Colorado Chinese Medicine University

Denver, CO · official site ↗

Private for-profitSpecial Focus: Other Health ProfessionsVery small
46
Fin. Resilience
Resilience score

vs. 84 peers in its group

How is this calculated?

Colorado Chinese Medicine University is a private for-profit institution in Denver, CO, classified by Carnegie as “Special Focus: Other Health Professions.”

It is benchmarked here against 84 peer institutions (Special Focus: Other Health Professions · Private for-profit).

On Ibex's Financial Resilience score it rates 46 out of 100 within that peer group, a transparent composite of endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per student, and instructional spend per student.

Its strongest standing relative to peers is 3-yr cohort default rate (0%, 6th percentile).

Peer group

Special Focus: Other Health Professions · Private for-profit

84 institutions

No cross-metric risk flags triggered.
What changedlargest year-over-year moves
Instructional spend / FTE ▼ -10% $4,076 → $3,672 2023→2024
Net tuition revenue / FTE ▼ -7% $12,143 → $11,350 2023→2024

Most recent single-year change in each tracked metric (rates in percentage points). Green = moved in this metric’s favorable direction, red = unfavorable, grey = size or context, not scored. Each row uses the latest pair of years that metric has, and federal collections release on different schedules, so the years differ from row to row: read the years on the row, not just the ranking. A single year is also not a trend, the multi-year series is on each metric’s card below.

How exposed Colorado Chinese Medicine University is to the structural shifts reshaping higher ed: a composite structural-risk index plus the 2025 federal budget law’s endowment excise tax, Grad PLUS elimination, new Parent PLUS borrowing cap and new Workforce Pell short-term-credential opportunity, and the demographic enrollment cliff. Only signals that apply to this institution are shown.

Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.
56
Elevated
Grad PLUS exposureShare of the school's graduate federal loan dollars that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 2026 (FSA Direct Loan data). Higher = more graduate borrowing that will disappear above the new caps.
20.1%
Moderate exposure
Higher than 39% of schools nationally
AY2025-26 (Federal Student Aid)
Avg Grad PLUS loanAverage Grad PLUS loan per borrower (FSA). The 2025 law caps unsubsidized grad borrowing at $20,500/yr and ends Grad PLUS. This is the average per-student amount that vanishes above the cap. The depth half of the Grad PLUS shock. Pair it with Grad PLUS exposure (the reliance share).
$11,447
Half the cap+
Higher than 11% of schools nationally
AY2025-26 (Federal Student Aid)
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%. This is a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.
-14.1%
Steep decline

Indicative signals, not forecasts, see each metric’s definition and the methodology. Endowment-tax, Grad PLUS, Parent PLUS and Workforce Pell figures appear only where the institution is exposed, and “nationally” compares against all schools that report each signal.

Turn these signals into action

Seeing exposure is step one. Ibex builds AI agents that monitor and act on exactly these pressures. Explore an interactive demo. Live demos run real workflows, and the rest are working mockups we build to your institution’s data.

What an enrollment loss would do to the budgetTuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the entire cost base stay where they are. It measures the size of the hole a decline would open, not what the institution would end up reporting after it responded.

Tuition and fees fund 78% of this institution’s operating revenue, and it runs a 14.2% operating margin. It could lose about 18.1% of its enrollment before the surplus becomes a deficit, if nothing else changed.

6.9% operating margin after the loss, with costs unchanged

A deliberately simple counterfactual: net tuition per student and total costs stay where the latest IPEDS finance filing put them, so only the tuition line moves. No institution facing this would hold costs flat, which is the point, the figure is the gap that would have to be closed, not a forecast of the margin it would report. A school that responds by discounting harder to hold headcount converts the same problem into a net-price one, and it does not show up here.

Where the money comes from $1.5M total revenue · IPEDS FY2022-23

Tuition & fees is the largest single source at 78% of revenue.

Tuition & fees78.2%
Other revenue21.8%

Where each dollar of revenue comes from, as a share of total positive revenue. Sources are standardized across public (GASB) and private (FASB) reporting. A net investment loss in a down market is shown as 0% and excluded from the mix.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Net tuition revenue / FTETuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student after institutional aid/discounts, what tuition nets.Calculated from filings
Average
$11,350
42nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $12,867
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)84 peers
▼ -21% choppy
Instructional spend / FTESpending on instruction per FTE student, how much of the budget reaches the classroom.Calculated from filings
Average
$3,672
49th percentile in peer grouppeer median $3,706
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)84 peers
▲ +7% choppy · turning
Operating marginOperating surplus or deficit as a share of operating revenue, leaving out investment swings and capital gifts: whether day-to-day operations run in the black.Calculated from filings
Strong
14.2%
75th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.6%
higher is better
FY2022-2378 peers
Operating result as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): the IPEDS net operating revenue ratio, the same figure the Financial Health Index uses. It leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and additions to endowment, and for private nonprofits counts only unrestricted revenue, so a one-year swing in investment markets or a building grant does not read as an operating surplus or deficit. For-profit institutions: (revenue excluding investment return − total expenses) ÷ that revenue. A surplus above 4% is strong. A thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks. Values beyond ±100% are not shown.
Tuition dependencyNet tuition as a share of operating revenue, how exposed the budget is to enrollment swings.Calculated from filings
78.2%
28th percentile in peer grouppeer median 91.1%
context, not scored
FY2022-2378 peers
Tuition and fees as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23), the same revenue base as the operating margin, so the two combine correctly in the enrollment-loss scenario. Operating revenue leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and endowment additions, and for private nonprofits counts unrestricted revenue only, so this share can run a few points above the tuition slice of the revenue-mix chart, which divides by every revenue source. For public institutions the base is the IPEDS consolidated figure, which can include component units such as foundations and university health systems, so a public with a large hospital shows lower dependency than its campus budget alone would. Not shown where the operating margin is not shown. Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.
Financial responsibility scoreED financial-responsibility composite score (-1.0 to 3.0, >=1.5 is passing).Regulator / auditor finding
Strong
3.0
91st percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.3
higher is better
AY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)50 peers
The U.S. Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, a -1.0 to +3.0 measure of an institution's solvency built from its audited finances. 1.5 and above passes, 1.0-1.4 is a zone needing oversight, and below 1.0 fails and can trigger letter-of-credit or cash-monitoring requirements. ED computes it only for private non-profit and proprietary schools, so it is reported only where scored. Higher is safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Grad PLUS exposureShare of the school's graduate federal loan dollars that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 2026 (FSA Direct Loan data). Higher = more graduate borrowing that will disappear above the new caps.Calculated from filings
Moderate exposure
20.1%
AY2025-26 (Federal Student Aid)
Share of the institution's graduate federal loan dollars (Grad Unsubsidized + Grad PLUS) that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 1, 2026, alongside new caps on graduate borrowing. A higher share means more of the school's graduate students rely on borrowing that will no longer exist above the unsubsidized cap. Source: U.S. Dept. of Education / Federal Student Aid Direct Loan Dashboard, award year 2025-26, the complete year (July 2025 to June 2026). Shown only for schools with Grad PLUS originations. It is an exposure signal, not a forecast of revenue loss. Not shown where fewer than 10 students (or parents) borrowed. From the Federal Student Aid Direct Loan dashboard for award year 2025-26, the complete year (July 2025 to June 2026).
Avg Grad PLUS loanAverage Grad PLUS loan per borrower (FSA). The 2025 law caps unsubsidized grad borrowing at $20,500/yr and ends Grad PLUS. This is the average per-student amount that vanishes above the cap. The depth half of the Grad PLUS shock. Pair it with Grad PLUS exposure (the reliance share).As filed
Half the cap+
$11,447
AY2025-26 (Federal Student Aid)
Average Grad PLUS loan per recipient (FSA Direct Loan Dashboard, award year 2025-26, full year). The 2025 budget law eliminates Grad PLUS for new borrowers from July 1, 2026 and caps unsubsidized graduate borrowing at $20,500/year ($50,000/year for professional-degree students such as medicine and law), so for a graduate program this is the average per-borrower amount that will no longer be available above that cap. Paired with Grad PLUS exposure (the institution's reliance share), it is the depth axis of the Grad PLUS shock: how much each affected borrower stands to lose. Shown only where Grad PLUS was originated. Not shown where fewer than 10 students (or parents) borrowed. From the Federal Student Aid Direct Loan dashboard for award year 2025-26, the complete year (July 2025 to June 2026).
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.Blended index
Elevated
56
FY2022-23 (IPEDS) with WICHE 2024 projections
An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. For-profit institutions report no operating-cushion figure and nearly all of them run close to 100% tuition dependency, so their index rests on at most three signals and reads higher than a nonprofit's; compare a for-profit with other for-profits. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.
Enrollment loss before deficitHow much of its enrollment the institution could lose before running an operating deficit, if it changed nothing else.Modelled by Ibex
Some cushion
18.1%
74th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.8%
higher is better
FY2022-2378 peers
The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of the same operating revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss. The same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. Where the surplus is larger than all tuition revenue, no enrollment loss alone produces a deficit and no figure is shown. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operating margin after a 10% enrollment lossWhat the operating margin becomes if a tenth of the students go and nothing else changes.Modelled by Ibex
Still in surplus
6.9%
75th percentile in peer grouppeer median -7.1%
higher is better
FY2022-2378 peers
The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operational-risk index (official findings)0-100 severity of what federal regulators and auditors have said about this institution. Higher means more official concern.Blended index
Clean
0.0
8th percentile in peer grouppeer median 11.0
lower is better
ED composite AY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)50 peers
A 0-100 severity score built only from published federal determinations: the Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, its Heightened Cash Monitoring list, and the going-concern, material-weakness, material-noncompliance, modified-opinion and repeat-finding results of the school's Single Audit. It is deliberately NOT a model: every component is something a regulator or an independent auditor put in writing. Components are scored only where they exist, and the score is their weighted average, so a school assessed on two signals sits on the same scale as one assessed on seven. Schools with neither a composite score nor a Single Audit on file are omitted rather than shown as clean: ED does not compute a composite score for public institutions, and no audit on file means nobody looked, not that nothing was found. Read it alongside the structural-risk index, which is the tool's own forward-looking model rather than a record of findings. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

12-month FTE enrollmentFull-time-equivalent enrollment over the full year, the denominator for per-student finance measures.As filed
112
20th percentile in peer grouppeer median 454
context, not scored
2023-24 (IPEDS)84 peers
Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.
Fully online studentsShare of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education (online) courses.As filed
10%
47th percentile in peer grouppeer median 11.5%
context, not scored
Fall 2023 (IPEDS)84 peers
Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality. Online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.
Applicant-pool diversity shiftProjected change in the non-white share of the home state's public high-school graduating class, class of 2025 to 2037.Modelled by Ibex
+5.8 pts
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.)
Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.
Hybrid (some online) enrollmentShare of students enrolled in some but not all courses online (hybrid), Fall 2023.As filed
90%
83rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 18.5%
context, not scored
Fall 202384 peers
Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Graduate share of enrollmentGraduate students as a share of total enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
100%
92nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 202384 peers
Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Women share of facultyWomen as a share of instructional staff (full- and part-time), Fall 2023.As filed
47.8%
10th percentile in peer grouppeer median 67.3%
context, not scored
Fall 202384 peers
Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Faculty of color shareU.S. faculty of color as a share of instructional staff, Fall 2023.As filed
26.1%
34th percentile in peer grouppeer median 43.8%
context, not scored
Fall 202384 peers
Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Direct competitors within 100 miCount of other institutions within 100 miles. Scored as lower-is-better because it is used here as a competitive-pressure signal for the institution, not as a benefit to students.Number of institutions in the same peer group within 100 miles.Calculated from filings
Strong
0
10th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)84 peers
How many institutions in the same Ibex peer group, the schools most likely to compete for the same students, sit within roughly 100 miles. For most schools the peer group is the same Carnegie classification and control. Schools in small classes sit in broader fallback groups by level, sector or region (see Peer groups in the methodology), and for them the count is looser. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks. A low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting power.
Metro-area unemployment rateUnemployment rate in the school's metro area, ACS 2020-24.As filed
Strong
4.5%
25th percentile in peer grouppeer median 5.1%
lower is better
ACS 2020-2484 peers
The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2020-24, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%. This is a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.External projection
Steep decline
-14.1%
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.) projection
Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age. The U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
In-state HS graduatesPublic + private high-school graduates in the school's state, class of 2025.External projection
65,716
19th percentile in peer grouppeer median 134,031
context, not scored
Class of 2025 (WICHE)81 peers
The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Net tuition revenue momentum (CAGR)Net tuition revenue momentum (CAGR).Modelled by Ibex
-2.8%
22nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 1.2%
context, not scored
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)80 peers
Compound annual growth rate of net tuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student over the tracked years, in nominal dollars (not adjusted for inflation). This is what the institution collects per student after its own discounts, not the net price a family pays (see Net price for that). A rising rate strengthens revenue but can strain affordability and yield, so it is shown as context rather than scored. Compared with the school's peer group. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

3-yr cohort default rateShare of borrowers defaulting within three years. Lower is better, but values covering 2020 to 2023 are depressed for every school by the federal payment pause, so the level means less than the comparison.Share of borrowers who default within three years of entering repayment. Lower is better.As filed
Strong
0%
6th percentile in peer grouppeer median 9.6%
lower is better
FY2017 cohort79 peers
Share of borrowers who defaulted within three years of entering repayment (U.S. Dept. of Education official cohort default rate). Shown for the FY2017 borrower cohort, the most recent cohort whose full three-year default window closed before the 2020-23 federal student-loan payment pause. More recent cohorts are reported by the College Scorecard at essentially 0%, but that reflects the payment pause (no payments were due, so almost no one could default), not borrower health, so the pre-pause cohort is the last meaningful reading. Lower is better.

Every figure on this page carries one of these labels. They are not degrees of confidence: a projection is not a worse number than a filing, it is a different kind of claim, and the distinction is invisible when both are set in the same grey card.

As filedThis is the institution's own figure as filed with a federal collection, or a federal agency's own published figure about it. Ibex has not adjusted it.
Calculated from filingsCalculated by Ibex from figures in the same federal filing, using nothing but arithmetic: a share, a ratio, or an amount per student. It is exactly as sound as the filed numbers it divides.
Blended indexA blend of several other measures on this page, combined by Ibex. The components and how they are weighted are listed in this metric's description. Reasonable people could weight them differently and get a different score.
Modelled by IbexFitted or extrapolated by Ibex from the institution's reported history. This number appears in no federal file: it is a summary of a trend, and it inherits every irregularity in the years it was fitted through.
External projectionBuilt on an external projection about the future, published by a research body rather than measured. Projections are revised as the underlying assumptions change, and this one describes a scenario, not a fact.
Regulator / auditor findingA finding published by a regulator or an independent auditor about this institution. It is a statement someone made in writing, not a measurement Ibex or the school took.

Colorado Chinese Medicine University’s largest fields by completions, with graduate earnings (4 years out) and debt benchmarked against the same field at its peer group. Sparklines show the 8-year completions trend.

FieldCompletions / yrMedian earnings, 4 yrs outMedian debtEarnings premiumRisk score
Health Professions & Clinical Sciences19$42,437
43rd pct · 22 peers
$92,815
66th pct · 25 peers
Below benchmark -43%High · 100
Health Professions & Clinical Sciences1––––

1 of 1 top fields shown have median graduate earnings below the CO state earnings-premium benchmark, an indicative flag under the 2025 federal earnings-premium test (effective July 1, 2026).

Earnings-premium status is an indicative estimate: median graduate earnings four years out vs the CO state median earnings of a high-school graduate (undergraduate credentials) or a bachelor’s-degree holder (graduate credentials) from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (2020-24). The official U.S. Department of Education determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.

The risk score (0–100) is an indicative blend of earnings-premium margin and the yearly completions growth rate, higher means a field pays closer to (or below) the benchmark and is shrinking. A directional screen, not an official determination.

Major-level detail (CIP 4-digit)
Health Professions & Clinical Sciences – 1 CIP program (4-digit), 1 with earnings
Major (CIP 4-digit)Compl./yrEarn 4yrEarn 1yr% > thresholdMedian debtDebt/earnEarnings premium2 of 3 yrs
Alternative and Complementary Medicine and Medical SystemsCIP 5133 ›19$42,437 n=30–54.3% 5yr$92,8152.19×Below benchmark -43%Below benchmark 2 of 2 yrs

Major-level earnings, debt and threshold pass-rates are reported by College Scorecard only where enough graduates exist to protect privacy, so 1 of 1 major shows an earnings figure. The rest read “–”. % > threshold is ED’s own share of graduates out-earning the federal earnings threshold (the do-no-harm pass rate), drawn from the best available measurement window (4-, 5- or 1-year) pooled across all nine College Scorecard Field-of-Study releases. A small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. 2 of 3 yrs flags fields below the earnings-premium benchmark in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, the statutory trigger under the 2025 test (effective July 1, 2026). Indicative. The Department of Education’s official determination may differ. Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard Field of Study (2014–15 through 2022–23 cohorts + most-recent snapshot), accessed March 2026.

Health Professions & Clinical Sciences – 1 CIP program (4-digit), 0 with earnings
Major (CIP 4-digit)Compl./yrEarn 4yrEarn 1yr% > thresholdMedian debtDebt/earnEarnings premium2 of 3 yrs
Alternative and Complementary Medicine and Medical SystemsCIP 5133 ›1–––––––

Major-level earnings, debt and threshold pass-rates are reported by College Scorecard only where enough graduates exist to protect privacy, so 0 of 1 major shows an earnings figure. The rest read “–”. % > threshold is ED’s own share of graduates out-earning the federal earnings threshold (the do-no-harm pass rate), drawn from the best available measurement window (4-, 5- or 1-year) pooled across all nine College Scorecard Field-of-Study releases. A small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. 2 of 3 yrs flags fields below the earnings-premium benchmark in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, the statutory trigger under the 2025 test (effective July 1, 2026). Indicative. The Department of Education’s official determination may differ. Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard Field of Study (2014–15 through 2022–23 cohorts + most-recent snapshot), accessed March 2026.

See the interactive dashboard for all fields and credential levels (associate through doctoral). Source: College Scorecard Field of Study.

Are Colorado Chinese Medicine University's programs at risk under the federal earnings-premium test?
Indicatively, that field has median graduate earnings (four years out) below the CO state earnings-premium benchmark at Colorado Chinese Medicine University on the latest reported cohort. Within those field, 1 of 1 individual majors with earnings data fell below the same benchmark, and 1 did so in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, which is the statutory trigger. The 2025 federal test (effective July 1, 2026) can withdraw federal Direct Loan eligibility from a program whose graduates earn less than a typical worker without the credential for 2 of 3 years. This is an estimate using College Scorecard field-of-study earnings against ACS state and national medians. The Department of Education's official determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.
Which schools are Colorado Chinese Medicine University's peers?
Colorado Chinese Medicine University is benchmarked against 84 institutions in the Special Focus: Other Health Professions · Private for-profit peer group. All percentiles and medians on this page are computed within that group.

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Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard & IPEDS (most recent releases), with the U.S. Census Bureau (ACS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Projections, field-demand outlook) and WICHE (enrollment-cliff projections). Most figures lag the current academic year by two to three years; earnings and debt come from the 2020-21 file and a few measures from older files, and each card states its own data year. Percentiles and medians are computed within the institution's peer group. Financial Resilience is a transparent composite, see each component above. Compiled by Ibex Insights.