Universidad Central Del Caribe

Bayamon, PR · official site ↗

Private nonprofitSpecial Focus: Medical Schools/CentersVery small
8
Fin. Resilience
Resilience score

vs. 25 peers in its group

How is this calculated?

Universidad Central Del Caribe is a private nonprofit institution in Bayamon, PR, classified by Carnegie as “Special Focus: Medical Schools/Centers.”

It enrolls about 90 undergraduates and is benchmarked here against 25 peer institutions (Special Focus: Medical Schools/Centers · Private nonprofit).

On Ibex's Financial Resilience score it rates 8 out of 100 within that peer group, a transparent composite of endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per student, and instructional spend per student.

That score and the financial health index below are not the same measure and can disagree: the resilience score ranks per-student resource levels against this peer group, while the financial health index scores the institution's own balance sheet and operating result on the CFI scale, independent of peers. A school with modest resources per student can still run a sound balance sheet, and a wealthy one can still post an operating loss.

Its strongest standing relative to peers is completions in growing fields (100%, 89th percentile).

Its weakest is 3-yr cohort default rate (4.2%).

Ibex's cross-metric scan flags: Undergrad enrollment down 31% since 2016.

Peer group

Special Focus: Medical Schools/Centers · Private nonprofit

25 institutions

Undergrad enrollment down 31% since 2016
What changedlargest year-over-year moves
Graduation rate (6-yr · first-time, full-time) ▼ -32% 59.1% → 40% 2023→2024
In-state tuition & fees ▲ +20% $6,442 → $7,707 2023→2024
First-year retention ▼ -16% 84.6% → 71.4% 2023→2024
Pell Grant dollars ▲ +14% $343,368 → $391,460 2024→2025
Endowment (end of year) ▲ +13% $5.3M → $6M 2022→2023
Federal awards expended ▲ +10% $25.5M → $28.1M 2024→2025

Most recent single-year change in each tracked metric. Green = moved in this metric’s favorable direction, red = unfavorable, grey = size or context, not scored. Each row uses the latest pair of years that metric has, and federal collections release on different schedules, so the years differ from row to row: read the years on the row, not just the ranking. A single year is also not a trend, the multi-year series is on each metric’s card below.

How exposed Universidad Central Del Caribe is to the structural shifts reshaping higher ed: a composite structural-risk index plus the 2025 federal budget law’s endowment excise tax, Grad PLUS elimination, new Parent PLUS borrowing cap and new Workforce Pell short-term-credential opportunity, and the demographic enrollment cliff. Only signals that apply to this institution are shown.

Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.
25
Low
Grad PLUS exposureShare of the school's graduate federal loan dollars that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 2026 (FSA Direct Loan data). Higher = more graduate borrowing that will disappear above the new caps.
22%
Moderate exposure
Higher than 53% of schools nationally
AY2025-26 YTD (through Q2, Dec 2025)
Avg Grad PLUS loanAverage Grad PLUS loan per borrower (FSA). The 2025 law caps unsubsidized grad borrowing at $20,500/yr and ends Grad PLUS, this is the average per-student amount that vanishes above the cap. The depth half of the Grad PLUS shock; pair with Grad PLUS exposure (the reliance share).
$18,673
Half the cap+
Higher than 48% of schools nationally
AY2025-26 YTD (through Q2, Dec 2025)
Workforce Pell exposureShare of this school's measured credentials that are undergraduate certificates, the sub-associate tier the 2025 budget law's new Workforce Pell Grant makes Pell-eligible from July 2026 (short-term programs of 150–600 clock hours over 8–15 weeks). An opportunity signal: higher = more of what the school already produces could draw new federal grant aid. Source: College Scorecard Field-of-Study; an upper-bound proxy since the certificate tier spans varying lengths.
6.1%
Moderate
Higher than 16% of schools nationally

Indicative signals, not forecasts, see each metric’s definition and the methodology. Endowment-tax, Grad PLUS, Parent PLUS and Workforce Pell figures appear only where the institution is actually exposed; “nationally” compares against all schools that report each signal.

Turn these signals into action

Seeing exposure is step one. Ibex builds AI agents that monitor and act on exactly these pressures, explore an interactive demo. Live demos run real workflows; the rest are working mockups we build to your institution’s data.

8.1
on a −4 to 10 scale
Financial Health IndexStrong

NACUBO Composite Financial Index, the balance-sheet health score accreditors and institutional boards use to gauge financial health; bond-rating agencies track similar ratios. 69th percentile of 25 peers. Carries little or no plant debt, so the viability ratio is excluded and weights re-normalized.

Primary reserve 55%16.4 mo
Return on net assets 30%8.1%
Operating result 15%11.7%

Composite of four ratios on a strength-factor scale (−4 weak → 10 strong): below 3 falls short of the threshold for financial health, below 1 signals acute stress, and above 6 is strong. Computed from IPEDS FY2022-23, the most recent finance release (it lags the current year by 2–3 years). Branch campuses that report finances at a parent/system level can show distorted ratios. For informational benchmarking, not a credit rating or financial advice.

What an enrollment loss would do to the budgetTuition revenue falls with the students; every other revenue line and the entire cost base are held where they are. It measures the size of the hole a decline would open, not what the institution would end up reporting after it responded.

Tuition and fees fund 63% of this institution’s revenue, and it runs a 10.6% operating margin. It could lose about 17.0% of its enrollment before the surplus becomes a deficit, if nothing else changed.

4.7% operating margin after the loss, with costs unchanged

A deliberately simple counterfactual: net tuition per student and total costs stay where the latest IPEDS finance filing put them, so only the tuition line moves. No institution facing this would hold costs flat, which is the point, the figure is the gap that would have to be closed, not a forecast of the margin it would report. A school that responds by discounting harder to hold headcount converts the same problem into a net-price one, and it does not show up here.

Where the money comes from $25.3M total revenue · IPEDS FY2022-23

Tuition & fees is the largest single source at 63% of revenue.

Tuition & fees62.5%
Government grants & contracts22.2%
Other revenue10.3%
Investment return5.0%

Where each dollar of revenue comes from, as a share of total positive revenue. Sources are standardized across public (GASB) and private (FASB) reporting; a net investment loss in a down market is shown as 0% and excluded from the mix.

Which agencies fund this schoolThe share of this school's federal funding that comes from each awarding agency in FY2024. These are dollars agencies committed (obligations), not dollars the school spent, so the total will not match the audited federal-awards-expended figure elsewhere on this page. Matched to the school by its own SAM.gov Unique Entity ID. $4.6M obligated · FY2024

Health & Human Services is the largest single funder at 90%.

Health & Human Services90.4%
Education9.2%
Defense0.5%

Federal dollars each agency committed to this institution in FY2024, as a share of its total positive obligations (USAspending.gov). Obligations are money committed, not money spent, so this total will not match the audited “Federal awards expended” figure elsewhere on this page. Amounts an agency reclaimed during the year are excluded.

Average net price by family income After grant & scholarship aid · Scorecard 2024-25
$0–30K$6,180
$30–48K$7,597
$48–75K$6,247
$75–110K$13,642
$110K+$13,642

Average annual net price (total cost minus grant and scholarship aid) paid by federal-aid recipients in each family-income band. Lower-income bands often pay less where need-based aid is strong.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Net tuition revenue / FTETuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student after institutional aid/discounts, what tuition actually nets.Calculated from filings
Below peers
$29,678
10th percentile in peer grouppeer median $45,442
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)25 peers
▲ +24% steady
Instructional spend / FTESpending on instruction per FTE student, how much of the budget reaches the classroom.Calculated from filings
Below peers
$11,228
6th percentile in peer grouppeer median $23,678
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)25 peers
▲ +33% choppy
Endowment (end of year)Total endowment value at year end, long-term invested wealth that funds operations and cushions shocks.As filed
Below peers
$6M
30th percentile in peer grouppeer median $47.5M
higher is better
FY2022-2322 peers
▲ +97% steady
Value of endowment assets at the end of the fiscal year (IPEDS finance, FY2022-23: FASB F2H02 / GASB F1H02), co-vintage with the other finance-year metrics on this page. Usually filed at the parent campus: most branch and online sub-units show the parent's endowment as a clearly labeled inherited value, and a few report a small endowment of their own alongside it. Multi-year trend from College Scorecard, shown only where it matches the IPEDS filing.
In-state tuition & feesPublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead; sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Published in-state tuition and fees before aid (sticker price).As filed
$7,707
2024-25 (Scorecard)
▼ -26% choppy · turning
Out-of-state tuition & feesPublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead; sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Published out-of-state tuition and fees before aid (sticker price).As filed
$7,707
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Avg annual cost of attendancePublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead; sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Average total annual cost, tuition, fees and living costs, before aid.As filed
$14,642
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Avg monthly faculty salaryWhat the institution pays its faculty. Scored as higher-is-better because it tracks an institution's ability to attract and hold teaching staff. It also tracks local cost of living, so compare within a region before drawing a conclusion.Average monthly salary of full-time faculty (IPEDS) – a proxy for faculty investment.As filed
Below peers
$4,119
3rd percentile in peer grouppeer median $10,879
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)16 peers
Average monthly salary of full-time faculty, as reported to IPEDS.
Average net priceWhat students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly price families actually pay after grants and scholarships.As filed
$8,524
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Endowment per undergradEndowment divided by undergraduate headcount. The two numbers come from different collections and different years, so read it as an order of magnitude rather than a precise figure.Endowment divided by undergraduate headcount, endowment wealth behind each undergrad.Calculated from filings
$66,167
FY2022-23 endowment / 2024-25 enrollment
Two collections, two dates: IPEDS reports the endowment for fiscal 2022-23 and the College Scorecard reports the 2024-25 headcount it is divided by. Treat it as an order-of-magnitude comparison, not a to-the-dollar figure.
Net price, low-income families (under $30K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning under ~$30,000. Lower is better.As filed
$6,180
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn under about $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). This is what the neediest admitted students actually pay, often far below the sticker price. Read it beside the overall net price and the high-income net price: a low figure here signals strong need-based aid. Lower is better.
Net price, high-income families (over $110K)Net price for families earning over about $110,000, which is close to the unsubsidized cost. Deliberately not scored: a low figure can mean a genuinely inexpensive school, or a school discounting even its wealthiest applicants to fill seats. Its distance from the low-income net price is the informative part, and that gap is what the aid-gradient reading is built on.Average yearly cost after grant aid for students from families earning over ~$110,000. Shown as context, not quality.As filed
$13,642
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Average annual net price paid by students whose families earn more than about $110,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25), close to the full-pay cost since little need-based aid applies. Reported as context: the gap between this and the low-income net price shows how steeply the school discounts by family income. Not a measure of quality.
Net price, middle-income families ($30K-$48K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $30,000 to $48,000. Lower is better.As filed
$7,597
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $30,000 to $48,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the middle rung of the income net-price ladder: read it together with the low-income (under ~$30K) and high-income (over ~$110K) net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.
Net price, upper-middle families ($48K-$75K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $48,000 to $75,000. Lower is better.As filed
$6,247
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $48,000 to $75,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fourth rung of the five-rung income net-price ladder: read it with the low, middle, upper and high-income net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.
Net price, upper-income families ($75K-$110K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $75,000 to $110,000. Lower is better.As filed
$13,642
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $75,000 to $110,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fifth rung of the income net-price ladder, just below the full-pay tier: read it with the lower rungs and the high-income net price to see the full cost gradient by family income. Lower is better.
Operating marginNet surplus as a share of total revenue, whether the institution runs in the black.Calculated from filings
Strong
10.6%
48th percentile in peer grouppeer median 13%
higher is better
FY2022-2322 peers
Net surplus as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): (total revenues − total expenses) ÷ total revenues. A surplus above 4% is strong; a thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks.
Tuition dependencyTuition's share of total revenue, how exposed the budget is to enrollment swings.Calculated from filings
62.5%
34th percentile in peer grouppeer median 74%
context, not scored
FY2022-2322 peers
Tuition & fees as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.
Tuition discount rateInstitutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition (IPEDS, private nonprofits only) – the tuition-discount rate. The share of sticker tuition handed back as aid; a high rate (the national average is ~56%) signals heavy price competition for students.Calculated from filings
Moderate
3%
46th percentile in peer grouppeer median 3.8%
context, not scored
FY2022-2325 peers
Institutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition & fee revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB): allowances applied to tuition ÷ (net tuition revenue + those allowances) – the tuition-discount rate enrollment leaders track, i.e. the share of sticker tuition handed back as institutional aid. Private nonprofit institutions only; public (GASB) institutions report tuition differently and are not shown. The national private-college average is roughly 56% (NACUBO); above ~60% signals heavy price competition.
State appropriations shareState appropriations' share of total revenue, material for public institutions, near zero for private.Calculated from filings
0%
45th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
FY2022-2322 peers
State appropriations as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Material for public institutions; ~0 for private.
Administrative cost shareInstitutional support (central administration, governance, general administration, fundraising, and under FASB the operation & maintenance of plant) as a share of total expenses, private nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the figure is comparable. An informational gauge of administrative intensity, not a measure of waste.Calculated from filings
15.8%
22nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 23.4%
context, not scored
FY2022-2325 peers
Institutional support, central administration, executive management, governance, general administration, fundraising and (under FASB rules) operation & maintenance of plant, as a share of total expenses (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB). Private nonprofit institutions only: public (GASB) institutions report functional expenses on a different basis and frequently consolidate large hospital and auxiliary operations, which makes a comparable ratio unreliable, so they are not shown. Because FASB folds plant operations into institutional support, this runs higher than a narrow 'central-office' figure, and schools with sizable hospital or auxiliary operations show a lower ratio as those costs enlarge total expenses. An informational benchmark of administrative intensity, compared within the peer group, not a measure of waste or quality.
Months of operating cushionMonths of operating expenses covered by expendable reserves, the institution's cash cushion.Calculated from filings
Strong
16.4 mo
55th percentile in peer grouppeer median 14.8 mo
higher is better
FY2022-2321 peers
How many months of operating expenses the institution could cover from expendable reserves (IPEDS FY2022-23 primary reserve ratio × 12). About 5 months, one semester, is the accreditor benchmark for solid footing; below ~3 months is thin. A negative figure means expendable reserves are themselves negative.
Return on net assetsChange in net assets over the year, whether the institution grew wealthier.Calculated from filings
Strong
8.1%
48th percentile in peer grouppeer median 8.3%
higher is better
FY2022-2320 peers
Change in total net assets ÷ net assets (IPEDS FY2022-23) – whether the institution grew wealthier over the year. 2–4% is adequate; above 4% is strong.
Endowment per FTE studentEndowment per full-time-equivalent student, the FTE-correct measure of endowment wealth per student.Calculated from filings
Average
$11,722
43rd percentile in peer grouppeer median $16,334
higher is better
FY2022-2322 peers
End-of-year endowment ÷ 12-month FTE enrollment, endowment wealth per full-time-equivalent student. The FTE-correct companion to endowment-per-undergraduate; FTE counts graduate and part-time load, so research universities look less wealthy on this basis than on a headcount basis. Both sides are FY2022-23: the denominator is the FTE count from the endowment's own year (2022-23), not the newer FTE figure shown in the enrollment section, so dividing the two numbers on this page will not reproduce this one.
Spent on instructionInstruction as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
24.5%
14th percentile in peer grouppeer median 35.1%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)25 peers
Instruction spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). 'Where the money goes' context, reported here for private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the functional split is comparable; not computed for public or for-profit institutions. Higher is not automatically better; research universities and those with hospitals or large auxiliaries spread spending across other functions.
Spent on student servicesStudent services as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
2.8%
18th percentile in peer grouppeer median 4.9%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)25 peers
Student-services spending (admissions, registrar, student life, counseling) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.
Spent on academic supportAcademic support as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
12.4%
54th percentile in peer grouppeer median 12.3%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)25 peers
Academic-support spending (libraries, academic computing, deans' offices) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Context, not a quality measure.
Spent on researchResearch as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
20.5%
98th percentile in peer grouppeer median 6.1%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)25 peers
Research spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only; near zero at teaching-focused colleges and sizeable at research universities. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.
Full-professor average salaryWhat the institution pays its faculty. Scored as higher-is-better because it tracks an institution's ability to attract and hold teaching staff. It also tracks local cost of living, so compare within a region before drawing a conclusion.Average salary of full (tenured-rank) professors, 9-month equated, 2023-24.As filed
Below peers
$48,944
4th percentile in peer grouppeer median $116,084
higher is better
2023-2414 peers
Average salary paid to full professors, the most senior instructional rank (IPEDS Human Resources, 2023-24, 9-month equated). It reflects both the school's pay scale and the seniority of its faculty, and it is a sizeable share of academic cost. Banded against the school's peer group.
Financial responsibility scoreED financial-responsibility composite score (-1.0 to 3.0; >=1.5 is passing).Regulator / auditor finding
Strong
3.0
71st percentile in peer grouppeer median 3.0
higher is better
FY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)21 peers
The U.S. Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, a -1.0 to +3.0 measure of an institution's solvency built from its audited finances. 1.5 and above passes; 1.0-1.4 is a zone needing oversight; below 1.0 fails and can trigger letter-of-credit or cash-monitoring requirements. ED computes it only for private non-profit and proprietary schools, so it is reported only where scored. Higher is safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Grad PLUS exposureShare of the school's graduate federal loan dollars that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 2026 (FSA Direct Loan data). Higher = more graduate borrowing that will disappear above the new caps.Calculated from filings
Moderate exposure
22%
AY2025-26 YTD (through Q2, Dec 2025)
Share of the institution's graduate federal loan dollars (Grad Unsubsidized + Grad PLUS) that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 1, 2026, alongside new caps on graduate borrowing. A higher share means more of the school's graduate students rely on borrowing that will no longer exist above the unsubsidized cap. Source: U.S. Dept. of Education / Federal Student Aid Direct Loan Dashboard, primarily award year 2025-26 (year-to-date through Q2, December 2025), the most current federal data; schools not yet reporting Grad PLUS in 2025-26 retain their most recent complete year (2024-25), shown per school. The reliance share is stable across the two vintages. Shown only for schools with Grad PLUS originations; an exposure signal, not a forecast of revenue loss. Federal Student Aid publishes this dashboard quarterly and schools report on different schedules, so each school is shown at its own most recent reported period. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Avg Grad PLUS loanAverage Grad PLUS loan per borrower (FSA). The 2025 law caps unsubsidized grad borrowing at $20,500/yr and ends Grad PLUS, this is the average per-student amount that vanishes above the cap. The depth half of the Grad PLUS shock; pair with Grad PLUS exposure (the reliance share).As filed
Half the cap+
$18,673
AY2025-26 YTD (through Q2, Dec 2025)
Average Grad PLUS loan per recipient (FSA Direct Loan Dashboard, award year 2025-26 year-to-date through Q2, with 2024-25 full-year retained where 2025-26 is not yet reported). The 2025 budget law eliminates Grad PLUS for new borrowers from July 1, 2026 and caps unsubsidized graduate borrowing at $20,500/year, so this is the average per-borrower amount that will no longer be available above that cap. Paired with Grad PLUS exposure (the institution's reliance share), it is the depth axis of the Grad PLUS shock: how much each affected borrower stands to lose. Shown only where Grad PLUS was originated. Federal Student Aid publishes this dashboard quarterly and schools report on different schedules, so each school is shown at its own most recent reported period. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.Blended index
Low
25
FY2022-23 (IPEDS) with WICHE 2024 projections
An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.
Federal awards expendedTotal federal award dollars expended in the audited fiscal year (SEFA total).As filed
$28.1M
11th percentile in peer grouppeer median $102.7M
context, not scored
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)14 peers
▲ +69% steady
Total federal award dollars the institution expended in the audited fiscal year, from the Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards in its Single Audit. It combines student aid, research grants, and every other federal program, so it measures the institution's overall exposure to federal funding rather than its quality. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Title IV aid expendedFederal student aid dollars expended (Student Financial Assistance cluster).As filed
$22.5M
11th percentile in peer grouppeer median $70M
context, not scored
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)14 peers
▲ +96% steady
Federal student financial aid the institution disbursed in the audited year: the Student Financial Assistance cluster, covering Pell, Direct Loans, Federal Work-Study, FSEOG and Perkins. It is the clearest single measure of how much Title IV money flows through the school. Context metric, not better or worse. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Pell Grant dollarsPell Grant dollars expended in the audited year (ALN 84.063).As filed
$391,460
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)
▼ -18% steady
Pell Grant dollars the institution disbursed in the audited fiscal year (federal assistance listing 84.063). Read alongside the school's Pell share of enrollment: high Pell dollars at a small school signals a low-income student body and heavy dependence on that appropriation. Context metric, not better or worse. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Direct Loan volumeWilliam D. Ford Direct Loan dollars expended (ALN 84.268).As filed
$22.1M
11th percentile in peer grouppeer median $67.7M
context, not scored
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)14 peers
▲ +103% steady
Federal Direct Loan dollars originated for the institution's students in the audited fiscal year (federal assistance listing 84.268). Large loan volume relative to enrollment means students are borrowing heavily to attend. Context metric, not better or worse; pair it with the school's median debt and earnings figures. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Audit findingsDistinct findings raised in the most recent Single Audit. Lower is better.As filed
Some findings
1
79th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0
lower is better
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)14 peers
▼ -50% choppy
Number of distinct audit findings the independent auditor raised in the institution's most recent Single Audit. A finding records a failure to comply with federal award rules or a breakdown in internal control, and can range from a late report to unallowable spending. Zero is common and is the clean result. Lower is better. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Repeat findingsShare of findings across the last three audits that repeat a prior year's finding.Calculated from filings
Mostly repeats
100%
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)
Of every finding raised across the institution's three most recent Single Audits, the share that repeats a finding from a prior year. A one-off finding is an error; a finding that recurs after the school promised a corrective action plan points to a governance or management problem the institution has not fixed. Shown only where the school had at least three findings across those audits, so the ratio means something. Lower is better. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Going-concern disclosureThe auditor's report includes a going-concern disclosure.Regulator / auditor finding
None
No
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)
Whether the independent auditor included a going-concern disclosure in the institution's most recent Single Audit report. Auditors add one when there is substantial doubt about the organization's ability to continue operating for the next year, so it is the most serious signal an audit carries. Read it as a prompt to open the audit itself, not as a verdict: the flag is the checkbox the auditor ticked on the federal SF-SAC form, and the underlying disclosure may concern a subsidiary or a since-resolved condition. About 2% of audited institutions carry one. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Material weaknessAuditor disclosed a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting.Regulator / auditor finding
None reported
No
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)
Whether the auditor found a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting: a deficiency severe enough that a material misstatement of the financial statements could go undetected. It does not mean money was lost, but it means the controls that would have caught a loss were not working. Around 10% of audited institutions report one. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Material noncomplianceAuditor disclosed material noncompliance with federal award requirements.Regulator / auditor finding
None reported
No
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)
Whether the auditor found material noncompliance with the rules attached to the institution's federal awards, such as student eligibility, cash management, or allowable cost requirements. Material means the breach was large enough to matter to the federal agency funding the school. About 2% of audited institutions report it. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Program compliance opinionAuditor issued a qualified, adverse, or disclaimer opinion on a major federal program.Regulator / auditor finding
Unmodified
No
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)
Whether the auditor issued anything other than a clean (unmodified) compliance opinion on at least one of the institution's major federal programs. A qualified, adverse, or disclaimer opinion means the auditor could not conclude the school followed that program's rules. Roughly 3% of audited institutions receive one; for most schools the major program at issue is Title IV student aid. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Low-risk auditeeQualifies as a low-risk auditee under 2 CFR 200.520 (a clean recent audit history).Regulator / auditor finding
Not low-risk
No
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)
Whether the institution qualified as a low-risk auditee under federal rule 2 CFR 200.520. A school earns the status only by filing on time for two consecutive years with clean opinions, no material weaknesses, and no going-concern doubt. It is a compact summary of a clean recent audit history, and it reduces how much of the school's federal spending must be audited the next year. About 73% of audited institutions qualify. Yes is better. The value is the box the filer ticked on the federal SF-SAC form, and a minority of filings tick it alongside a condition that should disqualify them, so treat a lone Yes as weaker evidence than a clean set of the other audit flags on this page. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Gifts and grants receivedTotal contributions, gifts, and grants received in the filing year (Form 990).As filed
Below peers
$6.3M
32nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $10.1M
higher is better
FY2023 (IRS Form 990 (ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer))14 peers
▼ -38% steady · turning
Total contributions, gifts, and grants the institution received in the filing year, from its Form 990. This is the broadest available measure of philanthropic and grant support reaching the institution, covering alumni giving, foundation grants, and government grants recorded as contributions. Read it against enrollment: strong giving at a small school is a real cushion against tuition dependence. Higher is better. Sourced from the institution's IRS Form 990, matched on the Employer Identification Number it reported in its federal Single Audit. Only private nonprofit institutions file a Form 990: public universities are government units and file none, and for-profit institutions file none. A school with no value did not file, which is not the same as a value of zero. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Tax-exempt bond debtTax-exempt bond liabilities outstanding at year end (Form 990).As filed
$0
18th percentile in peer grouppeer median $39.2M
context, not scored
FY2023 (IRS Form 990 (ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer))14 peers
Tax-exempt bond debt the institution still owed at the end of the filing year. Colleges borrow through municipal bonds to build dormitories, labs, and stadiums, so a large balance is not by itself a warning: it reflects a building programme. It becomes a risk when it is large relative to the institution's net assets, which is what the bond-debt-to-net-assets figure on this page measures. A zero here means the institution reported no tax-exempt bond debt outstanding, which is a genuine, debt-free result. Context metric, not better or worse. Sourced from the institution's IRS Form 990, matched on the Employer Identification Number it reported in its federal Single Audit. Only private nonprofit institutions file a Form 990: public universities are government units and file none, and for-profit institutions file none. A school with no value did not file, which is not the same as a value of zero. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Bond debt vs net assetsTax-exempt bond debt as a share of total net assets. Lower is better.Calculated from filings
Low leverage
0%
18th percentile in peer grouppeer median 19.6%
lower is better
FY2023 (IRS Form 990 (ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer))14 peers
The institution's outstanding tax-exempt bond debt divided by its total net assets. It answers the question the raw debt figure cannot: how heavy is this borrowing relative to what the institution actually owns. A wealthy university with billions in net assets carries a large bond balance comfortably; a tuition-dependent college with thin reserves does not. Above roughly 50% the debt is a material claim on the institution's resources. Shown only where net assets are positive. Lower is better. Sourced from the institution's IRS Form 990, matched on the Employer Identification Number it reported in its federal Single Audit. Only private nonprofit institutions file a Form 990: public universities are government units and file none, and for-profit institutions file none. A school with no value did not file, which is not the same as a value of zero. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Officer pay, share of expensesCompensation of current officers and key employees as a share of total expenses.Calculated from filings
1.8%
11th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.9%
context, not scored
FY2023 (IRS Form 990 (ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer))14 peers
What the institution paid its current officers, directors, trustees, and key employees, as a share of its total functional expenses. At almost every college this is a fraction of one percent, because the denominator includes all faculty and staff salaries. The figure is useful mainly at the extremes and at small institutions, where an unusually high share can indicate a top-heavy cost structure. It is not a measure of executive pay in absolute terms. Context metric, not better or worse. Sourced from the institution's IRS Form 990, matched on the Employer Identification Number it reported in its federal Single Audit. Only private nonprofit institutions file a Form 990: public universities are government units and file none, and for-profit institutions file none. A school with no value did not file, which is not the same as a value of zero. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
Federal funding obligatedHow much externally funded research the institution does. Shown as scale, not quality: it reflects mission, and an institution that does no sponsored research is not thereby worse at teaching. Useful for finding peers of comparable research intensity.Total federal dollars all agencies committed to this institution in FY2024, across grants, contracts, and student aid.As filed
$4.6M
63rd percentile in peer grouppeer median $2.5M
context, not scored
FY2024 (USAspending.gov)20 peers
Obligations reported to USAspending.gov for FY2024 (Oct 2023 to Sep 2024), summed across every awarding agency. This is money committed, not money spent, so it will not equal the audited 'Federal awards expended' figure and the two should not be subtracted from one another. Negative amounts (agencies reclaiming prior commitments) are excluded.
Federal funding agenciesHow many distinct federal agencies committed money to this institution in FY2024.As filed
3
60th percentile in peer grouppeer median 3
context, not scored
FY2024 (USAspending.gov)20 peers
A count of awarding agencies with positive FY2024 obligations. Neither high nor low is inherently better: a community college funded solely by the Department of Education is behaving normally, while a research university typically draws on ten or more agencies.
Largest funder's shareShare of federal funding that comes from the single largest awarding agency.Calculated from filings
90.4%
78th percentile in peer grouppeer median 78.1%
context, not scored
FY2024 (USAspending.gov)20 peers
The largest agency's FY2024 obligations as a share of the institution's total positive federal obligations. Read it as concentration, not risk: most teaching colleges sit near 100% because nearly all their federal money is Department of Education student aid.
Net-cost payback periodEstimated years to recoup the four-year net cost from the annual earnings premium over a high-school graduate in this state.Blended index
2.3 yrs
2020-21 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)
Four-year net price divided by the median 10-year earnings premium over a typical high-school graduate in the institution's state (College Scorecard earnings and net price; U.S. Census Bureau ACS state baselines). A simple value-for-cost gauge: fewer years is stronger. Shown only where net price and earnings are both reported, where earnings exceed the state high-school baseline, and where the resulting period is inside a working lifetime (past about 40 years the figure is only reporting that the premium is near zero, so no number is shown); it ignores aid timing, debt and non-completion, so read it as a directional comparison, not a financial projection.
Enrollment loss before deficitHow much of its enrollment the institution could lose before running an operating deficit, if it changed nothing else.Modelled by Ibex
Some cushion
17%
31st percentile in peer grouppeer median 23.6%
higher is better
FY2022-2321 peers
The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of total revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss; the same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operating margin after a 10% enrollment lossWhat the operating margin becomes if a tenth of the students go and nothing else changes.Modelled by Ibex
Still in surplus
4.7%
39th percentile in peer grouppeer median 7.1%
higher is better
FY2022-2322 peers
The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students; every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operational-risk index (official findings)0-100 severity of what federal regulators and auditors have actually said about this institution. Higher means more official concern.Blended index
Clean
5.0
78th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0.0
lower is better
ED composite FY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid) + Single Audit AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)23 peers
A 0-100 severity score built only from published federal determinations: the Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, its Heightened Cash Monitoring list, and the going-concern, material-weakness, material-noncompliance, modified-opinion and repeat-finding results of the school's Single Audit. It is deliberately NOT a model: every component is something a regulator or an independent auditor put in writing. Components are scored only where they exist, and the score is their weighted average, so a school assessed on two signals sits on the same scale as one assessed on seven. Schools with neither a composite score nor a Single Audit on file are omitted rather than shown as clean: ED does not compute a composite score for public institutions, and no audit on file means nobody looked, not that nothing was found. Read it alongside the structural-risk index, which is the tool's own forward-looking model rather than a record of findings. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Graduation rate · first-time, full-time
40%

40% graduate within 6 years (150% of normal time)
0% on-time, within 4 years (100%)
Counts only students who entered full-time as first-time freshmen and earned a bachelor's here, the conventional headline rate. Excludes part-time entrants and transfer-ins.

Completion rate · all students
46.3%

46.3% earned a degree or certificate within 8 years (IPEDS Outcome Measures)
The broader cohort, also counts part-time entrants and transfer-ins, and any credential. More inclusive, so it can run higher than the graduation rate.

Why two numbers? They measure different students over different windows, so they are not directly comparable. The graduation rate is the standard federal headline but tracks only first-time, full-time students through a bachelor's; the all-students completion rate adds the part-time and transfer students it leaves out, over a longer window. Read each for what it covers. Source: U.S. Department of Education, IPEDS Graduation Rates & Outcome Measures, via College Scorecard.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Undergraduate enrollmentNumber of degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS fall headcount). A size measure, not a quality signal.As filed
90
2024-25 (Scorecard)
▼ -31% steady
Admission rateShare of applicants admitted. Not scored: a low admit rate measures demand and application volume, not teaching, and it is easy to manufacture by soliciting applications the school intends to reject.Share of applicants offered admission. Lower means more selective; open-admission schools report none.As filed
60%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
▼ -21% choppy
First-year retentionShare of first-time, full-time freshmen who return for a second year, an early signal of student fit and support.As filed
71.4%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
▼ -14% choppy
Graduation rate (6-yr · first-time, full-time)Of first-time, full-time freshmen, the share who earn a bachelor's at this institution within six years (150% of normal time) – the conventional headline graduation rate. It counts only first-time, full-time students and excludes part-time entrants and transfer-ins, who are captured instead by the all-students completion rate.As filed
40%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
▼ -27% choppy · turning
Graduation rate (4-yr on-time · first-time, full-time)Of first-time, full-time freshmen, the share who earn a bachelor's within four years (100% of normal time) – the 'on-time' rate. It runs well below the six-year rate because many students take a fifth or sixth year; same first-time, full-time cohort as the six-year rate.As filed
0%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Pell recipient shareShare of undergraduates receiving a Pell grant, the standard proxy for how many low-income students a school enrolls. Not scored in either direction: it is a measure of who a school serves, and both a high and a low share are defensible depending on the mission.Share of undergraduates on a federal Pell Grant, a proxy for the share from lower-income families.As filed
72.2%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
▼ -20% choppy
Completion rate (all students · 8-yr)Of ALL entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, the share who earned a degree or certificate at this institution within eight years (IPEDS Outcome Measures). Broader than the graduation rate, which counts only first-time, full-time students, so the two are measured on different students and are not directly comparable.As filed
46.3%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Share of ALL entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, who earned a degree or certificate at this institution within eight years (IPEDS Outcome Measures, via College Scorecard). Broader and more inclusive than the graduation-rate figures, which count only first-time, full-time students entering a bachelor's program, so the two are measured on different groups of students and are not directly comparable.
First-generation studentsShare of undergraduates who are the first in their family to attend college.As filed
32.8%
2016-17 (Scorecard)
Share of undergraduates who are first-generation college students (College Scorecard, 2016-17). An access signal, not a measure of quality: a higher share often reflects a stronger commitment to serving students whose parents did not attend college. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Adult learners (25+)Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older.As filed
31.1%
2023-24 (Scorecard)
Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older (College Scorecard, 2023-24). Read as context on the student mix: schools serving many working adults look different on persistence and part-time measures than traditional-age campuses, and neither is inherently better. From the College Scorecard 2023-24 data file.
Part-time undergraduatesShare of undergraduates enrolled part-time.As filed
13.3%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Share of undergraduates enrolled part-time (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Context, not quality: a high part-time share is common at community and commuter institutions and affects graduation-rate comparisons, which are based only on full-time, first-time students.
Median family incomeMedian family income of students at this institution.As filed
$9,669
2016-17 (Scorecard)
Median family income of students at this institution (College Scorecard, 2016-17). An affordability and access signal, not a measure of quality: a lower figure typically means the school enrolls more students from modest-income families. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Low-income students (under $30K)Share of students from families earning under about $30,000 a year.As filed
76.6%
2016-17 (Scorecard)
Share of students whose families earn under roughly $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2016-17). A direct low-income access signal: a higher share usually reflects a school enrolling more students from modest-income households, and pairs naturally with the Pell recipient share. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Women (share of undergraduates)Share of undergraduates who are women.As filed
66.7%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Share of undergraduates who are women (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context on the student mix, not a measure of quality.
Transfer-out rateShare of students who transfer out. Not scored: it runs high at access-oriented and two-year feeder schools whose students are supposed to move on to a four-year program.Share of students who transfer to a different school within the tracking window. Shown as context, not quality.As filed
0%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Share of students who transfer OUT to a different institution within the tracking window (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context, not a quality measure: it runs high at access-oriented schools and two-year feeders whose students routinely move on to a four-year program, and it should be read together with the completion and retention figures rather than on its own.
Admission yieldAs filed
87.5%
Fall 2023
Share of admitted students who enrolled (IPEDS Admissions, Fall 2023): students who enrolled ÷ students admitted. A demand signal, how many accepted offers the institution converts to enrollment. Higher yield generally reflects stronger demand, though binding early-decision programs and price positioning can inflate it. Open-admission institutions do not report admissions and show none.
Program concentration (HHI)How concentrated a school's annual completions are across academic fields, as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (10,000 = one field, lower = many). Higher means more reliance on a few fields; lower means a diversified program portfolio.Calculated from filings
Highly concentrated
9,323
2022-23
How concentrated the institution's degree and certificate output is across academic fields (CIP 2-digit families), as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on the latest year's completions: 10,000 means every completion is in one field; lower means output is spread across many. A higher value means the school leans on fewer fields and is more exposed to demand shifts in them; a lower value reflects a broad program portfolio. Shown for institutions reporting at least 100 annual completions. A structural-diversification signal, not a measure of quality.
12-month FTE enrollmentFull-time-equivalent enrollment over the full year, the denominator for per-student finance measures.As filed
554
10th percentile in peer grouppeer median 1,401
context, not scored
2023-24 (IPEDS)25 peers
Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.
Student-faculty ratioStudents per instructional faculty member, lower usually means smaller classes and more contact.As filed
10:1
Fall 2023
Students per instructional faculty member (IPEDS, fall 2023). Lower generally means smaller classes and more faculty contact, though the measure mixes undergraduate and graduate teaching and is institution-reported.
Fully online studentsShare of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education (online) courses.As filed
2%
54th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2%
context, not scored
Fall 2023 (IPEDS)25 peers
Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality; online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.
Hybrid (some online) enrollmentShare of students enrolled in some but not all courses online (hybrid), Fall 2023.As filed
98%
94th percentile in peer grouppeer median 10%
context, not scored
Fall 202325 peers
Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Transfer-in share (undergraduate)Transfer-in students as a share of undergraduate enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
21.1%
Fall 2023
Transfer-in students as a share of all undergraduates (IPEDS, Fall 2023). A high share means the school depends on transfer pipelines rather than first-time freshmen, which changes both recruitment strategy and melt/retention risk. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Graduate share of enrollmentGraduate students as a share of total enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
83.9%
2nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 100%
context, not scored
Fall 202325 peers
Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Women share of facultyWomen as a share of instructional staff (full- and part-time), Fall 2023.As filed
54.4%
66th percentile in peer grouppeer median 53.2%
context, not scored
Fall 202325 peers
Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Faculty of color shareU.S. faculty of color as a share of instructional staff, Fall 2023.As filed
85.3%
94th percentile in peer grouppeer median 24.3%
context, not scored
Fall 202325 peers
Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Women in applicant poolWomen as a share of all first-time degree-seeking applicants.Calculated from filings
53.8%
Fall 2023
Women as a share of the school's first-time degree-seeking applicant pool (IPEDS Admissions, 2023-24). A read on the funnel's composition, useful for targeting and a proxy for program mix: nursing- and education-heavy schools skew female, engineering- and trade-heavy schools skew male. Neither skew is inherently better. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Direct competitors within 100 miCount of other institutions within 100 miles. Scored as lower-is-better because it is used here as a competitive-pressure signal for the institution, not as a benefit to students.Number of same-type institutions (same Carnegie class and control) within 100 miles.Calculated from filings
Below peers
1
76th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)25 peers
How many institutions of the same type (same Carnegie classification and control, i.e. the schools competing for the same students) sit within roughly 100 miles. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks; a low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting leverage.
Foreign first-time shareShare of first-time students whose legal residence is a foreign country.As filed
0%
Fall 2022
Share of the school's first-time degree-seeking class whose legal residence is outside the United States (IPEDS Residence & Migration, Fall 2022). A measure of international reach in the entering class. Neither high nor low is inherently better; it is context for tuition-revenue mix and exposure to visa and geopolitical risk. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Metro-area unemployment rateUnemployment rate in the school's metro area, ACS 2019-23.As filed
Below peers
11.5%
96th percentile in peer grouppeer median 5.6%
lower is better
ACS 2019-2325 peers
The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2019-23, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.
On-campus crime rateOn-campus criminal offenses per 1,000 students, 2024 (Clery Act).As filed
Strong
0 per 1k
26th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0 per 1k
lower is better
2024 (Clery)25 peers
Criminal offenses reported on campus in 2024 (murder, manslaughter, the four sex-offense categories, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor-vehicle theft and arson) per 1,000 students, from the school's federal Clery Act filing. Counts and enrollment are summed across the institution's campuses. A higher number does not always mean a more dangerous school: thorough reporting and dense residential campuses raise it. Lower is generally safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Workforce Pell exposureShare of this school's measured credentials that are undergraduate certificates, the sub-associate tier the 2025 budget law's new Workforce Pell Grant makes Pell-eligible from July 2026 (short-term programs of 150–600 clock hours over 8–15 weeks). An opportunity signal: higher = more of what the school already produces could draw new federal grant aid. Source: College Scorecard Field-of-Study; an upper-bound proxy since the certificate tier spans varying lengths.Modelled by Ibex
Moderate
6.1%
2024-25 (Scorecard completions)
Share of the institution's measured credentials that are undergraduate certificates, the sub-associate tier that the 2025 budget law's new Workforce Pell Grant makes Pell-eligible from July 1, 2026. Workforce Pell extends the Pell Grant to short-term workforce programs of 150 to 600 clock hours offered over 8 to 15 weeks, subject to state-workforce-board and accreditor approval and to job-placement, completion and earnings-value guardrails. This is an opportunity signal: a higher share means more of what the school already produces could draw new federal grant aid, and the upside is greatest where Pell reliance (shown separately) is also high. Computed as undergraduate-certificate completions divided by all credential completions in the College Scorecard Field-of-Study file (most recent release). Scorecard's 'Undergraduate Certificate' level spans certificates of varying length, so the statutory 150-600 clock-hour window is a subset of this tier, read this as an upper-bound exposure proxy, not a count of qualifying programs. Shown only for institutions that confer such certificates above a minimum completions floor.
Federal research fundingHow much externally funded research the institution does. Shown as scale, not quality: it reflects mission, and an institution that does no sponsored research is not thereby worse at teaching. Useful for finding peers of comparable research intensity.Research and Development cluster dollars expended, all federal agencies.As filed
$1.6M
41st percentile in peer grouppeer median $3.3M
context, not scored
AY2025 (Federal Audit Clearinghouse)11 peers
▼ -66% choppy
Federal research dollars the institution expended in the audited fiscal year, across the whole Research and Development cluster. Unlike the NIH funding figure on this page, it counts every federal agency: NSF, NIH, the Department of Defense, NASA, the Department of Energy and the rest. It is the broadest available measure of federal research capacity. Context metric, not better or worse. Reported only for institutions that file their own Single Audit with the Federal Audit Clearinghouse; a school with no value did not file one, which is not the same as a clean result. Public universities audited inside a state or system report, for-profit institutions (exempt from the Single Audit), and schools under the federal expenditure threshold do not appear. Each school is shown at its own most recent filing, so the peer comparison spans a few filing years rather than a single one.
NIH research fundingHow much externally funded research the institution does. Shown as scale, not quality: it reflects mission, and an institution that does no sponsored research is not thereby worse at teaching. Useful for finding peers of comparable research intensity.Total NIH award dollars, FY2024 (NIH RePORTER).As filed
$1.2M
28th percentile in peer grouppeer median $6.3M
context, not scored
FY2024 (NIH RePORTER)9 peers
Total National Institutes of Health award dollars the institution received in fiscal year 2024, from NIH RePORTER. It signals biomedical research strength and federal grant capacity; reported only for schools NIH funds and that match this tool by name and state. Dollars from multiple campuses or centers are summed. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Enrollment momentum (CAGR)Enrollment momentum (CAGR).Modelled by Ibex
-4.6%
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)
Compound annual growth rate of undergraduate enrollment over the years the tool tracks (College Scorecard, roughly 2016-2024). Positive means the school is growing; negative means it is shrinking, the leading indicator of demand stress ahead of the demographic cliff. Where the reported count jumps by a merger or a campus consolidation brought under one institution, only the years after that jump are measured, and where too little history follows it no rate is shown. A sharp fall is measured in full: a shrinking count is the signal this metric exists to carry, not an artifact to be cut away. No rate is shown where the enrolment never reaches 25 in the measured window: on a series that small one student is a double-digit annual rate, and a percentile computed from it would rank noise. Banded against the school's peer group. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Net-price momentum (CAGR)Net-price momentum (CAGR).Modelled by Ibex
Average
2.7%
62nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.3%
lower is better
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)25 peers
Compound annual growth rate of net tuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student over the tracked years. A high positive rate means the school's real net price is climbing faster than peers, which can strain affordability and yield. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Selectivity momentum (CAGR)Selectivity momentum (CAGR).Modelled by Ibex
-2.9%
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)
Compound annual growth rate of the admission rate over the tracked years. A negative value means the school is admitting a smaller share of applicants over time (getting more selective); a positive value means its admit rate is rising (getting less selective), often a sign of softening demand. Banded against the school's peer group. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Enrollment forecast (5-yr)Projected change in undergraduate enrollment about five years out, from the school's own trend.Modelled by Ibex
-25.9%
2024-2029 projection
Projected cumulative change in degree-seeking undergraduate enrollment roughly five years out, modeled by a least-squares log-linear fit on the school's own undergraduate history (IPEDS fall headcount via College Scorecard, 2016-2024). It uses the full multi-year series, so a single shock year (such as 2020) does not drive the result. Where the reported count jumps by a merger or a campus consolidation brought under one institution, only the years after that jump are fitted; a sharp fall is fitted in full. This is a naive trend extrapolation, not a demographic model: where it projects a change beyond plus or minus 60 percent the fit is treated as out of range and no figure is shown. Banded against the school's peer group; higher means projected growth. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Consecutive years of enrollment declineHow many years in a row undergraduate enrollment has fallen, counting back from the most recent year.Modelled by Ibex
Not declining
0 yrs
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)
The number of consecutive years, ending with the most recent one, in which this school's undergraduate headcount fell. Zero means the latest year was flat or up. A single down year is ordinary; three or more in a row is the pattern that precedes program cuts and closures, and it is visible in the federal data years before it becomes public. A fall smaller than 2% counts as flat, because year-to-year reporting noise at that scale would otherwise manufacture streaks. Measured on the same window as enrollment momentum: where a merger or consolidation makes the earlier years a different institution, only the years after it are counted. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Feeder statesThe home state of every first-time degree-seeking undergraduate in the entering class, as reported to IPEDS. Darker means a larger share of the class; the institution's own state is highlighted separately because at nearly every school it dwarfs the rest. 1 states and territories · Fall 2022
ALAKAZARCACOCTDEDCFLGAHIIDILINIAKSKYLAMEMDMAMIMNMSMOMTNENVNHNJNMNYNCNDOHOKORPARISCSDTNTXUTVTVAWAWVWIWY
PR 100.0%

Home state of first-time degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS residence and migration). Each state is one square of equal size, arranged in the rough shape of the country, so a small state sending many students is as visible as a large one. The institution’s own state is shown in gold and every other state is shaded against the largest of them, not against the home state, which otherwise flattens the rest of the map. Shares are of the whole entering class, so they do not add to 100% where students came from abroad.

SAT / ACT requirement IPEDS Fall 2023
Test-optional

This school is test-optional: applicants may submit SAT or ACT scores, but they are not required. Reported to IPEDS for the most recent admissions cycle. Test policy is a live enrollment lever, so it is shown as the school's stated category rather than a peer rank.

Six-year graduation rate by group First-time, full-time bachelor’s cohort · Scorecard 2024-25
Hispanic/Latino40%
Pell recipients43%

Six-year graduation rate (150% of normal time) for the first-time, full-time bachelor’s cohort, broken out by race and ethnicity and for Pell-grant recipients (College Scorecard). Each bar uses the same measure as the headline graduation rate, so the gaps between groups are directly comparable. School overall: 51%.

Undergraduate race & ethnicity IPEDS 2024-25
Hispanic/Latino87.8%
Unknown8.9%
White2.2%
American Indian/Alaska Native1.1%

Undergraduate enrollment by race and ethnicity, as reported to IPEDS (College Scorecard). “International” denotes nonresident students; “Unknown” means race/ethnicity was not reported.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Median earnings (10 yr)Median earnings of former students ten years after first enrolling (working, federally-aided students).As filed
$31,468
2020-21 (Scorecard)
Taken from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the most recent release in which the Department published this element; it is null in every release since. Earnings are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that first enrolled about a decade earlier, so this describes students who entered well before 2020.
Median debt at graduationMedian federal loan debt graduates carry at the point they complete.As filed
$7,363
2020-21 (Scorecard)
▲ +64% steady · turning
From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
3-yr cohort default rateShare of borrowers defaulting within three years. Lower is better, but values covering 2020 to 2023 are depressed for every school by the federal payment pause, so the level means less than the comparison.Share of borrowers who default within three years of entering repayment. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
4.2%
98th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0.5%
lower is better
FY2017 cohort23 peers
Share of borrowers who defaulted within three years of entering repayment (U.S. Dept. of Education official cohort default rate). Shown for the FY2017 borrower cohort, the most recent cohort whose full three-year default window closed before the 2020-23 federal student-loan payment pause. More recent cohorts are reported by the College Scorecard at essentially 0%, but that reflects the payment pause (no payments were due, so almost no one could default), not borrower health, so the pre-pause cohort is the last meaningful reading. Lower is better.
Share taking federal loansShare of students taking out federal loans, a borrowing-reliance signal.As filed
17.8%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Full-time faculty shareShare of faculty employed full-time, higher generally means more availability and continuity.As filed
Average
72.3%
64th percentile in peer grouppeer median 60.9%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Debt-to-earnings ratioMedian graduate debt divided by median earnings, how heavy the debt load is versus what graduates earn. Lower is better.Calculated from filings
0.23×
2020-21 (Scorecard)
Both sides of this ratio come from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying either. It is co-vintage, but it is not current.
Loan repayment rate (3-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.As filed
57.1%
2016-17 (Scorecard)
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within three years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17). Read it as context, not a simple good/bad score: a low rate can mean borrowers are struggling, but it can also mean many graduates have postponed payments while enrolled in graduate or professional school, which is common at selective schools and pushes their rate down. Unlike the cohort default rate, it is not distorted by the 2020-23 federal payment pause. Reported only where enough borrowers exist. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Earn more than a HS grad (6-yr)Share earning more than $28,000 (about a high-school graduate's wage) six years after entry.Calculated from filings
Below peers
38%
5th percentile in peer grouppeer median 92.3%
higher is better
2014-15 (Scorecard)11 peers
Share of students earning more than $28,000 a year, roughly what a typical high-school graduate earns, six years after entering this institution (College Scorecard, 2014-15). A direct read on whether attending beats not attending, and conceptually aligned with the 2025 budget law's program-level earnings-premium test. Share of former students earning more than $28,000, the Department's benchmark for the median earnings of a high-school graduate. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying it; the threshold is not inflation-adjusted.
Working 10 years after entryShare of the no-longer-enrolled cohort who are working ten years after entering.As filed
87.7%
2020-21 (Scorecard)
Share of students who are working (not still enrolled) ten years after entering this institution, of those whose employment status is known (College Scorecard, 2020-21). A coarse employment signal; it does not capture earnings level or job quality. Taken from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the most recent release in which the Department published this element; it is null in every release since. Earnings are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that first enrolled about a decade earlier, so this describes students who entered well before 2020.
Loan repayment rate (5-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who repaid at least $1 of principal within five years of entering repayment.As filed
44.2%
2016-17 (Scorecard)
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within five years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17), a longer-horizon companion to the three-year repayment rate. As with the three-year figure, a low rate can reflect graduates deferring payments while in further schooling rather than financial distress. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Median earnings (6 yr)Median earnings of working former students six years after they first enrolled.As filed
$24,669
2020-21 (Scorecard)
Median earnings of former students who are working and were federally aided, measured six years after they first enrolled (College Scorecard, 2020-21). A shorter-horizon companion to the ten-year earnings figure; early-career pay tends to run below the ten-year mark, so read the two together rather than in isolation. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Earnings measured about six years after entry, so the cohort behind it entered in the mid-2010s.
Earn more than a HS grad (10-yr)Share earning more than $28,000 (about a high-school graduate's wage) ten years after entry.Calculated from filings
Below peers
57.1%
4th percentile in peer grouppeer median 94.2%
higher is better
2014-15 (Scorecard)12 peers
Share of students earning more than $28,000 a year, roughly what a typical high-school graduate earns, ten years after entering this institution (College Scorecard, 2014-15). The long-horizon companion to the six-year figure and the closest public analogue to the 2025 budget law's program-level earnings-premium test. Share of former students earning more than $28,000, the Department's benchmark for the median earnings of a high-school graduate. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying it; the threshold is not inflation-adjusted.
Loan repayment rate (1-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who repaid at least $1 of principal within one year of entering repayment.As filed
38.9%
2014-15 (Scorecard)
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within one year of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2014-15), the earliest point on the repayment curve. As with the longer-horizon rates, a low figure can reflect borrowers deferring payments while in further schooling rather than financial distress. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying the one-year repayment rate. A decade old, and shown because no newer federal figure exists.
Loan repayment rate (7-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who repaid at least $1 of principal within seven years of entering repayment.As filed
57.1%
2016-17 (Scorecard)
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within seven years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17), the longest horizon reported. Together with the one-, three-, and five-year rates it traces how repayment progresses over time. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Pell completion gapOverall 6-year graduation rate minus the Pell-recipient graduation rate.Calculated from filings
+8.5 pts
2024-25 (Scorecard)
The school's overall six-year graduation rate minus the graduation rate of its Pell Grant recipients (College Scorecard). A larger positive gap means lower-income students complete at a lower rate than the student body overall; a value near zero means the school graduates Pell and non-Pell students at similar rates. Banded against the school's peer group. Smaller is better.
Field-demand outlook (10-yr)Employment-weighted 10-year BLS job-growth projection for the occupations this school's program mix feeds (U.S. all-occupations benchmark +3.1%). An indicative broad-field demand signal, not a program-specific or placement guarantee.External projection
Fast-growing field mix
+6.3 pts
87th percentile nationallynational median +4.7 pts
higher is better
BLS EP 2024-34
Projected 10-year (2024-34) change in U.S. employment for the occupations this institution's degrees and certificates feed, blended across its program mix. Built by mapping each CIP 2-digit field to its occupations via the NCES CIP-SOC crosswalk, taking the employment-weighted average of each occupation's BLS-projected percent change, then weighting fields by the institution's latest-year completions. The U.S. all-occupations benchmark is 3.1%, so a higher value means the school's graduates concentrate in faster-growing labor markets. An INDICATIVE field-level signal at broad-field granularity, not a program-specific or graduate-specific projection, and not a placement or earnings guarantee. Shown where at least 50% of completions fall in fields with a coherent occupational mapping and the school reports 100+ annual completions.
Completions in growing fieldsShare of completions in broad fields projected to grow faster than the all-occupations average (+3.1%).External projection
Mostly growth fields
100%
89th percentile nationallynational median 67.9%
higher is better
BLS EP 2024-34
The share of this institution's yearly completions that are in broad fields whose occupations the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projects will grow FASTER than the all-occupations average of 3.1% over 2024-34. It answers a different question from the field-demand outlook beside it: that one averages the whole program mix into a single rate, which lets a fast-growing half cancel out a shrinking half. This says how much of the graduating class is on the growing side. The denominator is completions in fields with a coherent occupational mapping, not all completions, because three broad fields map to essentially the whole economy and carry no signal; the share of completions that could be classified at all is shown in the field-mix breakdown. Ranked against every institution in the file rather than against the peer group: what a program mix is worth is set by the national labour market, not by whichever schools happen to share a Carnegie class. An indicative field-level signal, not a placement rate.
Return on credentialMedian 10-year earnings divided by the four-year cost of attendance (annual cost × 4) – a rough payback ratio for the degree.Calculated from filings
0.54×
2020-21 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)
Median 10-year earnings divided by the four-year cost of attendance (average annual cost × 4). A rough payback ratio: 1.0× means a graduate's annual 10-year earnings roughly equal the full four-year sticker cost. Earnings reflect federally-aided students; cost of attendance is the published sticker price before aid, so this is conservative relative to what families net of aid pay.
Grad rate vs predicted (access-adjusted)Actual 6-year graduation rate minus the rate predicted from the students the school enrolls.Modelled by Ibex
+8.9 pts
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)
Actual six-year graduation rate minus the rate predicted, by a regression across all four-year institutions, from the school's admission rate, Pell share, first-generation share, median family income and undergraduate size (College Scorecard, 2024-25). A positive value means the school graduates students at a higher rate than peers serving similar students at similar selectivity; a negative value means lower. This is a fairer cross-school comparison than the raw graduation rate, which penalizes access-oriented colleges. The figure is banded against a school's own peer group, so selective schools are compared with selective peers. The model uses no test-score input, so it under-predicts the most selective institutions, which therefore tend to show positive values. Reported for four-year institutions that publish an admission rate; an indicative model, not an official metric.
Loan payment vs earningsMonthly payment on the median federal debt, as a share of median monthly earnings ten years after entry.Calculated from filings
Manageable
3.2%
2020-21 (Scorecard)
What this school's median federal student debt would cost to repay each month on the ten-year Standard Repayment Plan, divided by the median graduate's monthly earnings ten years after entering. Both figures are the school's own reported medians from the same College Scorecard file year, so the ratio compares like with like, but they describe different people: the typical borrower and the typical earner are not necessarily the same student. The payment is calculated at the current published undergraduate Direct Loan interest rate (6.39% for 2025-26), not at the rates the debt was originally borrowed at, so it answers what the debt would cost a student starting now. Payments above roughly 8% of gross income are the widely used threshold for strain, and above 15% the standard plan is usually unaffordable without an income-driven alternative. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better.
Where this year’s graduates are headingEvery completion this institution awarded in the latest year, grouped by whether the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projects the occupations that broad field feeds to grow faster than average, grow more slowly, or shrink over the next ten years. 114 completions · BLS EP 2024-34

100% of completions are in fields projected to grow faster than the job market as a whole.

Faster than average100.0%

Each completion is placed by the broad field of its program, then by whether that field’s occupations are projected to grow faster than the all-occupations average, grow more slowly, or decline. Three broad fields map to essentially the whole economy and carry no field signal, so their completions are shown separately as unclassified rather than being counted either way. Field-level and indicative: it describes the labour markets a program mix feeds, not what any individual graduate does.

Earnings 10 years after entry: the middle 50% Working, federally-aided former students · Scorecard 2024-25
25th percentile$18,921
Median$31,468
75th percentile$46,448

Annual earnings of working former students measured ten years after they first enrolled (College Scorecard), shown as a range rather than a single number. The middle half of this school’s graduates earn between the 25th- and 75th-percentile figures; the Median bar matches the headline earnings figure. A wider gap means more variation in how graduates fare. Bars are scaled to the highest value shown.

Every figure on this page carries one of these labels. They are not degrees of confidence: a projection is not a worse number than a filing, it is a different kind of claim, and the distinction is invisible when both are set in the same grey card.

As filedThis is the institution's own figure as filed with a federal collection, or a federal agency's own published figure about it. Ibex has not adjusted it.
Calculated from filingsCalculated by Ibex from figures in the same federal filing, using nothing but arithmetic: a share, a ratio, or an amount per student. It is exactly as sound as the filed numbers it divides.
Blended indexA blend of several other measures on this page, combined by Ibex. The components and how they are weighted are listed in this metric's description. Reasonable people could weight them differently and get a different score.
Modelled by IbexFitted or extrapolated by Ibex from the institution's reported history. This number appears in no federal file: it is a summary of a trend, and it inherits every irregularity in the years it was fitted through.
External projectionBuilt on an external projection about the future, published by a research body rather than measured. Projections are revised as the underlying assumptions change, and this one describes a scenario, not a fact.
Regulator / auditor findingA finding published by a regulator or an independent auditor about this institution. It is a statement someone made in writing, not a measurement Ibex or the school took.

Universidad Central Del Caribe’s largest fields by completions, with graduate earnings (4 years out) and debt benchmarked against the same field at its peer group. Sparklines show the 8-year completions trend.

FieldCompletions / yrMedian earnings, 4 yrs outMedian debtEarnings premiumRisk score
Health Professions & Clinical Sciences12$30,017
(too few peers)
$6,750
(too few peers)
Above benchmark +83%Low · 18

All 1 top fields shown clear the PR state earnings-premium benchmark (indicative).

Earnings-premium status is an indicative estimate: median graduate earnings four years out vs the PR state median earnings of a high-school graduate (undergraduate credentials) or a bachelor’s-degree holder (graduate credentials) from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (2022 ACS 5-year). The official U.S. Department of Education determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.

The risk score (0–100) is an indicative blend of earnings-premium margin and the five-year completions trend, higher means a field pays closer to (or below) the benchmark and is shrinking. A directional screen, not an official determination.

Major-level detail (CIP 4-digit)
Health Professions & Clinical Sciences – 1 CIP program (4-digit), 1 with earnings
Major (CIP 4-digit)Compl./yrEarn 4yrEarn 1yr% > thresholdMedian debtDebt/earnEarnings premium2 of 3 yrs
Allied Health Diagnostic, Intervention, and Treatment ProfessionsCIP 5109 ›12$30,017 n=40$6,7500.23×Above benchmark +83%

Major-level earnings, debt and threshold pass-rates are reported by College Scorecard only where enough graduates exist to protect privacy, so 1 of 1 major shows an earnings figure; the rest read “–”. % > threshold is ED’s own share of graduates out-earning the federal earnings threshold (the do-no-harm pass rate), drawn from the best available measurement window (4-, 5- or 1-year) pooled across all nine College Scorecard Field-of-Study releases; a small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. 2 of 3 yrs flags fields below the earnings-premium benchmark in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, the statutory trigger under the 2025 test (effective July 1, 2026). Indicative; the Department of Education’s official determination may differ. Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard Field of Study (2014–15 through 2022–23 cohorts + most-recent snapshot), accessed March 2026.

See the interactive dashboard for all fields and credential levels (associate through doctoral). Source: College Scorecard Field of Study.

How financially healthy is Universidad Central Del Caribe?
On the NACUBO Composite Financial Index, the −4 to 10 balance-sheet score accreditors and institutional boards use – Universidad Central Del Caribe scores 8.1 (Strong), computed from its IPEDS FY2022-23 finances. This is informational benchmarking, not a credit rating.
How selective is Universidad Central Del Caribe?
Universidad Central Del Caribe admits about 60% of applicants, and roughly 71% of first-year students return for a second year.
What is Universidad Central Del Caribe's student-faculty ratio?
Universidad Central Del Caribe reports a student-faculty ratio of 10:1 (IPEDS, fall 2023) – that is, about 10 students for every instructional faculty member.
How much does Universidad Central Del Caribe cost?
The average published cost of attendance is $14,642 and the average net price after aid is $8,524 (College Scorecard).
How much do Universidad Central Del Caribe graduates earn?
Median earnings ten years after entry are $31,468 (College Scorecard), measured across students who received federal aid.
Are Universidad Central Del Caribe's programs at risk under the federal earnings-premium test?
Indicatively, at Universidad Central Del Caribe, the single largest field with available earnings data clears the PR state earnings-premium benchmark used by the 2025 federal test (effective July 1, 2026) – median graduate earnings (four years out) exceed those of a typical worker without the credential. This is an estimate using College Scorecard earnings vs ACS medians; the official Department of Education determination may differ.

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Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard & IPEDS (most recent releases), with the U.S. Census Bureau (ACS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Projections, field-demand outlook) and WICHE (enrollment-cliff projections). Figures lag the current academic year by roughly two to three years. Percentiles and medians are computed within the institution's peer group. Financial Resilience is a transparent composite, see each component above. Compiled by Ibex Insights.