Sami Halaseh Institute

Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn under about $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). This is what the neediest admitted students pay, often far below the sticker price. Read it beside the overall net price and the high-income net price: a low figure here signals strong need-based aid. Lower is better.

Average annual net price paid by students whose families earn more than about $110,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25), close to the full-pay cost since little need-based aid applies. Reported as context: the gap between this and the low-income net price shows how steeply the school discounts by family income. Not a measure of quality.

Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $48,000 to $75,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fourth rung of the five-rung income net-price ladder: read it with the low, middle, upper and high-income net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.

Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $75,000 to $110,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fifth rung of the income net-price ladder, just below the full-pay tier: read it with the lower rungs and the high-income net price to see the full cost gradient by family income. Lower is better.

Operating result as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): the IPEDS net operating revenue ratio, the same figure the Financial Health Index uses. It leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and additions to endowment, and for private nonprofits counts only unrestricted revenue, so a one-year swing in investment markets or a building grant does not read as an operating surplus or deficit. For-profit institutions: (revenue excluding investment return − total expenses) ÷ that revenue. A surplus above 4% is strong. A thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks. Values beyond ±100% are not shown.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

Tuition and fees as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23), the same revenue base as the operating margin, so the two combine correctly in the enrollment-loss scenario. Operating revenue leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and endowment additions, and for private nonprofits counts unrestricted revenue only, so this share can run a few points above the tuition slice of the revenue-mix chart, which divides by every revenue source. For public institutions the base is the IPEDS consolidated figure, which can include component units such as foundations and university health systems, so a public with a large hospital shows lower dependency than its campus budget alone would. Not shown where the operating margin is not shown. Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.

The U.S. Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, a -1.0 to +3.0 measure of an institution's solvency built from its audited finances. 1.5 and above passes, 1.0-1.4 is a zone needing oversight, and below 1.0 fails and can trigger letter-of-credit or cash-monitoring requirements. ED computes it only for private non-profit and proprietary schools, so it is reported only where scored. Higher is safer. Banded against the school's peer group.

An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. For-profit institutions report no operating-cushion figure and nearly all of them run close to 100% tuition dependency, so their index rests on at most three signals and reads higher than a nonprofit's; compare a for-profit with other for-profits. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.

Obligations reported to USAspending.gov for FY2025 (Oct 2024 to Sep 2025), summed across every awarding agency. This is money committed, not money spent, so it will not equal the audited 'Federal awards expended' figure and the two should not be subtracted from one another. Negative amounts (agencies reclaiming prior commitments) are excluded. A school with no figure here is one we could not match to a federal recipient (UEI) record, not one that received nothing; several large research universities are still unmatched.

A count of awarding agencies with positive FY2025 obligations. Neither high nor low is inherently better: a community college funded solely by the Department of Education is behaving normally, while a research university typically draws on ten or more agencies.

The largest agency's FY2025 obligations as a share of the institution's total positive federal obligations. Read it as concentration, not risk: most teaching colleges sit near 100% because nearly all their federal money is Department of Education student aid.

The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of the same operating revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss. The same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. Where the surplus is larger than all tuition revenue, no enrollment loss alone produces a deficit and no figure is shown. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

A 0-100 severity score built only from published federal determinations: the Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, its Heightened Cash Monitoring list, and the going-concern, material-weakness, material-noncompliance, modified-opinion and repeat-finding results of the school's Single Audit. It is deliberately NOT a model: every component is something a regulator or an independent auditor put in writing. Components are scored only where they exist, and the score is their weighted average, so a school assessed on two signals sits on the same scale as one assessed on seven. Schools with neither a composite score nor a Single Audit on file are omitted rather than shown as clean: ED does not compute a composite score for public institutions, and no audit on file means nobody looked, not that nothing was found. Read it alongside the structural-risk index, which is the tool's own forward-looking model rather than a record of findings. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.

Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older (College Scorecard, 2023-24). Read as context on the student mix: schools serving many working adults look different on persistence and part-time measures than traditional-age campuses, and neither is inherently better. From the College Scorecard 2023-24 data file.

Share of undergraduates enrolled part-time (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Context, not quality: a high part-time share is common at community and commuter institutions and affects graduation-rate comparisons, which are based only on full-time, first-time students.

Share of undergraduates who are women (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context on the student mix, not a measure of quality.

Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.

Students per instructional faculty member (IPEDS, fall 2023). Lower generally means smaller classes and more faculty contact, though the measure mixes undergraduate and graduate teaching and is institution-reported.

Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality. Online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.

Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.

Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Transfer-in students as a share of all undergraduates (IPEDS, Fall 2023). A high share means the school depends on transfer pipelines rather than first-time freshmen, which changes both recruitment strategy and melt/retention risk. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

How many institutions in the same Ibex peer group, the schools most likely to compete for the same students, sit within roughly 100 miles. For most schools the peer group is the same Carnegie classification and control. Schools in small classes sit in broader fallback groups by level, sector or region (see Peer groups in the methodology), and for them the count is looser. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks. A low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting power.

The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2020-24, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.

Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age. The U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

The number of consecutive years, ending with the most recent one, in which this school's undergraduate headcount fell. Zero means the latest year was flat or up. A single down year is ordinary. Three or more in a row is the pattern that precedes program cuts and closures, and it is visible in the federal data years before it becomes public. A fall smaller than 2% counts as flat, because year-to-year reporting noise at that scale would otherwise manufacture streaks. Measured on the same window as enrollment momentum: where a merger or consolidation makes the earlier years a different institution, only the years after it are counted. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.