Pacific Northwest Christian College

Kennewick, WA · official site ↗

Private nonprofitTwo-year institution (not classified by Carnegie)
47
Fin. Resilience
Resilience score

vs. 61 peers in its group

How is this calculated?

Pacific Northwest Christian College is a private nonprofit institution in Kennewick, WA, classified by Carnegie as “Two-year institution (not classified by Carnegie).”

It enrolls about 129 undergraduates and is benchmarked here against 61 peer institutions (Two-year · Private nonprofit).

On Ibex's Financial Resilience score it rates 47 out of 100 within that peer group, a transparent composite of endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per student, and instructional spend per student.

Its strongest standing relative to peers is net-value index (92.0, 99th percentile).

Its weakest is completion rate (all students · 8-yr) (50%).

Peer group

Two-year · Private nonprofit

61 institutions

No cross-metric risk flags triggered.
What changedlargest year-over-year moves
Net tuition revenue / FTE ▲ +57% $4,993 → $7,846 2023→2024
Pell recipient share ▲ +30% 47% → 61.2% 2023→2024
Instructional spend / FTE ▲ +19% $14,021 → $16,724 2023→2024
First-year retention ▼ -10% 48.1% → 43.5% 2023→2024

Most recent single-year change in each tracked metric. Green = moved in this metric’s favorable direction, red = unfavorable, grey = size or context, not scored. Each row uses the latest pair of years that metric has, and federal collections release on different schedules, so the years differ from row to row: read the years on the row, not just the ranking. A single year is also not a trend, the multi-year series is on each metric’s card below.

How exposed Pacific Northwest Christian College is to the structural shifts reshaping higher ed: a composite structural-risk index plus the 2025 federal budget law’s endowment excise tax, Grad PLUS elimination, new Parent PLUS borrowing cap and new Workforce Pell short-term-credential opportunity, and the demographic enrollment cliff. Only signals that apply to this institution are shown.

Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.
32
Low
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%; a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.
-10.9%
Steep decline

Indicative signals, not forecasts, see each metric’s definition and the methodology. Endowment-tax, Grad PLUS, Parent PLUS and Workforce Pell figures appear only where the institution is actually exposed; “nationally” compares against all schools that report each signal.

Turn these signals into action

Seeing exposure is step one. Ibex builds AI agents that monitor and act on exactly these pressures, explore an interactive demo. Live demos run real workflows; the rest are working mockups we build to your institution’s data.

What an enrollment loss would do to the budgetTuition revenue falls with the students; every other revenue line and the entire cost base are held where they are. It measures the size of the hole a decline would open, not what the institution would end up reporting after it responded.

Tuition and fees fund 28% of this institution’s revenue, and it runs a 10.1% operating margin. It could lose about 36.1% of its enrollment before the surplus becomes a deficit, if nothing else changed.

7.5% operating margin after the loss, with costs unchanged

A deliberately simple counterfactual: net tuition per student and total costs stay where the latest IPEDS finance filing put them, so only the tuition line moves. No institution facing this would hold costs flat, which is the point, the figure is the gap that would have to be closed, not a forecast of the margin it would report. A school that responds by discounting harder to hold headcount converts the same problem into a net-price one, and it does not show up here.

Where the money comes from $1.3M total revenue · IPEDS FY2022-23

Private gifts & grants is the largest single source at 71% of revenue.

Private gifts & grants70.8%
Tuition & fees27.8%
Auxiliary enterprises1.3%

Where each dollar of revenue comes from, as a share of total positive revenue. Sources are standardized across public (GASB) and private (FASB) reporting; a net investment loss in a down market is shown as 0% and excluded from the mix.

Average net price by family income After grant & scholarship aid · Scorecard 2024-25
$0–30K$8,129
$30–48K$8,238
$48–75K$11,858
$75–110K$15,550
$110K+$16,491

Average annual net price (total cost minus grant and scholarship aid) paid by federal-aid recipients in each family-income band. Lower-income bands often pay less where need-based aid is strong.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Net tuition revenue / FTETuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student after institutional aid/discounts, what tuition actually nets.Calculated from filings
Below peers
$7,846
28th percentile in peer grouppeer median $11,355
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)59 peers
▲ +69% choppy · turning
Instructional spend / FTESpending on instruction per FTE student, how much of the budget reaches the classroom.Calculated from filings
Average
$16,724
65th percentile in peer grouppeer median $13,057
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)59 peers
▲ +20% choppy · turning
In-state tuition & feesPublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead; sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Published in-state tuition and fees before aid (sticker price).As filed
$11,350
16th percentile in peer grouppeer median $16,190
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)29 peers
▲ +2% steady
Out-of-state tuition & feesPublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead; sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Published out-of-state tuition and fees before aid (sticker price).As filed
$11,350
16th percentile in peer grouppeer median $16,190
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)29 peers
Avg annual cost of attendancePublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead; sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Average total annual cost, tuition, fees and living costs, before aid.As filed
$18,371
11th percentile in peer grouppeer median $31,312
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)22 peers
Avg monthly faculty salaryWhat the institution pays its faculty. Scored as higher-is-better because it tracks an institution's ability to attract and hold teaching staff. It also tracks local cost of living, so compare within a region before drawing a conclusion.Average monthly salary of full-time faculty (IPEDS) – a proxy for faculty investment.As filed
Average
$5,778
58th percentile in peer grouppeer median $5,383
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)13 peers
Average monthly salary of full-time faculty, as reported to IPEDS.
Average net priceWhat students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly price families actually pay after grants and scholarships.As filed
Strong
$10,041
7th percentile in peer grouppeer median $25,163
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)37 peers
Net price, low-income families (under $30K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning under ~$30,000. Lower is better.As filed
Strong
$8,129
8th percentile in peer grouppeer median $22,365
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)32 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn under about $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). This is what the neediest admitted students actually pay, often far below the sticker price. Read it beside the overall net price and the high-income net price: a low figure here signals strong need-based aid. Lower is better.
Net price, high-income families (over $110K)Net price for families earning over about $110,000, which is close to the unsubsidized cost. Deliberately not scored: a low figure can mean a genuinely inexpensive school, or a school discounting even its wealthiest applicants to fill seats. Its distance from the low-income net price is the informative part, and that gap is what the aid-gradient reading is built on.Average yearly cost after grant aid for students from families earning over ~$110,000. Shown as context, not quality.As filed
$16,491
12th percentile in peer grouppeer median $28,651
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)21 peers
Average annual net price paid by students whose families earn more than about $110,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25), close to the full-pay cost since little need-based aid applies. Reported as context: the gap between this and the low-income net price shows how steeply the school discounts by family income. Not a measure of quality.
Net price, middle-income families ($30K-$48K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $30,000 to $48,000. Lower is better.As filed
Strong
$8,238
2nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $23,470
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)24 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $30,000 to $48,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the middle rung of the income net-price ladder: read it together with the low-income (under ~$30K) and high-income (over ~$110K) net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.
Net price, upper-middle families ($48K-$75K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $48,000 to $75,000. Lower is better.As filed
Strong
$11,858
6th percentile in peer grouppeer median $22,757
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)27 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $48,000 to $75,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fourth rung of the five-rung income net-price ladder: read it with the low, middle, upper and high-income net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.
Net price, upper-income families ($75K-$110K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $75,000 to $110,000. Lower is better.As filed
Strong
$15,550
6th percentile in peer grouppeer median $28,348
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)24 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $75,000 to $110,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fifth rung of the income net-price ladder, just below the full-pay tier: read it with the lower rungs and the high-income net price to see the full cost gradient by family income. Lower is better.
Operating marginNet surplus as a share of total revenue, whether the institution runs in the black.Calculated from filings
Strong
10.1%
75th percentile in peer grouppeer median -2.3%
higher is better
FY2022-2310 peers
Net surplus as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): (total revenues − total expenses) ÷ total revenues. A surplus above 4% is strong; a thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks.
Tuition dependencyTuition's share of total revenue, how exposed the budget is to enrollment swings.Calculated from filings
27.8%
5th percentile in peer grouppeer median 84%
context, not scored
FY2022-2310 peers
Tuition & fees as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.
Tuition discount rateInstitutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition (IPEDS, private nonprofits only) – the tuition-discount rate. The share of sticker tuition handed back as aid; a high rate (the national average is ~56%) signals heavy price competition for students.Calculated from filings
Moderate
29.7%
85th percentile in peer grouppeer median 3.1%
context, not scored
FY2022-2356 peers
Institutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition & fee revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB): allowances applied to tuition ÷ (net tuition revenue + those allowances) – the tuition-discount rate enrollment leaders track, i.e. the share of sticker tuition handed back as institutional aid. Private nonprofit institutions only; public (GASB) institutions report tuition differently and are not shown. The national private-college average is roughly 56% (NACUBO); above ~60% signals heavy price competition.
State appropriations shareState appropriations' share of total revenue, material for public institutions, near zero for private.Calculated from filings
0%
FY2022-23
State appropriations as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Material for public institutions; ~0 for private.
Administrative cost shareInstitutional support (central administration, governance, general administration, fundraising, and under FASB the operation & maintenance of plant) as a share of total expenses, private nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the figure is comparable. An informational gauge of administrative intensity, not a measure of waste.Calculated from filings
11.5%
38th percentile in peer grouppeer median 16.4%
context, not scored
FY2022-2351 peers
Institutional support, central administration, executive management, governance, general administration, fundraising and (under FASB rules) operation & maintenance of plant, as a share of total expenses (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB). Private nonprofit institutions only: public (GASB) institutions report functional expenses on a different basis and frequently consolidate large hospital and auxiliary operations, which makes a comparable ratio unreliable, so they are not shown. Because FASB folds plant operations into institutional support, this runs higher than a narrow 'central-office' figure, and schools with sizable hospital or auxiliary operations show a lower ratio as those costs enlarge total expenses. An informational benchmark of administrative intensity, compared within the peer group, not a measure of waste or quality.
Avg Parent PLUS loanAverage Parent PLUS loan originated per recipient family.As filed
$7,978
9th percentile in peer grouppeer median $13,323
context, not scored
AY2025-26 YTD (Federal Student Aid)27 peers
Average federal Parent PLUS loan per recipient (U.S. Dept. of Education, FSA Direct Loan Dashboard, AY2025-26 YTD). Parent PLUS faces new aggregate borrowing caps under the 2025 budget law; a high average shows how far families currently borrow above other federal aid. Companion to the Grad PLUS and Parent PLUS cap-gap signals. Context, not a quality measure. From the Federal Student Aid Direct Loan dashboard for award year 2025-26, year-to-date through Q2. A partial year, so it is not comparable with a full-year total.
Spent on instructionInstruction as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
86.9%
79th percentile in peer grouppeer median 58.9%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)56 peers
Instruction spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). 'Where the money goes' context, reported here for private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the functional split is comparable; not computed for public or for-profit institutions. Higher is not automatically better; research universities and those with hospitals or large auxiliaries spread spending across other functions.
Spent on student servicesStudent services as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
1.6%
46th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.3%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)56 peers
Student-services spending (admissions, registrar, student life, counseling) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.
Spent on academic supportAcademic support as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
0%
17th percentile in peer grouppeer median 6.3%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)56 peers
Academic-support spending (libraries, academic computing, deans' offices) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Context, not a quality measure.
Spent on researchResearch as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
0%
49th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)56 peers
Research spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only; near zero at teaching-focused colleges and sizeable at research universities. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.
Financial responsibility scoreED financial-responsibility composite score (-1.0 to 3.0; >=1.5 is passing).Regulator / auditor finding
Strong
3.0
97th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.2
higher is better
FY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)47 peers
The U.S. Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, a -1.0 to +3.0 measure of an institution's solvency built from its audited finances. 1.5 and above passes; 1.0-1.4 is a zone needing oversight; below 1.0 fails and can trigger letter-of-credit or cash-monitoring requirements. ED computes it only for private non-profit and proprietary schools, so it is reported only where scored. Higher is safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.Blended index
Low
32
FY2022-23 (IPEDS) with WICHE 2024 projections
An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.
Enrollment loss before deficitHow much of its enrollment the institution could lose before running an operating deficit, if it changed nothing else.Modelled by Ibex
Wide cushion
36.1%
95th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
higher is better
FY2022-2310 peers
The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of total revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss; the same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operating margin after a 10% enrollment lossWhat the operating margin becomes if a tenth of the students go and nothing else changes.Modelled by Ibex
Still in surplus
7.5%
95th percentile in peer grouppeer median -11.6%
higher is better
FY2022-2310 peers
The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students; every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operational-risk index (official findings)0-100 severity of what federal regulators and auditors have actually said about this institution. Higher means more official concern.Blended index
Clean
0.0
2nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 11.0
lower is better
ED composite FY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)47 peers
A 0-100 severity score built only from published federal determinations: the Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, its Heightened Cash Monitoring list, and the going-concern, material-weakness, material-noncompliance, modified-opinion and repeat-finding results of the school's Single Audit. It is deliberately NOT a model: every component is something a regulator or an independent auditor put in writing. Components are scored only where they exist, and the score is their weighted average, so a school assessed on two signals sits on the same scale as one assessed on seven. Schools with neither a composite score nor a Single Audit on file are omitted rather than shown as clean: ED does not compute a composite score for public institutions, and no audit on file means nobody looked, not that nothing was found. Read it alongside the structural-risk index, which is the tool's own forward-looking model rather than a record of findings. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Graduation rate · first-time, full-time

Not reported, this institution has no first-time, full-time bachelor's-degree cohort, so the graduation rate does not apply. See the all-students completion rate.

Completion rate · all students
50%

50% earned a degree or certificate within 8 years (IPEDS Outcome Measures)
The broader cohort, also counts part-time entrants and transfer-ins, and any credential. More inclusive, so it can run higher than the graduation rate.

Why two numbers? They measure different students over different windows, so they are not directly comparable. The graduation rate is the standard federal headline but tracks only first-time, full-time students through a bachelor's; the all-students completion rate adds the part-time and transfer students it leaves out, over a longer window. Read each for what it covers. Source: U.S. Department of Education, IPEDS Graduation Rates & Outcome Measures, via College Scorecard.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Undergraduate enrollmentNumber of degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS fall headcount). A size measure, not a quality signal.As filed
129
66th percentile in peer grouppeer median 89
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)61 peers
▲ +258% steady
First-year retentionShare of first-time, full-time students who return for a second year, an early signal of student fit and support. Reported for two-year and less-than-two-year institutions.As filed
Below peers
43.5%
17th percentile in peer grouppeer median 75.2%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)44 peers
▲ +36% choppy · turning
Graduation rate (150% of normal time)Of first-time, full-time degree- or certificate-seeking students, the share who completed within 150% of the program's normal time (about three years for a two-year program), per College Scorecard. This is the two-year analogue of the six-year graduation rate shown for four-year colleges.As filed
Strong
100%
90th percentile in peer grouppeer median 77.3%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)41 peers
▲ +32% choppy
Share of first-time, full-time degree/certificate-seeking students who completed within 150% of the program's normal time (about three years for a two-year program), per College Scorecard. The two-year analogue of the six-year rate shown for four-year colleges.
Graduation rate (on-time)Of first-time, full-time degree- or certificate-seeking students, the share who completed within the program's normal time (100%, on-time), per College Scorecard. Reported for two-year and less-than-two-year institutions.As filed
Below peers
0%
5th percentile in peer grouppeer median 69.9%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)41 peers
Share of first-time, full-time degree/certificate-seeking students who completed within the program's normal time (100%), per College Scorecard. Reported for two-year and less-than-two-year institutions.
Pell recipient shareShare of undergraduates receiving a Pell grant, the standard proxy for how many low-income students a school enrolls. Not scored in either direction: it is a measure of who a school serves, and both a high and a low share are defensible depending on the mission.Share of undergraduates on a federal Pell Grant, a proxy for the share from lower-income families.As filed
61.2%
84th percentile in peer grouppeer median 37.9%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)60 peers
▲ +31% choppy
Completion rate (all students · 8-yr)Of ALL entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, the share who earned a degree or certificate at this institution within eight years (IPEDS Outcome Measures). Broader than the graduation rate, which counts only first-time, full-time students, so the two are measured on different students and are not directly comparable.As filed
Below peers
50%
3rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 73.3%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)15 peers
Share of ALL entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, who earned a degree or certificate at this institution within eight years (IPEDS Outcome Measures, via College Scorecard). Broader and more inclusive than the graduation-rate figures, which count only first-time, full-time students entering a bachelor's program, so the two are measured on different groups of students and are not directly comparable.
Adult learners (25+)Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older.As filed
3.9%
5th percentile in peer grouppeer median 49.1%
context, not scored
2023-24 (Scorecard)55 peers
Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older (College Scorecard, 2023-24). Read as context on the student mix: schools serving many working adults look different on persistence and part-time measures than traditional-age campuses, and neither is inherently better. From the College Scorecard 2023-24 data file.
Part-time undergraduatesShare of undergraduates enrolled part-time.As filed
10.8%
71st percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)61 peers
Share of undergraduates enrolled part-time (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Context, not quality: a high part-time share is common at community and commuter institutions and affects graduation-rate comparisons, which are based only on full-time, first-time students.
Women (share of undergraduates)Share of undergraduates who are women.As filed
19.4%
6th percentile in peer grouppeer median 81.8%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)61 peers
Share of undergraduates who are women (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context on the student mix, not a measure of quality.
12-month FTE enrollmentFull-time-equivalent enrollment over the full year, the denominator for per-student finance measures.As filed
109
64th percentile in peer grouppeer median 83
context, not scored
2023-24 (IPEDS)60 peers
Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.
Student-faculty ratioStudents per instructional faculty member, lower usually means smaller classes and more contact.As filed
10:1
58th percentile in peer grouppeer median 9:1
context, not scored
Fall 202357 peers
Students per instructional faculty member (IPEDS, fall 2023). Lower generally means smaller classes and more faculty contact, though the measure mixes undergraduate and graduate teaching and is institution-reported.
Fully online studentsShare of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education (online) courses.As filed
0%
43rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 2023 (IPEDS)57 peers
Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality; online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.
Applicant-pool diversity shiftProjected change in the non-white share of the home state's public high-school graduating class, class of 2025 to 2037.Modelled by Ibex
+7.4 pts
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.)
Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.
Hybrid (some online) enrollmentShare of students enrolled in some but not all courses online (hybrid), Fall 2023.As filed
19%
83rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 202357 peers
Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Transfer-in share (undergraduate)Transfer-in students as a share of undergraduate enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
8.5%
90th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 202357 peers
Transfer-in students as a share of all undergraduates (IPEDS, Fall 2023). A high share means the school depends on transfer pipelines rather than first-time freshmen, which changes both recruitment strategy and melt/retention risk. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Graduate share of enrollmentGraduate students as a share of total enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
0%
Fall 2023
Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Women share of facultyWomen as a share of instructional staff (full- and part-time), Fall 2023.As filed
29.4%
14th percentile in peer grouppeer median 84.4%
context, not scored
Fall 202355 peers
Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Faculty of color shareU.S. faculty of color as a share of instructional staff, Fall 2023.As filed
5.9%
37th percentile in peer grouppeer median 12.1%
context, not scored
Fall 202355 peers
Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Varsity athlete shareVarsity athletes as a share of total enrollment (EADA, 2024-25).As filed
92.2%
2024-25 (EADA)
Student-athletes on varsity rosters as a share of total enrollment, from the federal Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act filing (2024-25). At small athletics-driven schools this share is large and athletics recruiting is a core part of the enrollment funnel; at big universities it is small. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Athletics revenue (total)Total intercollegiate-athletics revenue reported under EADA, 2024-25.As filed
$467,607
2024-25 (EADA)
Total revenue attributed to the school's intercollegiate-athletics program, from the federal Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act filing (2024-25). It indicates the scale of the athletics enterprise, which at some schools is a major brand and enrollment driver. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Direct competitors within 100 miCount of other institutions within 100 miles. Scored as lower-is-better because it is used here as a competitive-pressure signal for the institution, not as a benefit to students.Number of same-type institutions (same Carnegie class and control) within 100 miles.Calculated from filings
Strong
0
14th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)61 peers
How many institutions of the same type (same Carnegie classification and control, i.e. the schools competing for the same students) sit within roughly 100 miles. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks; a low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting leverage.
States recruited fromNumber of distinct US states sending at least one first-time student.Calculated from filings
Below peers
1
30th percentile in peer grouppeer median 1
higher is better
Fall 202235 peers
How many distinct US states the school's first-time degree-seeking class is drawn from (IPEDS Residence & Migration, Fall 2022). A higher count signals broader geographic reach and less dependence on any single state's shrinking pool of high school graduates; a low count means the school recruits from a narrow region and is more exposed to that region's demographic decline. Banded against the school's peer group.
Foreign first-time shareShare of first-time students whose legal residence is a foreign country.As filed
0%
46th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 202236 peers
Share of the school's first-time degree-seeking class whose legal residence is outside the United States (IPEDS Residence & Migration, Fall 2022). A measure of international reach in the entering class. Neither high nor low is inherently better; it is context for tuition-revenue mix and exposure to visa and geopolitical risk. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Metro-area unemployment rateUnemployment rate in the school's metro area, ACS 2019-23.As filed
Average
5.1%
46th percentile in peer grouppeer median 5.2%
lower is better
ACS 2019-2361 peers
The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2019-23, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.
On-campus crime rateOn-campus criminal offenses per 1,000 students, 2024 (Clery Act).As filed
Strong
0 per 1k
34th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0 per 1k
lower is better
2024 (Clery)25 peers
Criminal offenses reported on campus in 2024 (murder, manslaughter, the four sex-offense categories, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor-vehicle theft and arson) per 1,000 students, from the school's federal Clery Act filing. Counts and enrollment are summed across the institution's campuses. A higher number does not always mean a more dangerous school: thorough reporting and dense residential campuses raise it. Lower is generally safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%; a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.External projection
Steep decline
-10.9%
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.) projection
Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age; the U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
In-state HS graduatesPublic + private high-school graduates in the school's state, class of 2025.External projection
83,021
31st percentile in peer grouppeer median 137,304
context, not scored
Class of 2025 (WICHE)61 peers
The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Enrollment momentum (CAGR)Enrollment momentum (CAGR).Modelled by Ibex
Strong
37.6%
99th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
higher is better
2020-21 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)50 peers
Compound annual growth rate of undergraduate enrollment over the years the tool tracks (College Scorecard, roughly 2016-2024). Positive means the school is growing; negative means it is shrinking, the leading indicator of demand stress ahead of the demographic cliff. Where the reported count jumps by a merger or a campus consolidation brought under one institution, only the years after that jump are measured, and where too little history follows it no rate is shown. A sharp fall is measured in full: a shrinking count is the signal this metric exists to carry, not an artifact to be cut away. No rate is shown where the enrolment never reaches 25 in the measured window: on a series that small one student is a double-digit annual rate, and a percentile computed from it would rank noise. Banded against the school's peer group. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Net-price momentum (CAGR)Net-price momentum (CAGR).Modelled by Ibex
Below peers
14%
95th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.9%
lower is better
2020-21 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)54 peers
Compound annual growth rate of net tuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student over the tracked years. A high positive rate means the school's real net price is climbing faster than peers, which can strain affordability and yield. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Competing enrollment nearbyUndergraduates enrolled at same-type institutions within 100 miles, per one of this school's own undergraduates.Calculated from filings
Strong
0.00×
10th percentile in peer grouppeer median 1.65×
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)25 peers
For every undergraduate enrolled here, how many are enrolled at directly competing institutions (same Carnegie classification and control) within roughly 100 miles. It is the weight behind the competitor count on the neighbouring card: three tiny colleges nearby and one 40,000-student public are the same number of competitors and a completely different market. A value of 5x means the surrounding same-type market is five times this school's size, so a small shift in where those students choose to go moves this school's class far more than it moves theirs. Straight-line distance from campus coordinates, same 100-mile catchment as the competitor count. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower means more room to grow without taking students from a larger rival.
Consecutive years of enrollment declineHow many years in a row undergraduate enrollment has fallen, counting back from the most recent year.Modelled by Ibex
Not declining
0 yrs
29th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0 yrs
lower is better
2020-21 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)58 peers
The number of consecutive years, ending with the most recent one, in which this school's undergraduate headcount fell. Zero means the latest year was flat or up. A single down year is ordinary; three or more in a row is the pattern that precedes program cuts and closures, and it is visible in the federal data years before it becomes public. A fall smaller than 2% counts as flat, because year-to-year reporting noise at that scale would otherwise manufacture streaks. Measured on the same window as enrollment momentum: where a merger or consolidation makes the earlier years a different institution, only the years after it are counted. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Feeder statesThe home state of every first-time degree-seeking undergraduate in the entering class, as reported to IPEDS. Darker means a larger share of the class; the institution's own state is highlighted separately because at nearly every school it dwarfs the rest. 1 states and territories · Fall 2022
ALAKAZARCACOCTDEDCFLGAHIIDILINIAKSKYLAMEMDMAMIMNMSMOMTNENVNHNJNMNYNCNDOHOKORPARISCSDTNTXUTVTVAWashington: 2 students, 100.0%WAWVWIWY
WA 100.0%

Home state of first-time degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS residence and migration). Each state is one square of equal size, arranged in the rough shape of the country, so a small state sending many students is as visible as a large one. The institution’s own state is shown in gold and every other state is shaded against the largest of them, not against the home state, which otherwise flattens the rest of the map. Shares are of the whole entering class, so they do not add to 100% where students came from abroad.

Undergraduate race & ethnicity IPEDS 2024-25
Hispanic/Latino45.0%
White31.8%
Black11.6%
Two or more races10.1%
American Indian/Alaska Native0.8%
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander0.8%

Undergraduate enrollment by race and ethnicity, as reported to IPEDS (College Scorecard). “International” denotes nonresident students; “Unknown” means race/ethnicity was not reported.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Share taking federal loansShare of students taking out federal loans, a borrowing-reliance signal.As filed
52.7%
51st percentile in peer grouppeer median 51.9%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)60 peers
Net-value indexComposite 0-100 of earnings, completion, net price and debt vs peers.Blended index
Strong
92.0
99th percentile in peer grouppeer median 51.5
higher is better
2020-21 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)46 peers
A 0-100 composite of student value relative to the peer group: the average of peer percentile ranks for median earnings ten years out, graduation rate, net price (lower counts as better value) and median debt (lower is better). Built only where at least two components are reported. Higher means more outcome per dollar. Banded against the school's peer group.

Every figure on this page carries one of these labels. They are not degrees of confidence: a projection is not a worse number than a filing, it is a different kind of claim, and the distinction is invisible when both are set in the same grey card.

As filedThis is the institution's own figure as filed with a federal collection, or a federal agency's own published figure about it. Ibex has not adjusted it.
Calculated from filingsCalculated by Ibex from figures in the same federal filing, using nothing but arithmetic: a share, a ratio, or an amount per student. It is exactly as sound as the filed numbers it divides.
Blended indexA blend of several other measures on this page, combined by Ibex. The components and how they are weighted are listed in this metric's description. Reasonable people could weight them differently and get a different score.
Modelled by IbexFitted or extrapolated by Ibex from the institution's reported history. This number appears in no federal file: it is a summary of a trend, and it inherits every irregularity in the years it was fitted through.
External projectionBuilt on an external projection about the future, published by a research body rather than measured. Projections are revised as the underlying assumptions change, and this one describes a scenario, not a fact.
Regulator / auditor findingA finding published by a regulator or an independent auditor about this institution. It is a statement someone made in writing, not a measurement Ibex or the school took.

Pacific Northwest Christian College’s largest fields by completions, with graduate earnings (4 years out) and debt benchmarked against the same field at its peer group. Sparklines show the 8-year completions trend.

FieldCompletions / yrMedian earnings, 4 yrs outMedian debtEarnings premiumRisk score
Theology & Religious Vocations11Low · 0

Earnings-premium status is an indicative estimate: median graduate earnings four years out vs the WA state median earnings of a high-school graduate (undergraduate credentials) or a bachelor’s-degree holder (graduate credentials) from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (2022 ACS 5-year). The official U.S. Department of Education determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.

The risk score (0–100) is an indicative blend of earnings-premium margin and the five-year completions trend, higher means a field pays closer to (or below) the benchmark and is shrinking. A directional screen, not an official determination.

Major-level detail (CIP 4-digit)
Theology & Religious Vocations – 1 CIP program (4-digit), 0 with earnings
Major (CIP 4-digit)Compl./yrEarn 4yrEarn 1yr% > thresholdMedian debtDebt/earnEarnings premium2 of 3 yrs
Bible/Biblical StudiesCIP 3902 ›11

Major-level earnings, debt and threshold pass-rates are reported by College Scorecard only where enough graduates exist to protect privacy, so 0 of 1 major shows an earnings figure; the rest read “–”. % > threshold is ED’s own share of graduates out-earning the federal earnings threshold (the do-no-harm pass rate), drawn from the best available measurement window (4-, 5- or 1-year) pooled across all nine College Scorecard Field-of-Study releases; a small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. 2 of 3 yrs flags fields below the earnings-premium benchmark in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, the statutory trigger under the 2025 test (effective July 1, 2026). Indicative; the Department of Education’s official determination may differ. Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard Field of Study (2014–15 through 2022–23 cohorts + most-recent snapshot), accessed March 2026.

See the interactive dashboard for all fields and credential levels (associate through doctoral). Source: College Scorecard Field of Study.

What is Pacific Northwest Christian College's student-faculty ratio?
Pacific Northwest Christian College reports a student-faculty ratio of 10:1 (IPEDS, fall 2023) – that is, about 10 students for every instructional faculty member.
How much does Pacific Northwest Christian College cost?
The average published cost of attendance is $18,371 and the average net price after aid is $10,041 (College Scorecard).
Which schools are Pacific Northwest Christian College's peers?
Pacific Northwest Christian College is benchmarked against 61 institutions in the Two-year · Private nonprofit peer group; all percentiles and medians on this page are computed within that group.

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Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard & IPEDS (most recent releases), with the U.S. Census Bureau (ACS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Projections, field-demand outlook) and WICHE (enrollment-cliff projections). Figures lag the current academic year by roughly two to three years. Percentiles and medians are computed within the institution's peer group. Financial Resilience is a transparent composite, see each component above. Compiled by Ibex Insights.