Public
91 report a net price
median
middle half $12,278 to $17,648
every institution in the state
11 report a net price
median
middle half $19,343 to $31,483
every institution in the dataset
5,022 report a net price
median
middle half $10,728 to $23,787
Against the 91 research universities that report it, Vermont sits above the group's middle half: expensive. Against the 11 institutions in its own state, it sits near the bottom of the track: cheap. Both readings are correct, which is the point. A median with no spread beside it hides this entirely, and a spread taken from one reference under a median taken from another is worse than either, because it looks like an answer.
What moves when you switch, and what does not.
- Moves: the median printed beside the rank, the dashed reference line on every trend chart, and the spread bar under every rank. All three are read from one lookup, so a card cannot show one reference's median over another reference's spread.
- Does not move: the percentile, unless you are using a peer set you built. A rank is an exact count of institutions, and computing one inside a state needs every value in that state, not its summary. Rather than interpolate an estimate and print it in a slot that has always held a count, the rank line keeps saying in peer group and says so on every card.
Two floors, because a median and a spread are not the same claim. A reference needs 5 reporting institutions before we will print its median, and 8 before we will draw its spread, which is the same floor a percentile has to clear. A small state can therefore show a median with no bar under it. That is the honest outcome: a box plot drawn from six numbers invents a shape.
A hollow marker instead of a solid one means the school falls outside the track entirely, above the reference group's 90th or below its 10th. It is pinned to the end of the bar and reads as “at least this far out”, not as an exact position.
The three prices
A college does not have a price. It has at least three, they differ by a lot, and treating them as one number is the most common way to be wrong about cost. The tool keeps them separate and scores them differently.
Published tuition, fees, room and board, and total cost of attendance, before any aid. Shown as context, never scored. At most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker usually sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more.
What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, broken out by family income band. This is the one price we score, and lower is better. It still averages across very different aid packages, so read it as a band rather than a quote.
Net price for families earning over about $110,000, close to the unsubsidized cost. Deliberately not scored. A low figure can mean a genuinely inexpensive school, or one discounting even its wealthiest applicants to fill seats.
The informative number is usually the gap between the low-income and the full-pay net price. A wide gap means aid is being aimed at need. A narrow one means the school discounts broadly, which helps its yield more than it helps its neediest students. Each price card carries an information mark explaining which of the three it is and why it is scored the way it is.
How old each number is
The trap. The Department of Education publishes a "most recent" institution file, and it is not one vintage. It is assembled element by element, taking each measure's most recent non-null value. A measure the Department stopped collecting in 2016 sits in the current file looking exactly as fresh as one collected last year. Labelling the whole file with its release year, which is the obvious thing to do, is wrong by up to a decade for some measures.
What we do instead. Every measure is dated individually, and the date is derived rather than assumed: we compare the current file against every annual release back to 2010 and take the year whose values match. Each card shows its own date, and where the file year still is not the measurement window, the card says so.
What that turned up
- Current (2024-25). Enrollment, admissions, retention, graduation rates, tuition, net price, test scores, Pell share.
- 2020-21. The entire graduate-earnings and student-debt block. This is the last release in which the Department published it.
- 2016-17. Loan repayment rates, first-generation share, family income, income bands, veteran share. Not republished since.
- 2014-15. The one-year repayment rate and the share of former students earning more than $28,000.
A stale federal figure is still the only federal figure that exists, so we publish it rather than leave the card blank, and we say how old it is. Earnings are the case to watch: they are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that entered college roughly a decade before, so a 2020-21 earnings figure describes students who started well before 2020.
Federal collections arrive at different speeds. The other federal source behind the tool, IPEDS, publishes each component on its own schedule, so the layers below are not all from the same year. Each card carries the year of the collection it came from, and a layer is only moved forward when the newer file still carries the fields it is read for.
- 2023-24. Derived 12-month enrollment: full-time-equivalent headcount
- 2023-24. Derived human resources: average salary by academic rank
- 2023-24. Institutional characteristics: published room and board charges Held back: the newer file no longer carries the published room and board charges.
- Fall 2024. Institution directory: names, locations, metropolitan area, control and level
- Fall 2023. Admissions: applications, admits, enrolled, test-score submission
- Fall 2023. Derived fall enrollment: student-faculty ratio, out-of-state and distance-ed shares
- Fall 2023. Staff by occupational category: instructional-staff headcount and demographics
- FY2022-23. Finance, GASB (public institutions)
- FY2022-23. Finance, FASB (private nonprofit institutions)
- FY2022-23. Finance, for-profit institutions
- Fall 2022. Residence and migration of first-time undergraduates Held back: reporting is optional in odd-numbered years, so the newer file covers fewer than half of all institutions and cannot be compared across peers.
2 newer files are published but not used, for the reason shown. A partial or column-short release would make a comparison look complete when it is not.
Ratios that cross collections. Endowment per undergraduate divides an IPEDS fiscal-year figure by a Scorecard enrollment count, and the two are not from the same year. Cards like that name both dates rather than picking the flattering one, and should be read as an order of magnitude.
Filings that arrive on their own schedule. Single audits and IRS Form 990 returns follow each institution's own fiscal calendar, so we show each school at its most recent filing. That means a peer comparison on those measures spans a few filing years rather than one, and the cards say so.
Financial Health Index (CFI)
What it is. The headline financial score, and the one number here that is not an Ibex invention. It is the NACUBO Composite Financial Index (CFI), the balance-sheet measure accreditors and college boards already use, and whose underlying ratios bond-rating agencies track. Unlike a percentile, it is an absolute score: it says how strong the balance sheet is, not how it ranks.
How it is built. Four ratios come out of the IPEDS finance filing. Each is converted to a "strength factor" on a common scale, then blended by fixed weights onto one scale running from about −4 (weak) to 10 (strong):
Money it could spend vs. what it spends in a year. In plain terms: how many months it could run on reserves if the money stopped.
Spendable reserves vs. debt on buildings. Could it cover what it owes?
Change in net assets vs. total net assets. Is the balance sheet growing or shrinking?
Surplus or deficit vs. operating revenue. Did the year end in the black?
Reading the scale:
6 and above
3 to 6
1 to 3
below 1
Real example: how Vermont gets a 5.1
| Ratio | Vermont's figure | Strength factor | Weight | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary reserve | 6.6 months | 4.13 | 35% | 1.45 |
| Viability | 0.75× | 1.79 | 35% | 0.63 |
| Return on net assets | 21.6% | 10.00 | 20% | 2.00 |
| Operating result | 13.1% | 10.00 | 10% | 1.00 |
| Financial Health Index | 5.1 |
The contributions above are shown to two decimals for readability. The tool carries them unrounded and rounds only the final index, so adding the displayed figures can land a hundredth away from its internal total. Either way the published index is 5.1.
Read it and you learn something a single score would hide. Vermont's year was excellent (both the operating and net-asset ratios max out at 10), and it holds 6.6 months of cushion. What pulls the score down is viability at 0.75×: its spendable reserves cover only three quarters of its building debt. That is the number a board would ask about, and it is why the index blends four ratios instead of reporting one. The peer median for the group is 3.2, so 5.1 is comfortably above it (81st percentile).
The honest limits. Below 3 falls short of the conventional threshold for financial health; below 1 signals acute stress. Schools carrying little or no building debt have the viability ratio dropped and the other weights re-normalized. The CFI is computed from IPEDS FY2022-23 and lags the current year by two to three years. It is calculated for public (GASB) and private nonprofit (FASB) institutions. Private for-profit colleges report under a different FASB standard with no comparable net-asset or reserve concept, so they get an operating margin, tuition dependency and revenue composition but no Composite Financial Index. Branch campuses that report finances at a parent or system level can show distorted ratios. Where a branch, online division or other child unit files no IPEDS finance survey of its own, its profile shows the parent or system's figures, labeled as such and left out of rankings and peer percentiles so the same finances are never counted twice. It is for informational benchmarking, not a credit rating, and not financial advice.
Financial Resilience Score
What it is. The 0–100 gauge on each profile. It is a class rank, not a health grade: it says how a school's per-student finances compare with its own peer group. 90 does not mean "90% healthy". It means "near the top of this group". A school can score high in a weak group, and a strong school can score middling in an elite one.
How it relates to the Financial Health Index. They are two different measurements and they can disagree, so read them together rather than as one verdict. The Resilience Score is a peer-relative ranking of per-student resource levels. The Financial Health Index is an absolute CFI-style score of the institution's own balance sheet and operating result, computed without reference to peers. A school with modest resources per student can still run a sound balance sheet, and a well-resourced one can still post an operating loss. Across the 2,821 institutions that carry both, the two are close to uncorrelated (r = 0.06), which is what you would expect from measures of different things, not a sign that one of them is wrong.
How it is built. Up to three per-student measures from the IPEDS finance filing. Each is turned into a percentile inside the school's peer group, and the score is the average of the percentiles it has. Higher is stronger. No weighting, no adjustment, no hidden inputs:
- Endowment per undergraduate, the cushion behind each student.
- Net tuition revenue per FTE, what it actually collects per student after discounts.
- Instructional spend per FTE, what it puts back into teaching per student.
Real example: how Vermont gets a 90
| Input | Vermont | Peer median | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|
| Endowment per undergraduate | $71,130 | $13,300 | 96 |
| Net tuition revenue per student | $23,110 | $8,592 | 97 |
| Instructional spend per student | $14,705 | $10,804 | 77 |
That is the whole calculation. It also shows why the components are published next to the score: Vermont's strength is on the revenue side (an endowment more than five times the peer median, and near-top net tuition), while instructional spend sits at the 77th percentile. The gap between a 97 on revenue and a 77 on spending is the conversation the score exists to start.
Vermont reports all three inputs, which makes it the minority case: most schools are scored on two, because they report no endowment. See the limits below.
The honest limits. Most scores are built from two inputs, not three, and that is the norm rather than the exception. Of the 5,787 institutions in the tool, 5,691 carry a score and 96 are suppressed for reporting none of the inputs. Of those 5,691, 3,356 (59%) are scored on two inputs and 2,335 on all three. The missing input is always the same one: endowment per undergraduate. Every for-profit lacks it, which is faithful rather than a gap, since they hold no endowment; the rest are publics and nonprofits whose endowment is not in the filing. A two-input score and a three-input score look identical on the gauge, so check the components shown beneath it.
This also bites inside a group: in 32 of the 70 groups, some schools are scored on three inputs and others on two. Where that happens the scores are ranked on the same scale but are not built from the same measures, so a close gap between two schools in a mixed group is weaker evidence than the same gap in a group where everyone reports the same things.
And because it is a rank, the same dollars produce very different scores in different peer groups. For an absolute read on financial strength, use the Financial Health Index instead.
Structural closure-risk index
What it is. A 0–100 index where higher means more structural pressure. It screens for the financial and demographic strain that has historically come before closures and mergers. It is not a prediction that any school will close, not a credit rating, and not a forecast.
How it is built. Four signals. Each is converted to its own 0–100 pressure reading on a fixed, published scale, and the index is the plain average of whichever are available. At least two must be present, otherwise the score is suppressed:
| Signal | Scores 0 pressure at | Scores 100 pressure at |
|---|---|---|
| Operating margin, did the year end in the black | +10% margin | −5% margin |
| Months of cushion, how long it could run on reserves | 6 months | 0 months |
| Tuition dependency, share of revenue from tuition | 0% of revenue | 85% or more |
| Enrollment cliff, projected change in the home state's high-school graduates through 2041 | +5% growth | −20% decline |
Real example: how Vermont gets a 32
| Signal | Vermont | Pressure |
|---|---|---|
| Operating margin | +18.4% | 0 |
| Months of cushion | 6.6 months | 0 |
| Tuition dependency | 38.4% of revenue | 45.2 |
| Enrollment cliff (Vermont) | −15.3% by 2041 | 81.2 |
The pressure readings are carried unrounded and only the final index is rounded, so 38.4% ÷ 85% = 45.2 rather than a flat 45. Rounding each reading first would give 31.5 and still land on 32, but the arithmetic above is the one the tool actually runs.
The two money signals score zero pressure: Vermont's margin and cushion are both better than the scale's best case, so they are floored at 0. All 32 points come from structure, not from this year's books. It leans on tuition for 38% of revenue, and its home state is projected to lose 15.3% of its high-school graduates by 2041. That is the point of a structural index: it reads the pressures building around a school that a healthy income statement will not show you.
The honest limits. Equal weights are a choice, not a finding: we have no evidence that these four pressures matter equally, and we do not pretend otherwise. The scale endpoints are judgment calls, published above so you can disagree with them. Both money signals come from FY2022-23 filings, and the cliff is a projection to 2041. It is a signal to investigate, never a verdict.
Graduation vs. completion
What it is. Two different measures of student success, because the federal government measures it two different ways, on different students, over different time windows. They are not directly comparable, and a school can look very different on each. We show both, side by side, on every profile.
Graduation rate, first-time, full-time
The conventional headline rate, from the IPEDS Graduation Rate Survey (College Scorecard C150_4 / C100_4). It counts students who started full-time as first-time freshmen in a fall term seeking a bachelor's degree, and asks what share earned that degree at the same school within a set window:
- 6-year (150% of normal time), the standard reported graduation rate.
- 4-year (100% of normal time), the stricter "on-time" rate, which runs well below the 6-year figure because many students take a fifth or sixth year.
It leaves out part-time entrants, transfer-ins, and anyone who finishes elsewhere.
Completion rate, all students (8-yr)
The broader measure, from IPEDS Outcome Measures (College Scorecard OMAWDP8_ALL). It counts all entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, and asks what share earned any degree or certificate at the school within 8 years. Because it counts the part-time and transfer students the graduation rate leaves out, it is often higher at the same school.
Real example: three correct answers for one school (Harvard University)
| Measure | Rate | Who it counts |
|---|---|---|
| Graduation rate, 6-year | 97.6% | First-time, full-time freshmen |
| Graduation rate, 4-year ("on time") | 55.7% | The same students, stricter window |
| Completion rate, 8-year | 98.6% | All entering undergraduates, any credential |
97.6%, 55.7% and 98.6% are all true of the same school in the same year. The 42-point gap between the 6-year and 4-year rates is not a data error, it is how many students take a fifth year. Anyone quoting one of these without saying which one is telling you very little.
Both families are reported by the U.S. Department of Education and lag the current year by roughly two to three years.
Policy-exposure scenarios
What it is. Four signals modelling how a school could be affected by the 2025 federal budget law. Read them as "here is the size of the exposure if this lands as written". They are scenario estimates, not current law, and not a bill anyone has received.
The 2025 law sets an excise tax on large private endowments, at a rate that steps up with endowment per student. We show the rate a school would face. Only private nonprofit institutions with at least 3,000 students are in scope, and we publish the metric only where the rate is above zero, so a blank means not exposed. Tiers, by endowment per student: $500k = 1.4%, $750k = 4%, $2M = 8%.
Real example: Princeton University
Princeton holds $3,751,502 of endowment per full-time-equivalent student across 8,898 students. That clears the top tier ($2M), so its modelled rate is 8%. It is private, nonprofit and well over the 3,000-student floor, so it is in scope. Vermont is public, so this metric is blank on its profile: public universities are exempt. Only 16 of the 5,787 institutions in the tool are exposed at all.
Limit: Treasury defines the official student count its own way. We use endowment per FTE as the proxy, so a school near a tier boundary could land in a different tier than we show.
The 2025 law winds down the Grad PLUS loan. The question is how much a school's graduate borrowing depends on it today. We answer straight from federal disbursement data, with no modelling: Grad PLUS dollars divided by all graduate federal loan dollars (unsubsidized + Grad PLUS). Shown only for schools with Grad PLUS dollars above zero.
Real example: the University of Vermont
43.8% of Vermont's graduate federal loan dollars come from Grad PLUS, which is higher than 80% of the schools that report the signal. Its average Grad PLUS loan is $31,483, so those borrowers were reaching well above the unsubsidized cap. That is the size of the exposure, not a prediction of lost revenue: it says 43.8% of graduate loan volume runs through a program set to wind down, and the school would need another answer for it.
From July 1, 2026 the law caps Parent PLUS borrowing at $20,000 a year ($65,000 total per student). We show how far a school's average Parent PLUS loan already sits above that cap. Shown only where the average already exceeds it, so a blank means the average is under the cap.
Real example: the University of Vermont
Vermont's average Parent PLUS loan is $29,833. The new cap is $20,000.
That $9,833 is financing that has to come from somewhere else once the cap applies: private loans, family savings, or institutional aid. It is an exposure figure, not a forecast, and it is an average, so individual families sit above and below it.
This one is an opportunity, not a threat. From July 1, 2026 the law's new Workforce Pell Grant extends Pell to short-term workforce programs (150–600 clock hours over 8–15 weeks), subject to state-workforce-board and accreditor approval and to job-placement, completion and earnings guardrails. We show the share of a school's measured credentials that are undergraduate certificates, the tier that becomes eligible. A higher share means more of what the school already produces could draw new federal grant money, and the upside is biggest where Pell reliance is already high.
Real example: Miami Dade College
27.1% of Miami Dade's measured credentials are undergraduate certificates, across 46,182 undergraduates, and 49.7% of its students already receive Pell. Read together: roughly a quarter of what it awards sits in the newly eligible tier, at a school where half the students are Pell-eligible. Vermont is blank here because it awards no credentials in that tier.
Limit: Scorecard's certificate level covers certificates of many lengths, so the statutory 150–600-hour window is a subset of this tier. Read it as an upper bound, not a count of qualifying programs. Shown only for schools above a minimum completions floor.
Field-of-study analytics (CIP)
What it is. The "Top fields of study" section on each profile, which asks whether a school's individual majors pay off. It rolls up College Scorecard Field-of-Study data to the CIP 2-digit family and, when you expand a field, drills into its individual 4-digit-CIP majors. That is the finest grain ED publishes, since there is no 6-digit earnings series.
Completions come from eight dated yearly releases (2014-15 through 2022-23). Median earnings one and four years after completion are completion-weighted averages of program medians. ED moved debt and the earnings-threshold counts out of the latest dated files, so those come from the Most-Recent-Cohorts snapshot. Each 4-digit major links to a national field-of-study page ranking every U.S. college offering it. Major-level figures appear only where enough graduates exist to clear ED's privacy threshold, so many cells read "–".
- Earnings-premium test and the 2-of-3 mechanic. Compares a program's median earnings four years out against the ACS median for a high-school graduate (undergraduate credentials) or a bachelor's holder (graduate credentials) in the school's state. The 2 of 3 yrs badge flags a program that came in below that benchmark in two of its latest three reported cohort-years, which is the statutory trigger under the 2025 federal earnings-premium test (effective July 1, 2026), under which a program can lose Title IV eligibility. Indicative only: ED's official determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.
- Threshold pass-rate (% > threshold). ED's own share of a program's graduates earning above the federal earnings threshold: the above-threshold count divided by the measured-earnings cohort. This is the literal "do-no-harm" pass rate the 2025 test refers to. ED publishes it sparsely and in different measurement windows across releases (the 4-year window appears only in the most-recent snapshot; 5- and 1-year windows appear in other files), so we pool all nine Field-of-Study releases and report each program from the best available window: 4-year preferred, then 5-year, then 1-year. A small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. Every cell is real ED-published data with no imputation, and pooling raises coverage from roughly one program in five to about five in six.
- Debt-to-earnings. Median student debt at completion divided by median earnings four years out, a gainful-employment-style value ratio. Below 0.5× shows green, above 1.0× red.
Real example: the University of Vermont
Across Vermont's programs, median debt at completion is $20,951 against median earnings ten years out of $62,472, a school-wide debt-to-earnings ratio of 0.34×. Its median program-level debt-to-earnings rate (the annual payment as a share of earnings, ED's gainful-employment measure, where above 8% is flagged) is 0.65%. Both sit comfortably inside the safe band, which is what you would expect at a school whose graduates out-earn the peer median. The signal matters most where it does not.
Field-demand outlook
What it is. A forward-looking read on whether the jobs a school's degrees feed are growing or shrinking. It is the projected 10-year (2024-34) change in U.S. employment for those occupations, from BLS Employment Projections, mapped through the NCES CIP-SOC crosswalk and weighted by the school's own program mix. The benchmark is the U.S. all-occupations projection of +3.1%.
Real example: the University of Vermont
Weighted across everything Vermont awards, the occupations its graduates feed are projected to grow +5.1% over 2024-34, against the +3.1% national all-occupations benchmark. So its program mix points at slightly faster-growing work than the average job. That places it at the 65th percentile of its peer group. It is a broad-field signal, not a placement rate: it says nothing about whether any individual graduate gets one of those jobs.
Three fields are excluded because their crosswalk maps to "any job" and carries no coherent occupational signal: 05 Area/Ethnic/Gender Studies, 24 Liberal Arts & Humanities, and 30 Multi/Interdisciplinary. Excluding them is a judgment call, and it means a school heavily weighted toward those fields has a thinner signal here than the number suggests. It is indicative, and never a guarantee.
Risk flags
What it is. Short warnings that surface a pattern one number alone would hide: multi-year enrollment decline, heavy debt-to-earnings burden, or an unusually large endowment draw for the school's size, for example. Flags are fixed rules, not judgment and not AI. Each one is either true of the data or it is not. They are color-coded amber (watch) or red (acute), and shown only when the underlying data supports them.
Real example: the University of Vermont
Vermont carries no flags at all, and its profile shows none. That is the normal case and worth saying plainly: an empty flag list means no rule fired, not that the check was skipped. Flags are meant to be rare. If one appears, it is pointing at something specific in the published data, and the profile names which rule fired and why.
They are signals to investigate, not verdicts, and a flag is never a claim about an institution's future.
Role lenses
The profile view offers four optional lenses: Enrollment VP, CFO, President, and Board / Trustee. A lens never changes a single number. It reorders the metric cards, stars (★) the measures that role watches most, and opens on the most relevant tab. It is presentation over identical data, so two colleagues can read the same profile through the lens that matches their job.
Rankings
The leaderboards rank on one disclosed metric at a time. No weighting, no composite, no editorial judgment. Schools that do not report the metric are left out. To stop tiny programs distorting the lists, balance-sheet rankings (financial health, endowment per student) require at least 1,000 undergraduates, and enrollment-growth lists require a meaningful starting base. Each list states its own filter in a note. These are data rankings, not endorsements.
Value, ROI & the OBBBA screen
Two sections of the tool derive a number rather than republish one, so both are set out here in full.
Value & ROI is one ratio. Years to recoup = (net price × 4) ÷ (median earnings 10 years after entry − the median earnings of a high-school graduate in the same state). Net price and earnings come from the College Scorecard; the high-school baseline comes from the Census Bureau's American Community Survey, taken state by state so a school is measured against the labor market its graduates actually enter. A school is listed only if it enrolls at least 400 undergraduates and its earnings premium is positive; where the premium is zero or negative the ratio has no meaning and the school is left out rather than shown as infinite. It assumes four years to a degree and a flat premium over time, neither of which is true for every student, which is exactly why it is published as one disclosed ratio and not as a score.
The OBBBA Compliance Watchdog is a screen, not a determination. The 2025 budget law adds a program-level earnings-premium standard from July 1, 2026: a program can lose federal loan eligibility if its graduates' median earnings fall below what a typical high-school graduate earns in the same state (for undergraduate credentials) or a typical bachelor's graduate earns (for graduate credentials). We apply that comparison to each 4-digit-CIP program a school reports in the College Scorecard Field of Study files, and rank schools by the share of completions in programs that fall below their benchmark, weighted by completions rather than by program count so a large failing program counts for more than a small one. Schools with fewer than four programs carrying published earnings, or fewer than 400 undergraduates, are not screened at all. This is our arithmetic on public data, run years before the Department of Education publishes its own; it is directional, it is not the official calculation, and it is not a legal determination about any institution.
Limits & what this is not
- It is not a credit rating or investment advice. The CFI tracks ratios similar to those agencies use, but it is not a rating and carries no opinion on any security.
- It is not a "best colleges" ranking. There is no overall quality score and no weighting of one metric against another.
- The data lags. Scorecard figures trail the current year by about 2 years; IPEDS finance by 2 to 3. Every metric is labeled with its source year, so check the label before quoting it.
- Most scores are ranks, not grades. Financial Resilience and the percentile standings say where a school sits among its peers. They do not say the peer group itself is healthy.
- System reporting can distort. Branch campuses that file finances at a parent/system level may show ratios that do not reflect the individual campus. Where a child unit files no finance of its own, its profile shows the parent/system figures, labeled as such and left out of rankings and peer percentiles.
- Small cohorts are suppressed. Federal privacy rules withhold earnings and debt for small programs. Those cells show as missing, never as zero.
- Blank does not mean clean. On the Single Audit metrics especially, an empty value means the school filed no audit, not that the audit found nothing.
Quick answers
Seventeen public sources: College Scorecard (2024-25), IPEDS (FY2022-23 finance), BLS Employment Projections (2024-34), WICHE enrollment projections, the FSA Direct Loan Dashboard and FSA financial-responsibility data (composite scores and the Heightened Cash Monitoring list), Census ACS, the NSF NCSES Higher Education R&D survey (FY2023), NIH RePORTER (FY2024), USAspending federal award data (FY2024, obligations by agency), IRS Form 990 filings (private-nonprofit finances), the federal Clery Act campus-safety collection (2024), and the Department of Education Equity in Athletics (EADA) survey, plus OpenAlex, Wikipedia and Wikidata for research output, pageviews and founding year. No proprietary data and no live API calls. Some metrics are projections or 2025-budget-law scenarios, flagged as such.
70 groups, built from two facts: Carnegie type and sector (public, private nonprofit, private for-profit). Percentiles and medians are computed only inside a school's own group, so comparisons are like-for-like. A group needs at least 10 schools; the few that fall short are widened to region-and-sector, then to sector alone. Every profile names its group and its size.
The NACUBO Composite Financial Index: primary reserve (35%), viability (35%), return on net assets (20%) and operating result (10%) on a −4 to 10 scale. It is an absolute score, not a rank. Informational benchmarking, not a credit rating.
It is a class rank, not a health grade. Up to three per-student IPEDS finance measures (endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per FTE, instructional spend per FTE) are each turned into a percentile inside the school's peer group, and the score is the average of the percentiles the school has. Example: the University of Vermont ranks 96th, 97th and 77th on all three inputs, and (96+97+77)/3 = 90, so it scores 90. Most schools are scored on two: 3,356 of the 5,691 scored institutions report no endowment. Higher means stronger relative to peers, not healthy in absolute terms.
Built from the College Scorecard release of June 10, 2026; Scorecard figures lag about 2 years, IPEDS finance 2 to 3 (the CFI is from FY2022-23). The source year is labeled on every metric.
They count different students. The graduation rate (IPEDS Graduation Rate Survey) counts only first-time, full-time students who earn a bachelor's at the school, within 6 years (150% of normal time, the headline) or 4 years (100%, "on-time"). The completion rate (IPEDS Outcome Measures) is broader: all entering undergraduates, including part-time and transfer-ins, who earn any credential within 8 years. Different students, different windows, so the two are not comparable. We show both.
No. No overall quality score and no editorial judgment. Leaderboards rank one disclosed metric at a time. A transparent starting point, not an endorsement.
Because the school did not report it, the federal privacy threshold suppressed it, or the metric is published only where it applies (endowment tax only for exposed schools, the Parent PLUS gap only where the average tops the cap). A blank is never a zero, and on the Single Audit metrics it is never a clean result.
Yes. Private for-profit institutions are included with their operating margin, tuition dependency and revenue composition, from the IPEDS for-profit finance survey (FASB, FY2022-23). They get no Composite Financial Index, because the for-profit accounting standard has no comparable net-asset or reserve concept to build it on.
Disclaimer. This tool is for informational benchmarking and education planning only. It is not financial, investment, accreditation, or credit advice. Data may lag, be revised, or contain errors, and all figures are point-in-time snapshots of the most recent public releases. The financial-responsibility composite score and the Heightened Cash Monitoring flag are reproduced from U.S. Department of Education data and are not Ibex assessments or predictions of closure. Research output (OpenAlex), Wikipedia pageviews and founding year (Wikidata) come from open, community-maintained sources matched by name and shown only where a confident match exists. Several metrics are projections (BLS field-demand outlook, WICHE enrollment cliff) or 2025-budget-law scenarios (endowment-tax exposure, Grad PLUS exposure, the Parent PLUS cap gap and Workforce Pell exposure), and the closure-risk score is a structural index, not a prediction. Worked examples on this page use figures published on those institutions' own profiles in this tool, drawn from the public sources named above.
Source: College Scorecard (2024-25) & IPEDS finance (FY2022-23), U.S. Department of Education; BLS Employment Projections (2024-34); WICHE "Knocking at the College Door" (11th ed.); FSA Direct Loan Dashboard (AY2025-26 YTD, AY2024-25 full year where not yet reported) and FSA financial-responsibility data (composite scores AY2022-23, Heightened Cash Monitoring March 2026); NSF NCSES HERD (FY2023); NIH RePORTER (FY2024); the Clery Act campus-safety collection (2024) and EADA athletics survey, U.S. Department of Education; U.S. Census ACS; and OpenAlex, Wikipedia and Wikidata (open community sources). Compiled by Ibex Insights.
