Fremont University
Cerritos, CA · official site ↗
Private for-profitBaccalaureate/Associate's: MixedVery small
22
Fin. Resilience
Fremont University is a private for-profit institution in Cerritos, CA, classified by Carnegie as “Baccalaureate/Associate's: Mixed.”
It enrolls about 157 undergraduates and is benchmarked here against 18 peer institutions (Baccalaureate/Associate's: Mixed · Private for-profit).
On Ibex's Financial Resilience score it rates 22 out of 100 within that peer group, a transparent composite of endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per student, and instructional spend per student.
Its strongest standing relative to peers is completion rate (all students · 8-yr) (69.1%, 92nd percentile).
Its weakest is competing enrollment nearby (12.62×).
Ibex's cross-metric scan flags: Undergrad enrollment down 43% since 2016; First-year retention 0% (below 60%).
Peer group
Baccalaureate/Associate's: Mixed · Private for-profit
18 institutions
Undergrad enrollment down 43% since 2016
First-year retention 0% (below 60%)
Percentile profileoutward = stronger vs peers
Each spoke is this institution’s peer-group standing (0–100) on a headline metric, oriented so outward always means stronger (lower net price scores higher). A balanced large shape signals broad strength; a spiky shape flags specific weak spots.
What changedlargest year-over-year moves
Graduation rate (6-yr · first-time, full-time)
▲ +17%
33.8% → 39.5%
2023→2024
Instructional spend / FTE
▼ -11%
$3,429 → $3,048
2023→2024
Pell recipient share
▲ +11%
61.7% → 68.3%
2023→2024
Net tuition revenue / FTE
▲ +6%
$10,402 → $11,016
2023→2024
Undergraduate enrollment
▲ +3%
153 → 157
2023→2024
Most recent single-year change in each tracked metric. Green = moved in this metric’s favorable direction, red = unfavorable, grey = size or context, not scored. Each row uses the latest pair of years that metric has, and federal collections release on different schedules, so the years differ from row to row: read the years on the row, not just the ranking. A single year is also not a trend, the multi-year series is on each metric’s card below.
Policy & demographic exposure
How exposed Fremont University is to the structural shifts reshaping higher ed: a composite structural-risk index plus the 2025 federal budget law’s endowment excise tax, Grad PLUS elimination, new Parent PLUS borrowing cap and new Workforce Pell short-term-credential opportunity, and the demographic enrollment cliff. Only signals that apply to this institution are shown.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.
100
HighWorkforce Pell exposureShare of this school's measured credentials that are undergraduate certificates, the sub-associate tier the 2025 budget law's new Workforce Pell Grant makes Pell-eligible from July 2026 (short-term programs of 150–600 clock hours over 8–15 weeks). An opportunity signal: higher = more of what the school already produces could draw new federal grant aid. Source: College Scorecard Field-of-Study; an upper-bound proxy since the certificate tier spans varying lengths.
18.4%
SubstantialHigher than 24% of schools nationally
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%; a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.
-27.7%
Severe declineIndicative signals, not forecasts, see each metric’s definition and the methodology. Endowment-tax, Grad PLUS, Parent PLUS and Workforce Pell figures appear only where the institution is actually exposed; “nationally” compares against all schools that report each signal.
Turn these signals into action
Seeing exposure is step one. Ibex builds AI agents that monitor and act on exactly these pressures, explore an interactive demo. Live demos run real workflows; the rest are working mockups we build to your institution’s data.
Enrollment shock
What an enrollment loss would do to the budgetTuition revenue falls with the students; every other revenue line and the entire cost base are held where they are. It measures the size of the hole a decline would open, not what the institution would end up reporting after it responded.
Tuition and fees fund 95% of this institution’s revenue, and it runs a -14.2% operating margin. It is already spending more than it takes in, so there is no cushion to lose.
-26.2%
operating margin after the loss, with costs unchanged
A deliberately simple counterfactual: net tuition per student and total costs stay where the latest IPEDS finance filing put them, so only the tuition line moves. No institution facing this would hold costs flat, which is the point, the figure is the gap that would have to be closed, not a forecast of the margin it would report. A school that responds by discounting harder to hold headcount converts the same problem into a net-price one, and it does not show up here.
Revenue composition
Where the money comes from
$2.9M total revenue · IPEDS FY2022-23
Tuition & fees is the largest single source at 95% of revenue.
Tuition & fees94.7%
Investment return5.3%
Where each dollar of revenue comes from, as a share of total positive revenue. Sources are standardized across public (GASB) and private (FASB) reporting; a net investment loss in a down market is shown as 0% and excluded from the mix.
Federal funding mix
Which agencies fund this schoolThe share of this school's federal funding that comes from each awarding agency in FY2024. These are dollars agencies committed (obligations), not dollars the school spent, so the total will not match the audited federal-awards-expended figure elsewhere on this page. Matched to the school by its own SAM.gov Unique Entity ID.
$855,845 obligated · FY2024
Education alone accounts for 100% of it.
Education100.0%
Federal dollars each agency committed to this institution in FY2024, as a share of its total positive obligations (USAspending.gov). Obligations are money committed, not money spent, so this total will not match the audited “Federal awards expended” figure elsewhere on this page. Amounts an agency reclaimed during the year are excluded.
Net price by income
Average net price by family income
After grant & scholarship aid · Scorecard 2024-25
$0–30K$33,323
$30–48K$37,211
$48–75K$34,248
$75–110K$39,537
Average annual net price (total cost minus grant and scholarship aid) paid by federal-aid recipients in each family-income band. Lower-income bands often pay less where need-based aid is strong.
Financial Health
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Net tuition revenue / FTETuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student after institutional aid/discounts, what tuition actually nets.Calculated from filings
Below peers
$11,016
19th percentile in peer grouppeer median $16,486
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Instructional spend / FTESpending on instruction per FTE student, how much of the budget reaches the classroom.Calculated from filings
Below peers
$3,048
25th percentile in peer grouppeer median $4,739
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Average net priceWhat students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly price families actually pay after grants and scholarships.As filed
Below peers
$34,483
90th percentile in peer grouppeer median $22,678
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)15 peers
Net price, low-income families (under $30K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning under ~$30,000. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$33,323
83rd percentile in peer grouppeer median $21,625
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)15 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn under about $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). This is what the neediest admitted students actually pay, often far below the sticker price. Read it beside the overall net price and the high-income net price: a low figure here signals strong need-based aid. Lower is better.
Net price, middle-income families ($30K-$48K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $30,000 to $48,000. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$37,211
96th percentile in peer grouppeer median $22,165
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)13 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $30,000 to $48,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the middle rung of the income net-price ladder: read it together with the low-income (under ~$30K) and high-income (over ~$110K) net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.
Net price, upper-middle families ($48K-$75K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $48,000 to $75,000. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$34,248
81st percentile in peer grouppeer median $23,415
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)13 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $48,000 to $75,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fourth rung of the five-rung income net-price ladder: read it with the low, middle, upper and high-income net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.
Net price, upper-income families ($75K-$110K)What students actually pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $75,000 to $110,000. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$39,537
95th percentile in peer grouppeer median $24,749
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)10 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $75,000 to $110,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fifth rung of the income net-price ladder, just below the full-pay tier: read it with the lower rungs and the high-income net price to see the full cost gradient by family income. Lower is better.
Operating marginNet surplus as a share of total revenue, whether the institution runs in the black.Calculated from filings
Deficit
-14.2%
43rd percentile in peer grouppeer median -13.2%
higher is better
FY2022-2315 peers
Net surplus as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): (total revenues − total expenses) ÷ total revenues. A surplus above 4% is strong; a thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Tuition dependencyTuition's share of total revenue, how exposed the budget is to enrollment swings.Calculated from filings
94.7%
50th percentile in peer grouppeer median 94.7%
context, not scored
FY2022-2315 peers
Tuition & fees as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.
Financial responsibility scoreED financial-responsibility composite score (-1.0 to 3.0; >=1.5 is passing).Regulator / auditor finding
Average
1.8
35th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.0
higher is better
FY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)10 peers
The U.S. Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, a -1.0 to +3.0 measure of an institution's solvency built from its audited finances. 1.5 and above passes; 1.0-1.4 is a zone needing oversight; below 1.0 fails and can trigger letter-of-credit or cash-monitoring requirements. ED computes it only for private non-profit and proprietary schools, so it is reported only where scored. Higher is safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.Blended index
High
100
FY2022-23 (IPEDS) with WICHE 2024 projections
An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.
Federal funding obligatedHow much externally funded research the institution does. Shown as scale, not quality: it reflects mission, and an institution that does no sponsored research is not thereby worse at teaching. Useful for finding peers of comparable research intensity.Total federal dollars all agencies committed to this institution in FY2024, across grants, contracts, and student aid.As filed
$855,845
FY2024 (USAspending.gov)
Obligations reported to USAspending.gov for FY2024 (Oct 2023 to Sep 2024), summed across every awarding agency. This is money committed, not money spent, so it will not equal the audited 'Federal awards expended' figure and the two should not be subtracted from one another. Negative amounts (agencies reclaiming prior commitments) are excluded.
Federal funding agenciesHow many distinct federal agencies committed money to this institution in FY2024.As filed
1
FY2024 (USAspending.gov)
A count of awarding agencies with positive FY2024 obligations. Neither high nor low is inherently better: a community college funded solely by the Department of Education is behaving normally, while a research university typically draws on ten or more agencies.
Largest funder's shareShare of federal funding that comes from the single largest awarding agency.Calculated from filings
100%
FY2024 (USAspending.gov)
The largest agency's FY2024 obligations as a share of the institution's total positive federal obligations. Read it as concentration, not risk: most teaching colleges sit near 100% because nearly all their federal money is Department of Education student aid.
Enrollment loss before deficitHow much of its enrollment the institution could lose before running an operating deficit, if it changed nothing else.Modelled by Ibex
No cushion
0%
30th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
higher is better
FY2022-2315 peers
The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of total revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss; the same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operating margin after a 10% enrollment lossWhat the operating margin becomes if a tenth of the students go and nothing else changes.Modelled by Ibex
Into deficit
-26.2%
37th percentile in peer grouppeer median -25.7%
higher is better
FY2022-2315 peers
The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students; every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Operational-risk index (official findings)0-100 severity of what federal regulators and auditors have actually said about this institution. Higher means more official concern.Blended index
Clean
16.0
65th percentile in peer grouppeer median 13.5
lower is better
ED composite FY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)10 peers
A 0-100 severity score built only from published federal determinations: the Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, its Heightened Cash Monitoring list, and the going-concern, material-weakness, material-noncompliance, modified-opinion and repeat-finding results of the school's Single Audit. It is deliberately NOT a model: every component is something a regulator or an independent auditor put in writing. Components are scored only where they exist, and the score is their weighted average, so a school assessed on two signals sits on the same scale as one assessed on seven. Schools with neither a composite score nor a Single Audit on file are omitted rather than shown as clean: ED does not compute a composite score for public institutions, and no audit on file means nobody looked, not that nothing was found. Read it alongside the structural-risk index, which is the tool's own forward-looking model rather than a record of findings. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Graduation & completion
Graduation rate · first-time, full-time
39.5%
39.5% graduate within 6 years (150% of normal time)
0% on-time, within 4 years (100%)
Counts only students who entered full-time as first-time freshmen and earned a bachelor's here, the conventional headline rate. Excludes part-time entrants and transfer-ins.
Completion rate · all students
69.1%
69.1% earned a degree or certificate within 8 years (IPEDS Outcome Measures)
The broader cohort, also counts part-time entrants and transfer-ins, and any credential. More inclusive, so it can run higher than the graduation rate.
Why two numbers? They measure different students over different windows, so they are not directly comparable. The graduation rate is the standard federal headline but tracks only first-time, full-time students through a bachelor's; the all-students completion rate adds the part-time and transfer students it leaves out, over a longer window. Read each for what it covers. Source: U.S. Department of Education, IPEDS Graduation Rates & Outcome Measures, via College Scorecard.
Enrollment & Pipeline
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Undergraduate enrollmentNumber of degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS fall headcount). A size measure, not a quality signal.As filed
157
25th percentile in peer grouppeer median 499
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
First-year retentionShare of first-time, full-time freshmen who return for a second year, an early signal of student fit and support.As filed
0%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Graduation rate (6-yr · first-time, full-time)Of first-time, full-time freshmen, the share who earn a bachelor's at this institution within six years (150% of normal time) – the conventional headline graduation rate. It counts only first-time, full-time students and excludes part-time entrants and transfer-ins, who are captured instead by the all-students completion rate.As filed
Below peers
39.5%
15th percentile in peer grouppeer median 56.7%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)17 peers
Graduation rate (4-yr on-time · first-time, full-time)Of first-time, full-time freshmen, the share who earn a bachelor's within four years (100% of normal time) – the 'on-time' rate. It runs well below the six-year rate because many students take a fifth or sixth year; same first-time, full-time cohort as the six-year rate.As filed
0%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Pell recipient shareShare of undergraduates receiving a Pell grant, the standard proxy for how many low-income students a school enrolls. Not scored in either direction: it is a measure of who a school serves, and both a high and a low share are defensible depending on the mission.Share of undergraduates on a federal Pell Grant, a proxy for the share from lower-income families.As filed
68.3%
69th percentile in peer grouppeer median 58.5%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Completion rate (all students · 8-yr)Of ALL entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, the share who earned a degree or certificate at this institution within eight years (IPEDS Outcome Measures). Broader than the graduation rate, which counts only first-time, full-time students, so the two are measured on different students and are not directly comparable.As filed
Strong
69.1%
92nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 61.3%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of ALL entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, who earned a degree or certificate at this institution within eight years (IPEDS Outcome Measures, via College Scorecard). Broader and more inclusive than the graduation-rate figures, which count only first-time, full-time students entering a bachelor's program, so the two are measured on different groups of students and are not directly comparable.
First-generation studentsShare of undergraduates who are the first in their family to attend college.As filed
54%
53rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 53.8%
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of undergraduates who are first-generation college students (College Scorecard, 2016-17). An access signal, not a measure of quality: a higher share often reflects a stronger commitment to serving students whose parents did not attend college. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Adult learners (25+)Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older.As filed
84.3%
86th percentile in peer grouppeer median 63.4%
context, not scored
2023-24 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older (College Scorecard, 2023-24). Read as context on the student mix: schools serving many working adults look different on persistence and part-time measures than traditional-age campuses, and neither is inherently better. From the College Scorecard 2023-24 data file.
Part-time undergraduatesShare of undergraduates enrolled part-time.As filed
0%
32nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)17 peers
Share of undergraduates enrolled part-time (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Context, not quality: a high part-time share is common at community and commuter institutions and affects graduation-rate comparisons, which are based only on full-time, first-time students.
Median family incomeMedian family income of students at this institution.As filed
$15,273
42nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $19,930
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)18 peers
Median family income of students at this institution (College Scorecard, 2016-17). An affordability and access signal, not a measure of quality: a lower figure typically means the school enrolls more students from modest-income families. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Low-income students (under $30K)Share of students from families earning under about $30,000 a year.As filed
72.1%
58th percentile in peer grouppeer median 64.6%
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of students whose families earn under roughly $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2016-17). A direct low-income access signal: a higher share usually reflects a school enrolling more students from modest-income households, and pairs naturally with the Pell recipient share. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Women (share of undergraduates)Share of undergraduates who are women.As filed
82.8%
42nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 85.4%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of undergraduates who are women (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context on the student mix, not a measure of quality.
Middle-income students ($30K-$75K)Share of students from families earning roughly $30,000 to $75,000 a year.As filed
23.4%
42nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 26%
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of students whose families earn roughly $30,000 to $75,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2016-17), the two middle income bands combined. Reported as context on the student mix: together with the low-income (under ~$30K) and upper-income (over ~$75K) shares it sketches the full family-income picture, and the three bands sum to about 100%. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Transfer-out rateShare of students who transfer out. Not scored: it runs high at access-oriented and two-year feeder schools whose students are supposed to move on to a four-year program.Share of students who transfer to a different school within the tracking window. Shown as context, not quality.As filed
26.3%
97th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)17 peers
Share of students who transfer OUT to a different institution within the tracking window (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context, not a quality measure: it runs high at access-oriented schools and two-year feeders whose students routinely move on to a four-year program, and it should be read together with the completion and retention figures rather than on its own.
12-month FTE enrollmentFull-time-equivalent enrollment over the full year, the denominator for per-student finance measures.As filed
280
19th percentile in peer grouppeer median 509
context, not scored
2023-24 (IPEDS)18 peers
Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.
Student-faculty ratioStudents per instructional faculty member, lower usually means smaller classes and more contact.As filed
17:1
50th percentile in peer grouppeer median 17:1
context, not scored
Fall 202318 peers
Students per instructional faculty member (IPEDS, fall 2023). Lower generally means smaller classes and more faculty contact, though the measure mixes undergraduate and graduate teaching and is institution-reported.
Fully online studentsShare of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education (online) courses.As filed
75%
75th percentile in peer grouppeer median 32%
context, not scored
Fall 2023 (IPEDS)18 peers
Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality; online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.
Applicant-pool diversity shiftProjected change in the non-white share of the home state's public high-school graduating class, class of 2025 to 2037.Modelled by Ibex
+5 pts
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.)
Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.
Hybrid (some online) enrollmentShare of students enrolled in some but not all courses online (hybrid), Fall 2023.As filed
25%
53rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 24.5%
context, not scored
Fall 202318 peers
Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Transfer-in share (undergraduate)Transfer-in students as a share of undergraduate enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
39.2%
97th percentile in peer grouppeer median 11.8%
context, not scored
Fall 202318 peers
Transfer-in students as a share of all undergraduates (IPEDS, Fall 2023). A high share means the school depends on transfer pipelines rather than first-time freshmen, which changes both recruitment strategy and melt/retention risk. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Graduate share of enrollmentGraduate students as a share of total enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
5%
81st percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 202318 peers
Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Women share of facultyWomen as a share of instructional staff (full- and part-time), Fall 2023.As filed
60%
39th percentile in peer grouppeer median 64.2%
context, not scored
Fall 202318 peers
Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Faculty of color shareU.S. faculty of color as a share of instructional staff, Fall 2023.As filed
56%
81st percentile in peer grouppeer median 36.4%
context, not scored
Fall 202318 peers
Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Direct competitors within 100 miCount of other institutions within 100 miles. Scored as lower-is-better because it is used here as a competitive-pressure signal for the institution, not as a benefit to students.Number of same-type institutions (same Carnegie class and control) within 100 miles.Calculated from filings
Below peers
4
86th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)18 peers
How many institutions of the same type (same Carnegie classification and control, i.e. the schools competing for the same students) sit within roughly 100 miles. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks; a low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting leverage.
States recruited fromNumber of distinct US states sending at least one first-time student.Calculated from filings
Strong
2
70th percentile in peer grouppeer median 1
higher is better
Fall 202215 peers
How many distinct US states the school's first-time degree-seeking class is drawn from (IPEDS Residence & Migration, Fall 2022). A higher count signals broader geographic reach and less dependence on any single state's shrinking pool of high school graduates; a low count means the school recruits from a narrow region and is more exposed to that region's demographic decline. Banded against the school's peer group.
Foreign first-time shareShare of first-time students whose legal residence is a foreign country.As filed
0%
Fall 2022
Share of the school's first-time degree-seeking class whose legal residence is outside the United States (IPEDS Residence & Migration, Fall 2022). A measure of international reach in the entering class. Neither high nor low is inherently better; it is context for tuition-revenue mix and exposure to visa and geopolitical risk. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Metro-area unemployment rateUnemployment rate in the school's metro area, ACS 2019-23.As filed
Below peers
6.6%
81st percentile in peer grouppeer median 5%
lower is better
ACS 2019-2318 peers
The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2019-23, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.
On-campus crime rateOn-campus criminal offenses per 1,000 students, 2024 (Clery Act).As filed
Average
0 per 1k
43rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 0 per 1k
lower is better
2024 (Clery)14 peers
Criminal offenses reported on campus in 2024 (murder, manslaughter, the four sex-offense categories, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor-vehicle theft and arson) per 1,000 students, from the school's federal Clery Act filing. Counts and enrollment are summed across the institution's campuses. A higher number does not always mean a more dangerous school: thorough reporting and dense residential campuses raise it. Lower is generally safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%; a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.External projection
Severe decline
-27.7%
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.) projection
Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age; the U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Workforce Pell exposureShare of this school's measured credentials that are undergraduate certificates, the sub-associate tier the 2025 budget law's new Workforce Pell Grant makes Pell-eligible from July 2026 (short-term programs of 150–600 clock hours over 8–15 weeks). An opportunity signal: higher = more of what the school already produces could draw new federal grant aid. Source: College Scorecard Field-of-Study; an upper-bound proxy since the certificate tier spans varying lengths.Modelled by Ibex
Substantial
18.4%
2024-25 (Scorecard completions)
Share of the institution's measured credentials that are undergraduate certificates, the sub-associate tier that the 2025 budget law's new Workforce Pell Grant makes Pell-eligible from July 1, 2026. Workforce Pell extends the Pell Grant to short-term workforce programs of 150 to 600 clock hours offered over 8 to 15 weeks, subject to state-workforce-board and accreditor approval and to job-placement, completion and earnings-value guardrails. This is an opportunity signal: a higher share means more of what the school already produces could draw new federal grant aid, and the upside is greatest where Pell reliance (shown separately) is also high. Computed as undergraduate-certificate completions divided by all credential completions in the College Scorecard Field-of-Study file (most recent release). Scorecard's 'Undergraduate Certificate' level spans certificates of varying length, so the statutory 150-600 clock-hour window is a subset of this tier, read this as an upper-bound exposure proxy, not a count of qualifying programs. Shown only for institutions that confer such certificates above a minimum completions floor.
In-state HS graduatesPublic + private high-school graduates in the school's state, class of 2025.External projection
469,214
86th percentile in peer grouppeer median 94,824
context, not scored
Class of 2025 (WICHE)18 peers
The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Enrollment momentum (CAGR)Enrollment momentum (CAGR).Modelled by Ibex
Below peers
-6.9%
26th percentile in peer grouppeer median -2.5%
higher is better
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)17 peers
Compound annual growth rate of undergraduate enrollment over the years the tool tracks (College Scorecard, roughly 2016-2024). Positive means the school is growing; negative means it is shrinking, the leading indicator of demand stress ahead of the demographic cliff. Where the reported count jumps by a merger or a campus consolidation brought under one institution, only the years after that jump are measured, and where too little history follows it no rate is shown. A sharp fall is measured in full: a shrinking count is the signal this metric exists to carry, not an artifact to be cut away. No rate is shown where the enrolment never reaches 25 in the measured window: on a series that small one student is a double-digit annual rate, and a percentile computed from it would rank noise. Banded against the school's peer group. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Net-price momentum (CAGR)Net-price momentum (CAGR).Modelled by Ibex
Strong
-3.6%
19th percentile in peer grouppeer median -0.2%
lower is better
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Compound annual growth rate of net tuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student over the tracked years. A high positive rate means the school's real net price is climbing faster than peers, which can strain affordability and yield. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Enrollment forecast (5-yr)Projected change in undergraduate enrollment about five years out, from the school's own trend.Modelled by Ibex
Below peers
-31.5%
30th percentile in peer grouppeer median -9.3%
higher is better
2024-2029 projection15 peers
Projected cumulative change in degree-seeking undergraduate enrollment roughly five years out, modeled by a least-squares log-linear fit on the school's own undergraduate history (IPEDS fall headcount via College Scorecard, 2016-2024). It uses the full multi-year series, so a single shock year (such as 2020) does not drive the result. Where the reported count jumps by a merger or a campus consolidation brought under one institution, only the years after that jump are fitted; a sharp fall is fitted in full. This is a naive trend extrapolation, not a demographic model: where it projects a change beyond plus or minus 60 percent the fit is treated as out of range and no figure is shown. Banded against the school's peer group; higher means projected growth. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
Competing enrollment nearbyUndergraduates enrolled at same-type institutions within 100 miles, per one of this school's own undergraduates.Calculated from filings
Below peers
12.62×
97th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0.00×
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)15 peers
For every undergraduate enrolled here, how many are enrolled at directly competing institutions (same Carnegie classification and control) within roughly 100 miles. It is the weight behind the competitor count on the neighbouring card: three tiny colleges nearby and one 40,000-student public are the same number of competitors and a completely different market. A value of 5x means the surrounding same-type market is five times this school's size, so a small shift in where those students choose to go moves this school's class far more than it moves theirs. Straight-line distance from campus coordinates, same 100-mile catchment as the competitor count. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower means more room to grow without taking students from a larger rival.
Consecutive years of enrollment declineHow many years in a row undergraduate enrollment has fallen, counting back from the most recent year.Modelled by Ibex
Not declining
0 yrs
36th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0 yrs
lower is better
2016-17 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
The number of consecutive years, ending with the most recent one, in which this school's undergraduate headcount fell. Zero means the latest year was flat or up. A single down year is ordinary; three or more in a row is the pattern that precedes program cuts and closures, and it is visible in the federal data years before it becomes public. A fall smaller than 2% counts as flat, because year-to-year reporting noise at that scale would otherwise manufacture streaks. Measured on the same window as enrollment momentum: where a merger or consolidation makes the earlier years a different institution, only the years after it are counted. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Where students come from
Feeder statesThe home state of every first-time degree-seeking undergraduate in the entering class, as reported to IPEDS. Darker means a larger share of the class; the institution's own state is highlighted separately because at nearly every school it dwarfs the rest.
2 states and territories · Fall 2022
CA 80.0%AZ 20.0%
Home state of first-time degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS residence and migration). Each state is one square of equal size, arranged in the rough shape of the country, so a small state sending many students is as visible as a large one. The institution’s own state is shown in gold and every other state is shaded against the largest of them, not against the home state, which otherwise flattens the rest of the map. Shares are of the whole entering class, so they do not add to 100% where students came from abroad.
Completion equity
Six-year graduation rate by group
First-time, full-time bachelor’s cohort · Scorecard 2024-25
White60%
Black33%
Hispanic/Latino46%
Asian0%
Two or more races0%
Pell recipients44%
Six-year graduation rate (150% of normal time) for the first-time, full-time bachelor’s cohort, broken out by race and ethnicity and for Pell-grant recipients (College Scorecard). Each bar uses the same measure as the headline graduation rate, so the gaps between groups are directly comparable. School overall: 36%.
Completion by income and entry path
Where the Pell gap actually sitsThe share of students who earned an award within eight years, split at the same time by whether they received a Pell Grant and by whether they arrived with no prior college. A gap that exists for one entry path and not the other points at a different problem from one that runs through both.
eight-year award rate · 2024-25
| Entering group | Pell recipients | Not Pell | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| All entering studentsEveryone who enrolled as a degree-seeking undergraduate, however they arrived. | 68%n=136 | – | – |
| Entered as first-timeStudents with no prior college enrollment. | 63%n=43 | – | – |
| Entered with prior collegeTransfer-in and returning students. | 71%n=93 | – | – |
Federal Outcome Measures: the share of entering degree-seeking undergraduates who had earned an award eight years later, counting part-time students and transfers that the headline graduation rate leaves out. A positive gap means Pell recipients finished less often. Rates are shown only where at least 30 students entered on that side, because a rate over a handful of students is arithmetic rather than a measurement, so a row can be blank on one side. Race crossed with Pell is not published by any federal collection and is deliberately not estimated here.
Student body
Undergraduate race & ethnicity
IPEDS 2024-25
Hispanic/Latino54.1%
Black17.2%
Unknown10.8%
Asian7.6%
White5.7%
Two or more races4.5%
Undergraduate enrollment by race and ethnicity, as reported to IPEDS (College Scorecard). “International” denotes nonresident students; “Unknown” means race/ethnicity was not reported.
Student Outcomes & Risk
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Median earnings (10 yr)Median earnings of former students ten years after first enrolling (working, federally-aided students).As filed
Average
$39,003
42nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $39,080
higher is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
Taken from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the most recent release in which the Department published this element; it is null in every release since. Earnings are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that first enrolled about a decade earlier, so this describes students who entered well before 2020.
Median debt at graduationMedian federal loan debt graduates carry at the point they complete.As filed
Average
$20,000
56th percentile in peer grouppeer median $19,343
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
3-yr cohort default rateShare of borrowers defaulting within three years. Lower is better, but values covering 2020 to 2023 are depressed for every school by the federal payment pause, so the level means less than the comparison.Share of borrowers who default within three years of entering repayment. Lower is better.As filed
Strong
3.5%
8th percentile in peer grouppeer median 9.4%
lower is better
FY2017 cohort18 peers
Share of borrowers who defaulted within three years of entering repayment (U.S. Dept. of Education official cohort default rate). Shown for the FY2017 borrower cohort, the most recent cohort whose full three-year default window closed before the 2020-23 federal student-loan payment pause. More recent cohorts are reported by the College Scorecard at essentially 0%, but that reflects the payment pause (no payments were due, so almost no one could default), not borrower health, so the pre-pause cohort is the last meaningful reading. Lower is better.
Share taking federal loansShare of students taking out federal loans, a borrowing-reliance signal.As filed
67.1%
19th percentile in peer grouppeer median 75.6%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Full-time faculty shareShare of faculty employed full-time, higher generally means more availability and continuity.As filed
Below peers
8%
4th percentile in peer grouppeer median 25%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)12 peers
Debt-to-earnings ratioMedian graduate debt divided by median earnings, how heavy the debt load is versus what graduates earn. Lower is better.Calculated from filings
Average
0.51×
53rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 0.50×
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
Both sides of this ratio come from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying either. It is co-vintage, but it is not current.
Loan repayment rate (3-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.As filed
Below peers
25.5%
25th percentile in peer grouppeer median 32.8%
higher is better
2016-17 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within three years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17). Read it as context, not a simple good/bad score: a low rate can mean borrowers are struggling, but it can also mean many graduates have postponed payments while enrolled in graduate or professional school, which is common at selective schools and pushes their rate down. Unlike the cohort default rate, it is not distorted by the 2020-23 federal payment pause. Reported only where enough borrowers exist. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Earn more than a HS grad (6-yr)Share earning more than $28,000 (about a high-school graduate's wage) six years after entry.Calculated from filings
Average
47.4%
58th percentile in peer grouppeer median 41.8%
higher is better
2014-15 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of students earning more than $28,000 a year, roughly what a typical high-school graduate earns, six years after entering this institution (College Scorecard, 2014-15). A direct read on whether attending beats not attending, and conceptually aligned with the 2025 budget law's program-level earnings-premium test. Share of former students earning more than $28,000, the Department's benchmark for the median earnings of a high-school graduate. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying it; the threshold is not inflation-adjusted.
Working 10 years after entryShare of the no-longer-enrolled cohort who are working ten years after entering.As filed
Average
81.6%
47th percentile in peer grouppeer median 82.2%
higher is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of students who are working (not still enrolled) ten years after entering this institution, of those whose employment status is known (College Scorecard, 2020-21). A coarse employment signal; it does not capture earnings level or job quality. Taken from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the most recent release in which the Department published this element; it is null in every release since. Earnings are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that first enrolled about a decade earlier, so this describes students who entered well before 2020.
Withdrew by year 2Share of entrants who had withdrawn by their second year. Lower is better.As filed
Average
29.6%
36th percentile in peer grouppeer median 30.4%
lower is better
2019-20 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of students who had withdrawn from this institution by the end of their second year (College Scorecard, 2019-20). An early-attrition signal, where lower is better; high part-time or adult-learner enrollment can raise it without reflecting institutional quality. From the College Scorecard 2019-20 data file, the last release carrying it.
Loan repayment rate (5-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who repaid at least $1 of principal within five years of entering repayment.As filed
Below peers
28.6%
25th percentile in peer grouppeer median 30.7%
higher is better
2016-17 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within five years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17), a longer-horizon companion to the three-year repayment rate. As with the three-year figure, a low rate can reflect graduates deferring payments while in further schooling rather than financial distress. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Median earnings (6 yr)Median earnings of working former students six years after they first enrolled.As filed
Below peers
$30,681
25th percentile in peer grouppeer median $37,023
higher is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
Median earnings of former students who are working and were federally aided, measured six years after they first enrolled (College Scorecard, 2020-21). A shorter-horizon companion to the ten-year earnings figure; early-career pay tends to run below the ten-year mark, so read the two together rather than in isolation. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Earnings measured about six years after entry, so the cohort behind it entered in the mid-2010s.
Earn more than a HS grad (10-yr)Share earning more than $28,000 (about a high-school graduate's wage) ten years after entry.Calculated from filings
Average
57%
36th percentile in peer grouppeer median 59.8%
higher is better
2014-15 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of students earning more than $28,000 a year, roughly what a typical high-school graduate earns, ten years after entering this institution (College Scorecard, 2014-15). The long-horizon companion to the six-year figure and the closest public analogue to the 2025 budget law's program-level earnings-premium test. Share of former students earning more than $28,000, the Department's benchmark for the median earnings of a high-school graduate. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying it; the threshold is not inflation-adjusted.
Median debt (did not complete)Median federal loan debt of students who left without completing. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$9,500
92nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $6,334
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
Median federal loan debt carried by students who withdrew from this institution without completing a credential (College Scorecard, 2020-21). The counterpart to debt at graduation, and often the higher-risk group: borrowing with no degree to show for it. Lower is better, but compare it against the school's completion and withdrawal rates rather than on its own. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
Loan repayment rate (1-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who repaid at least $1 of principal within one year of entering repayment.As filed
Below peers
22.7%
25th percentile in peer grouppeer median 27.5%
higher is better
2014-15 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within one year of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2014-15), the earliest point on the repayment curve. As with the longer-horizon rates, a low figure can reflect borrowers deferring payments while in further schooling rather than financial distress. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying the one-year repayment rate. A decade old, and shown because no newer federal figure exists.
Loan repayment rate (7-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who repaid at least $1 of principal within seven years of entering repayment.As filed
Average
37.5%
47th percentile in peer grouppeer median 37.7%
higher is better
2016-17 (Scorecard)18 peers
Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within seven years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17), the longest horizon reported. Together with the one-, three-, and five-year rates it traces how repayment progresses over time. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Median debt (first-generation students)Median federal loan debt of students who are the first in their family to attend college. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$20,000
97th percentile in peer grouppeer median $13,485
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
Median cumulative federal loan debt carried by first-generation students, those whose parents did not complete college (College Scorecard, 2020-21). Read it beside the all-students median debt: a gap between the two is an equity signal about who shoulders the borrowing. Lower is better, but weigh it against completion and earnings. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
Median debt (Pell recipients)Median federal loan debt of Pell Grant recipients, the lowest-income aided students. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$20,000
97th percentile in peer grouppeer median $13,625
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
Median cumulative federal loan debt carried by Pell Grant recipients (College Scorecard, 2020-21), the lowest-income federally-aided students at the school. Compare it with the all-students median debt and the Pell share: it shows how much the neediest students borrow to attend. Lower is better. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Median debt pools the borrowers who left in that award year and the one before it.
Loan repayment rate, completers (3-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who COMPLETED and had paid down at least $1 of principal within 3 years. Higher is better.As filed
Below peers
31.9%
26th percentile in peer grouppeer median 38.3%
higher is better
2016-17 (Scorecard)17 peers
Three-year loan repayment rate among borrowers who completed their program (College Scorecard, 2016-17): the share who, three years after entering repayment, are not in default and have paid down at least a dollar of principal. Read it beside the all-borrower loan repayment rate and the non-completer rate: completers almost always repay at higher rates, so a low figure here is a strong warning sign. Higher is better. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Loan repayment rate, non-completers (3-yr)Share of borrowers paying down principal. Higher is better, with one honest caveat: a selective school can look worse than it is because many of its graduates postpone payments while in graduate or professional school. Read it beside median debt and earnings rather than alone.Share of borrowers who LEFT WITHOUT a credential and had paid down at least $1 of principal within 3 years. Higher is better.As filed
Below peers
14.9%
21st percentile in peer grouppeer median 24.5%
higher is better
2016-17 (Scorecard)17 peers
Three-year loan repayment rate among borrowers who left WITHOUT completing (College Scorecard, 2016-17), the group at the highest risk of default since they carry debt without the credential. Pair it with the non-completer median debt: together they show how heavily a school's dropouts are burdened. Higher is better. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.
Pell completion gapOverall 6-year graduation rate minus the Pell-recipient graduation rate.Calculated from filings
Strong
-8 pts
9th percentile in peer grouppeer median +1.5 pts
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)17 peers
The school's overall six-year graduation rate minus the graduation rate of its Pell Grant recipients (College Scorecard). A larger positive gap means lower-income students complete at a lower rate than the student body overall; a value near zero means the school graduates Pell and non-Pell students at similar rates. Banded against the school's peer group. Smaller is better.
Black-White completion gapWhite 6-year graduation rate minus Black 6-year graduation rate.Calculated from filings
Below peers
+26.7 pts
77th percentile in peer grouppeer median +17 pts
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)11 peers
The school's White-student six-year graduation rate minus its Black-student rate (College Scorecard). A larger positive gap means Black students complete at a lower rate; a value near zero means the school closes that gap. Reported only where both groups make up a meaningful share of the student body, so a handful of students in one subgroup cannot drive the number. Banded against the school's peer group. Smaller is better.
Programs below earnings benchmarkShare of program completions in fields whose graduate earnings currently fall below the state earnings benchmark used by the 2025 budget law's earnings-premium test.Modelled by Ibex
Below peers
20.8%
69th percentile in peer grouppeer median 7%
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard field of study)18 peers
Share of this school's measured program completions in programs whose median earnings four years after completion fall below the state benchmark (a high-school graduate's earnings for undergraduate credentials, a bachelor's for graduate credentials). This is the same early-warning screen behind our OBBBA Compliance Watchdog leaderboard, computed on public College Scorecard Field-of-Study data, not the official federal determination. Shown only where at least four programs report earnings. Lower is less exposure.
Net-value indexComposite 0-100 of earnings, completion, net price and debt vs peers.Blended index
Below peers
28.0
8th percentile in peer grouppeer median 52.0
higher is better
2020-21 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
A 0-100 composite of student value relative to the peer group: the average of peer percentile ranks for median earnings ten years out, graduation rate, net price (lower counts as better value) and median debt (lower is better). Built only where at least two components are reported. Higher means more outcome per dollar. Banded against the school's peer group.
Loan payment vs earningsMonthly payment on the median federal debt, as a share of median monthly earnings ten years after entry.Calculated from filings
Manageable
7%
53rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 6.8%
lower is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)18 peers
What this school's median federal student debt would cost to repay each month on the ten-year Standard Repayment Plan, divided by the median graduate's monthly earnings ten years after entering. Both figures are the school's own reported medians from the same College Scorecard file year, so the ratio compares like with like, but they describe different people: the typical borrower and the typical earner are not necessarily the same student. The payment is calculated at the current published undergraduate Direct Loan interest rate (6.39% for 2025-26), not at the rates the debt was originally borrowed at, so it answers what the debt would cost a student starting now. Payments above roughly 8% of gross income are the widely used threshold for strain, and above 15% the standard plan is usually unaffordable without an income-driven alternative. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better.
Earnings spread
Earnings 10 years after entry: the middle 50%
Working, federally-aided former students · Scorecard 2024-25
25th percentile$17,035
Median$39,003
75th percentile$59,470
Annual earnings of working former students measured ten years after they first enrolled (College Scorecard), shown as a range rather than a single number. The middle half of this school’s graduates earn between the 25th- and 75th-percentile figures; the Median bar matches the headline earnings figure. A wider gap means more variation in how graduates fare. Bars are scaled to the highest value shown.
Where these numbers come from
Every figure on this page carries one of these labels. They are not degrees of confidence: a projection is not a worse number than a filing, it is a different kind of claim, and the distinction is invisible when both are set in the same grey card.
As filedThis is the institution's own figure as filed with a federal collection, or a federal agency's own published figure about it. Ibex has not adjusted it.
Calculated from filingsCalculated by Ibex from figures in the same federal filing, using nothing but arithmetic: a share, a ratio, or an amount per student. It is exactly as sound as the filed numbers it divides.
Blended indexA blend of several other measures on this page, combined by Ibex. The components and how they are weighted are listed in this metric's description. Reasonable people could weight them differently and get a different score.
Modelled by IbexFitted or extrapolated by Ibex from the institution's reported history. This number appears in no federal file: it is a summary of a trend, and it inherits every irregularity in the years it was fitted through.
External projectionBuilt on an external projection about the future, published by a research body rather than measured. Projections are revised as the underlying assumptions change, and this one describes a scenario, not a fact.
Regulator / auditor findingA finding published by a regulator or an independent auditor about this institution. It is a statement someone made in writing, not a measurement Ibex or the school took.
Top fields of study (bachelor's)
Fremont University’s largest fields by completions, with graduate earnings (4 years out) and debt benchmarked against the same field at its peer group. Sparklines show the 8-year completions trend.
| Field | Completions / yr | Median earnings, 4 yrs out | Median debt | Earnings premium | Risk score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Health Professions & Clinical Sciences | 11 | $56,318 65th pct · 13 peers | $45,000 77th pct · 15 peers | Above benchmark +46% | Low · 28 |
| Business, Management & Marketing | 8 | $57,386 45th pct · 10 peers | $45,000 79th pct · 12 peers | Above benchmark +49% | Moderate · 42 |
All 2 top fields shown clear the CA state earnings-premium benchmark (indicative).
Earnings-premium status is an indicative estimate: median graduate earnings four years out vs the CA state median earnings of a high-school graduate (undergraduate credentials) or a bachelor’s-degree holder (graduate credentials) from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (2022 ACS 5-year). The official U.S. Department of Education determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.
The risk score (0–100) is an indicative blend of earnings-premium margin and the five-year completions trend, higher means a field pays closer to (or below) the benchmark and is shrinking. A directional screen, not an official determination.
Major-level detail (CIP 4-digit)
Health Professions & Clinical Sciences – 1 CIP program (4-digit), 1 with earnings
| Major (CIP 4-digit) | Compl./yr | Earn 4yr | Earn 1yr | % > threshold | Median debt | Debt/earn | Earnings premium | 2 of 3 yrs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Public HealthCIP 5122 › | 11 | $56,318 n=16 | – | – | $45,000 | 0.80× | Above benchmark +46% | – |
Major-level earnings, debt and threshold pass-rates are reported by College Scorecard only where enough graduates exist to protect privacy, so 1 of 1 major shows an earnings figure; the rest read “–”. % > threshold is ED’s own share of graduates out-earning the federal earnings threshold (the do-no-harm pass rate), drawn from the best available measurement window (4-, 5- or 1-year) pooled across all nine College Scorecard Field-of-Study releases; a small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. 2 of 3 yrs flags fields below the earnings-premium benchmark in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, the statutory trigger under the 2025 test (effective July 1, 2026). Indicative; the Department of Education’s official determination may differ. Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard Field of Study (2014–15 through 2022–23 cohorts + most-recent snapshot), accessed March 2026.
Business, Management & Marketing – 1 CIP program (4-digit), 1 with earnings
| Major (CIP 4-digit) | Compl./yr | Earn 4yr | Earn 1yr | % > threshold | Median debt | Debt/earn | Earnings premium | 2 of 3 yrs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Business Administration, Management and OperationsCIP 5202 › | 8 | $57,386 n=19 | – | – | $45,000 | 0.78× | Above benchmark +49% | – |
Major-level earnings, debt and threshold pass-rates are reported by College Scorecard only where enough graduates exist to protect privacy, so 1 of 1 major shows an earnings figure; the rest read “–”. % > threshold is ED’s own share of graduates out-earning the federal earnings threshold (the do-no-harm pass rate), drawn from the best available measurement window (4-, 5- or 1-year) pooled across all nine College Scorecard Field-of-Study releases; a small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. 2 of 3 yrs flags fields below the earnings-premium benchmark in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, the statutory trigger under the 2025 test (effective July 1, 2026). Indicative; the Department of Education’s official determination may differ. Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard Field of Study (2014–15 through 2022–23 cohorts + most-recent snapshot), accessed March 2026.
See the interactive dashboard for all fields and credential levels (associate through doctoral). Source: College Scorecard Field of Study.
Frequently asked
What is Fremont University's student-faculty ratio?
Fremont University reports a student-faculty ratio of 17:1 (IPEDS, fall 2023) – that is, about 17 students for every instructional faculty member.
How much does Fremont University cost?
The average net price after aid is $34,483 (College Scorecard).
How much do Fremont University graduates earn?
Median earnings ten years after entry are $39,003 (College Scorecard), measured across students who received federal aid.
Are Fremont University's programs at risk under the federal earnings-premium test?
Indicatively, at Fremont University, all 2 of the largest fields with available earnings data clear the CA state earnings-premium benchmark used by the 2025 federal test (effective July 1, 2026) – median graduate earnings (four years out) exceed those of a typical worker without the credential. This is an estimate using College Scorecard earnings vs ACS medians; the official Department of Education determination may differ.
Which schools are Fremont University's peers?
Fremont University is benchmarked against 18 institutions in the Baccalaureate/Associate's: Mixed · Private for-profit peer group; all percentiles and medians on this page are computed within that group.
Compare with peers
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Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard & IPEDS (most recent releases), with the U.S. Census Bureau (ACS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Projections, field-demand outlook) and WICHE (enrollment-cliff projections). Figures lag the current academic year by roughly two to three years. Percentiles and medians are computed within the institution's peer group. Financial Resilience is a transparent composite, see each component above. Compiled by Ibex Insights.