Kansas Health Science University

Net surplus as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): (total revenues − total expenses) ÷ total revenues. A surplus above 4% is strong; a thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

Tuition & fees as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.

Institutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition & fee revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB): allowances applied to tuition ÷ (net tuition revenue + those allowances) – the tuition-discount rate enrollment leaders track, i.e. the share of sticker tuition handed back as institutional aid. Private nonprofit institutions only; public (GASB) institutions report tuition differently and are not shown. The national private-college average is roughly 56% (NACUBO); above ~60% signals heavy price competition.

State appropriations as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Material for public institutions; ~0 for private.

Institutional support, central administration, executive management, governance, general administration, fundraising and (under FASB rules) operation & maintenance of plant, as a share of total expenses (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB). Private nonprofit institutions only: public (GASB) institutions report functional expenses on a different basis and frequently consolidate large hospital and auxiliary operations, which makes a comparable ratio unreliable, so they are not shown. Because FASB folds plant operations into institutional support, this runs higher than a narrow 'central-office' figure, and schools with sizable hospital or auxiliary operations show a lower ratio as those costs enlarge total expenses. An informational benchmark of administrative intensity, compared within the peer group, not a measure of waste or quality.

How many months of operating expenses the institution could cover from expendable reserves (IPEDS FY2022-23 primary reserve ratio × 12). About 5 months, one semester, is the accreditor benchmark for solid footing; below ~3 months is thin. A negative figure means expendable reserves are themselves negative.

Expendable reserves ÷ plant-related debt (IPEDS FY2022-23 viability ratio). At or above 1.25×, reserves fully cover long-term debt. Shown blank when the institution carries little or no plant debt.

Change in total net assets ÷ net assets (IPEDS FY2022-23) – whether the institution grew wealthier over the year. 2–4% is adequate; above 4% is strong.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

Instruction spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). 'Where the money goes' context, reported here for private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the functional split is comparable; not computed for public or for-profit institutions. Higher is not automatically better; research universities and those with hospitals or large auxiliaries spread spending across other functions.

Student-services spending (admissions, registrar, student life, counseling) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.

Academic-support spending (libraries, academic computing, deans' offices) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Context, not a quality measure.

Research spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only; near zero at teaching-focused colleges and sizeable at research universities. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.

The U.S. Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, a -1.0 to +3.0 measure of an institution's solvency built from its audited finances. 1.5 and above passes; 1.0-1.4 is a zone needing oversight; below 1.0 fails and can trigger letter-of-credit or cash-monitoring requirements. ED computes it only for private non-profit and proprietary schools, so it is reported only where scored. Higher is safer. Banded against the school's peer group.

Share of the institution's graduate federal loan dollars (Grad Unsubsidized + Grad PLUS) that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 1, 2026, alongside new caps on graduate borrowing. A higher share means more of the school's graduate students rely on borrowing that will no longer exist above the unsubsidized cap. Source: U.S. Dept. of Education / Federal Student Aid Direct Loan Dashboard, primarily award year 2025-26 (year-to-date through Q2, December 2025), the most current federal data; schools not yet reporting Grad PLUS in 2025-26 retain their most recent complete year (2024-25), shown per school. The reliance share is stable across the two vintages. Shown only for schools with Grad PLUS originations; an exposure signal, not a forecast of revenue loss. Federal Student Aid publishes this dashboard quarterly and schools report on different schedules, so each school is shown at its own most recent reported period. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.

Average Grad PLUS loan per recipient (FSA Direct Loan Dashboard, award year 2025-26 year-to-date through Q2, with 2024-25 full-year retained where 2025-26 is not yet reported). The 2025 budget law eliminates Grad PLUS for new borrowers from July 1, 2026 and caps unsubsidized graduate borrowing at $20,500/year, so this is the average per-borrower amount that will no longer be available above that cap. Paired with Grad PLUS exposure (the institution's reliance share), it is the depth axis of the Grad PLUS shock: how much each affected borrower stands to lose. Shown only where Grad PLUS was originated. Federal Student Aid publishes this dashboard quarterly and schools report on different schedules, so each school is shown at its own most recent reported period. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.

An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.

Obligations reported to USAspending.gov for FY2024 (Oct 2023 to Sep 2024), summed across every awarding agency. This is money committed, not money spent, so it will not equal the audited 'Federal awards expended' figure and the two should not be subtracted from one another. Negative amounts (agencies reclaiming prior commitments) are excluded.

A count of awarding agencies with positive FY2024 obligations. Neither high nor low is inherently better: a community college funded solely by the Department of Education is behaving normally, while a research university typically draws on ten or more agencies.

The largest agency's FY2024 obligations as a share of the institution's total positive federal obligations. Read it as concentration, not risk: most teaching colleges sit near 100% because nearly all their federal money is Department of Education student aid.

The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of total revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss; the same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students; every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

A 0-100 severity score built only from published federal determinations: the Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, its Heightened Cash Monitoring list, and the going-concern, material-weakness, material-noncompliance, modified-opinion and repeat-finding results of the school's Single Audit. It is deliberately NOT a model: every component is something a regulator or an independent auditor put in writing. Components are scored only where they exist, and the score is their weighted average, so a school assessed on two signals sits on the same scale as one assessed on seven. Schools with neither a composite score nor a Single Audit on file are omitted rather than shown as clean: ED does not compute a composite score for public institutions, and no audit on file means nobody looked, not that nothing was found. Read it alongside the structural-risk index, which is the tool's own forward-looking model rather than a record of findings. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.

Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.

Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality; online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.

Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.

Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

How many institutions of the same type (same Carnegie classification and control, i.e. the schools competing for the same students) sit within roughly 100 miles. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks; a low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting leverage.

The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2019-23, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.

Criminal offenses reported on campus in 2024 (murder, manslaughter, the four sex-offense categories, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor-vehicle theft and arson) per 1,000 students, from the school's federal Clery Act filing. Counts and enrollment are summed across the institution's campuses. A higher number does not always mean a more dangerous school: thorough reporting and dense residential campuses raise it. Lower is generally safer. Banded against the school's peer group.

Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age; the U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.