Urban Academy of Beauty
Rio Rancho, NM · official site ↗
Private for-profitLess-than-two-year institution (not classified by Carnegie)
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Fin. Resilience
Urban Academy of Beauty is a private for-profit institution in Rio Rancho, NM, classified by Carnegie as “Less-than-two-year institution (not classified by Carnegie).”
It is benchmarked here against 1329 peer institutions (Less-than-two-year · Private for-profit).
Its strongest standing relative to peers is direct competitors within 100 mi (6, 7th percentile).
Its weakest is loan repayment rate (1-yr) (23%).
Peer group
Less-than-two-year · Private for-profit
1329 institutions
No cross-metric risk flags triggered.
Policy & demographic exposure
How exposed Urban Academy of Beauty is to the structural shifts reshaping higher ed: a composite structural-risk index plus the 2025 federal budget law’s endowment excise tax, Grad PLUS elimination, new Parent PLUS borrowing cap and new Workforce Pell short-term-credential opportunity, and the demographic enrollment cliff. Only signals that apply to this institution are shown.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.
67
HighEnrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%. This is a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.
-23.9%
Severe declineIndicative signals, not forecasts, see each metric’s definition and the methodology. Endowment-tax, Grad PLUS, Parent PLUS and Workforce Pell figures appear only where the institution is exposed, and “nationally” compares against all schools that report each signal.
Turn these signals into action
Seeing exposure is step one. Ibex builds AI agents that monitor and act on exactly these pressures. Explore an interactive demo. Live demos run real workflows, and the rest are working mockups we build to your institution’s data.
Enrollment shock
What an enrollment loss would do to the budgetTuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the entire cost base stay where they are. It measures the size of the hole a decline would open, not what the institution would end up reporting after it responded.
Tuition and fees fund 95% of this institution’s operating revenue, and it runs a 14.0% operating margin. It could lose about 14.8% of its enrollment before the surplus becomes a deficit, if nothing else changed.
5.0%
operating margin after the loss, with costs unchanged
A deliberately simple counterfactual: net tuition per student and total costs stay where the latest IPEDS finance filing put them, so only the tuition line moves. No institution facing this would hold costs flat, which is the point, the figure is the gap that would have to be closed, not a forecast of the margin it would report. A school that responds by discounting harder to hold headcount converts the same problem into a net-price one, and it does not show up here.
Revenue composition
Where the money comes from
$117,372 total revenue · IPEDS FY2022-23
Tuition & fees is the largest single source at 95% of revenue.
Tuition & fees94.5%
Other revenue5.5%
Where each dollar of revenue comes from, as a share of total positive revenue. Sources are standardized across public (GASB) and private (FASB) reporting. A net investment loss in a down market is shown as 0% and excluded from the mix.
Financial Health
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Operating marginOperating surplus or deficit as a share of operating revenue, leaving out investment swings and capital gifts: whether day-to-day operations run in the black.Calculated from filings
Strong
14%
47th percentile in peer grouppeer median 16.3%
higher is better
FY2022-231201 peers
Operating result as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): the IPEDS net operating revenue ratio, the same figure the Financial Health Index uses. It leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and additions to endowment, and for private nonprofits counts only unrestricted revenue, so a one-year swing in investment markets or a building grant does not read as an operating surplus or deficit. For-profit institutions: (revenue excluding investment return − total expenses) ÷ that revenue. A surplus above 4% is strong. A thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks. Values beyond ±100% are not shown.
Tuition dependencyNet tuition as a share of operating revenue, how exposed the budget is to enrollment swings.Calculated from filings
94.5%
62nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 91.3%
context, not scored
FY2022-231201 peers
Tuition and fees as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23), the same revenue base as the operating margin, so the two combine correctly in the enrollment-loss scenario. Operating revenue leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and endowment additions, and for private nonprofits counts unrestricted revenue only, so this share can run a few points above the tuition slice of the revenue-mix chart, which divides by every revenue source. For public institutions the base is the IPEDS consolidated figure, which can include component units such as foundations and university health systems, so a public with a large hospital shows lower dependency than its campus budget alone would. Not shown where the operating margin is not shown. Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.Blended index
High
67
FY2022-23 (IPEDS) with WICHE 2024 projections
An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. For-profit institutions report no operating-cushion figure and nearly all of them run close to 100% tuition dependency, so their index rests on at most three signals and reads higher than a nonprofit's; compare a for-profit with other for-profits. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.
Enrollment loss before deficitHow much of its enrollment the institution could lose before running an operating deficit, if it changed nothing else.Modelled by Ibex
Some cushion
14.8%
45th percentile in peer grouppeer median 18%
higher is better
FY2022-231186 peers
The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of the same operating revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss. The same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. Where the surplus is larger than all tuition revenue, no enrollment loss alone produces a deficit and no figure is shown. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operating margin after a 10% enrollment lossWhat the operating margin becomes if a tenth of the students go and nothing else changes.Modelled by Ibex
Still in surplus
5%
45th percentile in peer grouppeer median 8.1%
higher is better
FY2022-231201 peers
The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Enrollment & Pipeline
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Undergraduate enrollmentNumber of degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS fall headcount). A size measure, not a quality signal.As filed
0
0th percentile in peer grouppeer median 100
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)1302 peers
First-generation studentsShare of undergraduates who are the first in their family to attend college.As filed
49.8%
38th percentile in peer grouppeer median 52.3%
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)929 peers
Share of undergraduates who are first-generation college students (College Scorecard, 2016-17). An access signal, not a measure of quality: a higher share often reflects a stronger commitment to serving students whose parents did not attend college. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Median family incomeMedian family income of students at this institution.As filed
$19,724
67th percentile in peer grouppeer median $16,488
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)1079 peers
Median family income of students at this institution (College Scorecard, 2016-17). An affordability and access signal, not a measure of quality: a lower figure typically means the school enrolls more students from modest-income families. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Low-income students (under $30K)Share of students from families earning under about $30,000 a year.As filed
68.3%
43rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 70.5%
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)1045 peers
Share of students whose families earn under roughly $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2016-17). A direct low-income access signal: a higher share usually reflects a school enrolling more students from modest-income households, and pairs naturally with the Pell recipient share. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Middle-income students ($30K-$75K)Share of students from families earning roughly $30,000 to $75,000 a year.As filed
26.3%
75th percentile in peer grouppeer median 22.1%
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)624 peers
Share of students whose families earn roughly $30,000 to $75,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2016-17), the two middle income bands combined. Reported as context on the student mix: together with the low-income (under ~$30K) and upper-income (over ~$75K) shares it sketches the full family-income picture, and the three bands sum to about 100%. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Applicant-pool diversity shiftProjected change in the non-white share of the home state's public high-school graduating class, class of 2025 to 2037.Modelled by Ibex
+1.7 pts
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.)
Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.
Women share of facultyWomen as a share of instructional staff (full- and part-time), Fall 2023.As filed
100%
82nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 87.5%
context, not scored
Fall 20231269 peers
Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Faculty of color shareU.S. faculty of color as a share of instructional staff, Fall 2023.As filed
0%
7th percentile in peer grouppeer median 50%
context, not scored
Fall 20231269 peers
Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Direct competitors within 100 miCount of other institutions within 100 miles. Scored as lower-is-better because it is used here as a competitive-pressure signal for the institution, not as a benefit to students.Number of institutions in the same peer group within 100 miles.Calculated from filings
Strong
6
7th percentile in peer grouppeer median 27
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)1302 peers
How many institutions in the same Ibex peer group, the schools most likely to compete for the same students, sit within roughly 100 miles. For most schools the peer group is the same Carnegie classification and control. Schools in small classes sit in broader fallback groups by level, sector or region (see Peer groups in the methodology), and for them the count is looser. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks. A low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting power.
Metro-area unemployment rateUnemployment rate in the school's metro area, ACS 2020-24.As filed
Average
5.5%
55th percentile in peer grouppeer median 5.3%
lower is better
ACS 2020-241289 peers
The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2020-24, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%. This is a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.External projection
Severe decline
-23.9%
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.) projection
Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age. The U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
In-state HS graduatesPublic + private high-school graduates in the school's state, class of 2025.External projection
22,472
4th percentile in peer grouppeer median 111,084
context, not scored
Class of 2025 (WICHE)1293 peers
The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Student Outcomes & Risk
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Median earnings (10 yr)Median earnings of former students ten years after first enrolling (working, federally-aided students).As filed
Strong
$33,273
88th percentile in peer grouppeer median $25,459
higher is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)899 peers
Taken from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the most recent release in which the Department published this element. It is null in every release since. Earnings are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that first enrolled about a decade earlier, so this describes students who entered well before 2020.
Median debt at graduationMedian federal loan debt graduates carry at the point they complete.As filed
Below peers
$10,556
78th percentile in peer grouppeer median $8,950
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)963 peers
From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
3-yr cohort default rateShare of borrowers defaulting within three years. Lower is better, but values covering 2020 to 2023 are depressed for every school by the federal payment pause, so the level means less than the comparison.Share of borrowers who default within three years of entering repayment. Lower is better.As filed
Average
10.7%
36th percentile in peer grouppeer median 13.2%
lower is better
FY2017 cohort1008 peers
Share of borrowers who defaulted within three years of entering repayment (U.S. Dept. of Education official cohort default rate). Shown for the FY2017 borrower cohort, the most recent cohort whose full three-year default window closed before the 2020-23 federal student-loan payment pause. More recent cohorts are reported by the College Scorecard at essentially 0%, but that reflects the payment pause (no payments were due, so almost no one could default), not borrower health, so the pre-pause cohort is the last meaningful reading. Lower is better.
Debt-to-earnings ratioMedian debt at graduation divided by the median earnings of former students 10 years after entry, how heavy the debt load is versus what students go on to earn. Lower is better.Calculated from filings
Average
0.32×
54th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0.31×
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)759 peers
Both sides of this ratio come from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying either. It is co-vintage, but it is not current.
Loan repayment rate (3-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.As filed
Below peers
28.8%
28th percentile in peer grouppeer median 36.2%
higher is better
2016-17 (Scorecard)880 peers
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within three years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17). Read it as context, not a simple good/bad score: a low rate can mean borrowers are struggling, but it can also mean many graduates have postponed payments while enrolled in graduate or professional school, which is common at selective schools and pushes their rate down. Unlike the cohort default rate, it is not distorted by the 2020-23 federal payment pause. Reported only where enough borrowers exist. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Working 10 years after entryShare of the no-longer-enrolled cohort who are working ten years after entering.As filed
Below peers
68.5%
19th percentile in peer grouppeer median 76.3%
higher is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)899 peers
Share of students who are working (not still enrolled) ten years after entering this institution, of those whose employment status is known (College Scorecard, 2020-21). A coarse employment signal. It does not capture earnings level or job quality. Taken from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the most recent release in which the Department published this element. It is null in every release since. Earnings are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that first enrolled about a decade earlier, so this describes students who entered well before 2020.
Withdrew by year 2Share of entrants who had withdrawn by their second year. Lower is better.As filed
Average
22.3%
40th percentile in peer grouppeer median 25%
lower is better
2019-20 (Scorecard)583 peers
Share of students who had withdrawn from this institution by the end of their second year (College Scorecard, 2019-20). An early-attrition signal, where lower is better. High part-time or adult-learner enrollment can raise it without reflecting institutional quality. From the College Scorecard 2019-20 data file, the last release carrying it.
Loan repayment rate (5-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who repaid at least $1 of principal within five years of entering repayment.As filed
Average
39.1%
54th percentile in peer grouppeer median 38.3%
higher is better
2016-17 (Scorecard)801 peers
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within five years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17), a longer-horizon companion to the three-year repayment rate. As with the three-year figure, a low rate can reflect graduates deferring payments while in further schooling rather than financial distress. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Median earnings (6 yr)Median earnings of working former students six years after they first enrolled.As filed
Average
$20,360
37th percentile in peer grouppeer median $22,012
higher is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)1030 peers
Median earnings of former students who are working and were federally aided, measured six years after they first enrolled (College Scorecard, 2020-21). A shorter-horizon companion to the ten-year earnings figure. Early-career pay tends to run below the ten-year mark, so read the two together rather than in isolation. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Earnings measured about six years after entry, so the cohort behind it entered in the mid-2010s.
Median debt (did not complete)Median federal loan debt of students who left without completing. Lower is better.As filed
Average
$4,750
65th percentile in peer grouppeer median $4,750
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)858 peers
Median federal loan debt carried by students who withdrew from this institution without completing a credential (College Scorecard, 2020-21). The counterpart to debt at graduation, and often the higher-risk group: borrowing with no degree to show for it. Lower is better, but compare it against the school's completion and withdrawal rates rather than on its own. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
Loan repayment rate (1-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who repaid at least $1 of principal within one year of entering repayment.As filed
Below peers
23%
18th percentile in peer grouppeer median 33.6%
higher is better
2014-15 (Scorecard)881 peers
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within one year of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2014-15), the earliest point on the repayment curve. As with the longer-horizon rates, a low figure can reflect borrowers deferring payments while in further schooling rather than financial distress. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying the one-year repayment rate. A decade old, and shown because no newer federal figure exists.
Median debt (first-generation students)Median federal loan debt of students who are the first in their family to attend college. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$8,028
68th percentile in peer grouppeer median $7,389
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)649 peers
Median cumulative federal loan debt carried by first-generation students, those whose parents did not complete college (College Scorecard, 2020-21). Read it beside the all-students median debt: a gap between the two is an equity signal about who shoulders the borrowing. Lower is better, but weigh it against completion and earnings. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
Median debt (Pell recipients)Median federal loan debt of Pell Grant recipients, the lowest-income aided students. Lower is better.As filed
Average
$8,028
64th percentile in peer grouppeer median $7,452
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)717 peers
Median cumulative federal loan debt carried by Pell Grant recipients (College Scorecard, 2020-21), the lowest-income federally-aided students at the school. Compare it with the all-students median debt and the Pell share: it shows how much the neediest students borrow to attend. Lower is better. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
Loan payment vs earningsMonthly payment on the median federal debt, as a share of median monthly earnings ten years after entry.Calculated from filings
Manageable
4.3%
54th percentile in peer grouppeer median 4.2%
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)759 peers
What this school's median federal student debt would cost to repay each month on the ten-year Standard Repayment Plan, divided by former students' median monthly earnings ten years after entering. Both figures are the school's own reported medians from the same College Scorecard file year, so the ratio compares like with like, but they describe different people: the typical borrower and the typical earner are not necessarily the same student. The payment is calculated at the current published undergraduate Direct Loan interest rate (6.39% for 2025-26), not at the rates the debt was originally borrowed at, so it answers what the debt would cost a student starting now. Payments above roughly 8% of gross income are the widely used threshold for strain, and above 15% the standard plan is usually unaffordable without an income-driven alternative. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better.
Net-value indexComposite 0-100 of earnings, completion, net price and debt vs peers.Blended index
Average
55.0
62nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 50.0
higher is better
2020-21 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)1144 peers
A 0-100 composite of student value relative to the peer group: the average of peer percentile ranks for median earnings ten years out, graduation rate, net price (lower counts as better value) and median debt (lower is better). Built only where at least two components are reported. Higher means more outcome per dollar. Banded against the school's peer group.
Earnings spread
Earnings 10 years after entry: the middle 50%
Working, federally-aided former students · Scorecard 2024-25
25th percentile$12,968
Median$33,273
75th percentile$50,068
Annual earnings of working former students measured ten years after they first enrolled (College Scorecard), shown as a range rather than a single number. The middle half of this school’s graduates earn between the 25th- and 75th-percentile figures. The Median bar matches the headline earnings figure. A wider gap means more variation in how graduates fare. Bars are scaled to the highest value shown.
Where these numbers come from
Every figure on this page carries one of these labels. They are not degrees of confidence: a projection is not a worse number than a filing, it is a different kind of claim, and the distinction is invisible when both are set in the same grey card.
As filedThis is the institution's own figure as filed with a federal collection, or a federal agency's own published figure about it. Ibex has not adjusted it.
Calculated from filingsCalculated by Ibex from figures in the same federal filing, using nothing but arithmetic: a share, a ratio, or an amount per student. It is exactly as sound as the filed numbers it divides.
Blended indexA blend of several other measures on this page, combined by Ibex. The components and how they are weighted are listed in this metric's description. Reasonable people could weight them differently and get a different score.
Modelled by IbexFitted or extrapolated by Ibex from the institution's reported history. This number appears in no federal file: it is a summary of a trend, and it inherits every irregularity in the years it was fitted through.
External projectionBuilt on an external projection about the future, published by a research body rather than measured. Projections are revised as the underlying assumptions change, and this one describes a scenario, not a fact.
Top fields of study (all levels)
Urban Academy of Beauty’s largest fields by completions, with graduate earnings (4 years out) and debt benchmarked against the same field at its peer group. Sparklines show the 8-year completions trend.
| Field | Completions / yr | Median earnings, 4 yrs out | Median debt | Earnings premium | Risk score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Personal & Culinary Services | 11 | $31,385 82nd pct · 793 peers | $10,556 75th pct · 757 peers | Below benchmark -11% | Moderate · 40 |
1 of 1 top fields shown have median graduate earnings below the NM state earnings-premium benchmark, an indicative flag under the 2025 federal earnings-premium test (effective July 1, 2026).
Earnings-premium status is an indicative estimate: median graduate earnings four years out vs the NM state median earnings of a high-school graduate (undergraduate credentials) or a bachelor’s-degree holder (graduate credentials) from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (2020-24). The official U.S. Department of Education determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.
The risk score (0–100) is an indicative blend of earnings-premium margin and the yearly completions growth rate, higher means a field pays closer to (or below) the benchmark and is shrinking. A directional screen, not an official determination.
Major-level detail (CIP 4-digit)
Personal & Culinary Services – 1 CIP program (4-digit), 1 with earnings
| Major (CIP 4-digit) | Compl./yr | Earn 4yr | Earn 1yr | % > threshold | Median debt | Debt/earn | Earnings premium | 2 of 3 yrs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cosmetology and Related Personal Grooming ServicesCIP 1204 › | 11 | $31,385 n=145 | – | 18.6% | $10,556 | 0.34× | Below benchmark -11% | Below benchmark 2 of 2 yrs |
Major-level earnings, debt and threshold pass-rates are reported by College Scorecard only where enough graduates exist to protect privacy, so 1 of 1 major shows an earnings figure. The rest read “–”. % > threshold is ED’s own share of graduates out-earning the federal earnings threshold (the do-no-harm pass rate), drawn from the best available measurement window (4-, 5- or 1-year) pooled across all nine College Scorecard Field-of-Study releases. A small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. 2 of 3 yrs flags fields below the earnings-premium benchmark in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, the statutory trigger under the 2025 test (effective July 1, 2026). Indicative. The Department of Education’s official determination may differ. Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard Field of Study (2014–15 through 2022–23 cohorts + most-recent snapshot), accessed March 2026.
See the interactive dashboard for all fields and credential levels (associate through doctoral). Source: College Scorecard Field of Study.
Frequently asked
How much do Urban Academy of Beauty graduates earn?
Median earnings ten years after entry are $33,273 (College Scorecard), measured across students who received federal aid.
Are Urban Academy of Beauty's programs at risk under the federal earnings-premium test?
Indicatively, that field has median graduate earnings (four years out) below the NM state earnings-premium benchmark at Urban Academy of Beauty on the latest reported cohort. Within those field, 1 of 1 individual majors with earnings data fell below the same benchmark, and 1 did so in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, which is the statutory trigger. The 2025 federal test (effective July 1, 2026) can withdraw federal Direct Loan eligibility from a program whose graduates earn less than a typical worker without the credential for 2 of 3 years. This is an estimate using College Scorecard field-of-study earnings against ACS state and national medians. The Department of Education's official determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.
Which schools are Urban Academy of Beauty's peers?
Urban Academy of Beauty is benchmarked against 1329 institutions in the Less-than-two-year · Private for-profit peer group. All percentiles and medians on this page are computed within that group.
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Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard & IPEDS (most recent releases), with the U.S. Census Bureau (ACS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Projections, field-demand outlook) and WICHE (enrollment-cliff projections). Most figures lag the current academic year by two to three years; earnings and debt come from the 2020-21 file and a few measures from older files, and each card states its own data year. Percentiles and medians are computed within the institution's peer group. Financial Resilience is a transparent composite, see each component above. Compiled by Ibex Insights.