Kansas Health Science University

Net surplus as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): (total revenues − total expenses) ÷ total revenues. A surplus above 4% is strong; a thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks.

Tuition & fees as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.

Institutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition & fee revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB): allowances applied to tuition ÷ (net tuition revenue + those allowances) — the tuition-discount rate enrollment leaders track, i.e. the share of sticker tuition handed back as institutional aid. Private nonprofit institutions only; public (GASB) institutions report tuition differently and are not shown. The national private-college average is roughly 56% (NACUBO); above ~60% signals heavy price competition.

State appropriations as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Material for public institutions; ~0 for private.

Institutional support — central administration, executive management, governance, general administration, fundraising and (under FASB rules) operation & maintenance of plant — as a share of total expenses (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB). Private nonprofit institutions only: public (GASB) institutions report functional expenses on a different basis and frequently consolidate large hospital and auxiliary operations, which makes a comparable ratio unreliable, so they are not shown. Because FASB folds plant operations into institutional support, this runs higher than a narrow 'central-office' figure, and schools with sizable hospital or auxiliary operations show a lower ratio as those costs enlarge total expenses. An informational benchmark of administrative intensity, compared within the peer group — not a measure of waste or quality.

How many months of operating expenses the institution could cover from expendable reserves (IPEDS FY2022-23 primary reserve ratio × 12). About 5 months — one semester — is the accreditor benchmark for solid footing; below ~3 months is thin. A negative figure means expendable reserves are themselves negative.

Expendable reserves ÷ plant-related debt (IPEDS FY2022-23 viability ratio). At or above 1.25×, reserves fully cover long-term debt. Shown blank when the institution carries little or no plant debt.

Change in total net assets ÷ net assets (IPEDS FY2022-23) — whether the institution grew wealthier over the year. 2–4% is adequate; above 4% is strong.

Share of the institution's graduate federal loan dollars (Grad Unsubsidized + Grad PLUS) that came from Grad PLUS — the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 1, 2026, alongside new caps on graduate borrowing. A higher share means more of the school's graduate students rely on borrowing that will no longer exist above the unsubsidized cap. Source: U.S. Dept. of Education / Federal Student Aid Direct Loan Dashboard — primarily award year 2025-26 (year-to-date through Q2, December 2025), the most current federal data; schools not yet reporting Grad PLUS in 2025-26 retain their most recent complete year (2024-25), shown per school. The reliance share is stable across the two vintages. Shown only for schools with Grad PLUS originations; an exposure signal, not a forecast of revenue loss.

Average Grad PLUS loan per recipient (FSA Direct Loan Dashboard — award year 2025-26 year-to-date through Q2, with 2024-25 full-year retained where 2025-26 is not yet reported). The 2025 budget law eliminates Grad PLUS for new borrowers from July 1, 2026 and caps unsubsidized graduate borrowing at $20,500/year — so this is the average per-borrower amount that will no longer be available above that cap. Paired with Grad PLUS exposure (the institution's reliance share), it is the depth axis of the Grad PLUS shock: how much each affected borrower stands to lose. Shown only where Grad PLUS was originated.

An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers — a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating.

Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age; the U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment.