Institute of Buddhist Studies

Value of endowment assets at the end of the fiscal year (IPEDS finance, FY2022-23: FASB F2H02 / GASB F1H02), co-vintage with the other finance-year metrics on this page. Usually filed at the parent campus: most branch and online sub-units show the parent's endowment as a clearly labeled inherited value, and a few report a small endowment of their own alongside it. Multi-year trend from College Scorecard, shown only where it matches the IPEDS filing.

Average monthly salary of full-time faculty, as reported to IPEDS.

Operating result as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): the IPEDS net operating revenue ratio, the same figure the Financial Health Index uses. It leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and additions to endowment, and for private nonprofits counts only unrestricted revenue, so a one-year swing in investment markets or a building grant does not read as an operating surplus or deficit. For-profit institutions: (revenue excluding investment return − total expenses) ÷ that revenue. A surplus above 4% is strong. A thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks. Values beyond ±100% are not shown.

Tuition and fees as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23), the same revenue base as the operating margin, so the two combine correctly in the enrollment-loss scenario. Operating revenue leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and endowment additions, and for private nonprofits counts unrestricted revenue only, so this share can run a few points above the tuition slice of the revenue-mix chart, which divides by every revenue source. For public institutions the base is the IPEDS consolidated figure, which can include component units such as foundations and university health systems, so a public with a large hospital shows lower dependency than its campus budget alone would. Not shown where the operating margin is not shown. Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.

Institutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition and fee revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB): tuition allowances funded by the school itself (endowment, gifts and other institutional money) ÷ (net tuition revenue + all allowances applied to tuition). Pell, other federal, state and local grants are left out of the numerator because they are not the school's discount. Private nonprofit institutions only. Public (GASB) institutions report tuition differently and are not shown. Also not shown where a school books most of its own aid as scholarship expense instead of as a tuition allowance, because this measure cannot see that aid. The rate covers all students, undergraduate and graduate, so it runs well below NACUBO's widely quoted average, which covers first-time, full-time freshmen only.

State appropriations as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Material for public institutions, ~0 for private.

Institutional support, central administration, executive management, governance, general administration, fundraising and (under FASB rules) operation and maintenance of plant, as a share of total expenses (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB). Private nonprofit institutions only: public (GASB) institutions report functional expenses on a different basis and frequently consolidate large hospital and auxiliary operations, which makes a comparable ratio unreliable, so they are not shown. Because FASB folds plant operations into institutional support, this runs higher than a narrow 'central-office' figure, and schools with sizable hospital or auxiliary operations show a lower ratio as those costs enlarge total expenses. An informational benchmark of administrative intensity, compared within the peer group, not a measure of waste or quality.

How many months of operating expenses the institution could cover from expendable reserves (IPEDS FY2022-23 primary reserve ratio × 12). About 5 months, one semester, is the accreditor benchmark for solid footing. Below ~3 months is thin. A negative figure means expendable reserves are themselves negative.

Change in total net assets ÷ net assets (IPEDS FY2022-23), whether the institution grew wealthier over the year. 2–4% is adequate, and above 4% is strong.

End-of-year endowment ÷ 12-month FTE enrollment, endowment wealth per full-time-equivalent student. The FTE-correct companion to endowment-per-undergraduate. FTE counts graduate and part-time load, so research universities look less wealthy on this basis than on a headcount basis. Both sides are FY2022-23: the denominator is the FTE count from the endowment's own year (2022-23), not the newer FTE figure shown in the enrollment section, so dividing the two numbers on this page will not reproduce this one. Where one campus files finance for sister campuses that share its federal ID, the endowment covers all of them, so their FTE is counted too.

Instruction spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). 'Where the money goes' context, reported here for private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the functional split is comparable. It is not computed for public or for-profit institutions. Higher is not automatically better. Research universities and those with hospitals or large auxiliaries spread spending across other functions.

Student-services spending (admissions, registrar, student life, counseling) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.

Academic-support spending (libraries, academic computing, deans' offices) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Context, not a quality measure.

Research spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. It runs near zero at teaching-focused colleges and sizeable at research universities. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.

Average salary paid to full professors, the most senior instructional rank (IPEDS Human Resources, 2023-24, 9-month equated). It reflects both the school's pay scale and the seniority of its faculty, and it is a sizeable share of academic cost. Banded against the school's peer group.

An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. For-profit institutions report no operating-cushion figure and nearly all of them run close to 100% tuition dependency, so their index rests on at most three signals and reads higher than a nonprofit's; compare a for-profit with other for-profits. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.

The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of the same operating revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss. The same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. Where the surplus is larger than all tuition revenue, no enrollment loss alone produces a deficit and no figure is shown. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.

Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality. Online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.

Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.

Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

How many institutions in the same Ibex peer group, the schools most likely to compete for the same students, sit within roughly 100 miles. For most schools the peer group is the same Carnegie classification and control. Schools in small classes sit in broader fallback groups by level, sector or region (see Peer groups in the methodology), and for them the count is looser. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks. A low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting power.

The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2020-24, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.

Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age. The U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

Average monthly views of the institution's English-Wikipedia article over the trailing 12 months (Wikimedia REST API), counting human readers only (automated crawlers excluded) and following a renamed article to its current title. A top-of-funnel public-attention proxy: how often people look the school up. Reported only where a matching Wikipedia article exists. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Compound annual growth rate of net tuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student over the tracked years, in nominal dollars (not adjusted for inflation). This is what the institution collects per student after its own discounts, not the net price a family pays (see Net price for that). A rising rate strengthens revenue but can strain affordability and yield, so it is shown as context rather than scored. Compared with the school's peer group. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.