New York Law School

New York, NY · official site ↗

Private nonprofitSpecial Focus: Business & ManagementGraduate/Professional
84
Fin. Resilience
Resilience score

vs. 21 peers in its group

New York Law School is a private nonprofit institution in New York, NY, classified by Carnegie as “Special Focus: Business & Management.”

It is benchmarked here against 21 peer institutions (Special Focus: Business & Management · Private nonprofit).

On Ibex's Financial Resilience score it rates 84 out of 100 within that peer group, a transparent composite of endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per student, and instructional spend per student.

Its strongest standing relative to peers is instructional spend / fte ($29,406, 100th percentile).

Its weakest is field-demand outlook (10-yr) (+1.8%).

Peer group

Special Focus: Business & Management · Private nonprofit

21 institutions

No cross-metric risk flags triggered.

How exposed New York Law School is to the structural shifts reshaping higher ed: a composite structural-risk index plus the 2025 federal budget law’s endowment excise tax and Grad PLUS elimination and the demographic enrollment cliff. Only signals that apply to this institution are shown.

Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers — directional, not a prediction.
38
Elevated
Grad PLUS exposureShare of the school's graduate federal loan dollars that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 2026 (FSA Direct Loan data). Higher = more graduate borrowing that will disappear above the new caps.
62.7%
High exposure
Higher than 97% of schools nationally
AY2025-26 YTD (through Q2, Dec 2025)
Avg Grad PLUS loanAverage Grad PLUS loan per borrower (FSA). The 2025 law caps unsubsidized grad borrowing at $20,500/yr and ends Grad PLUS — this is the average per-student amount that vanishes above the cap. The depth half of the Grad PLUS shock; pair with Grad PLUS exposure (the reliance share).
$38,732
Above the cap
Higher than 91% of schools nationally
AY2025-26 YTD (through Q2, Dec 2025)
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%; a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.
-27%
Severe decline
Among the most exposed nationally. In the top 10% of U.S. institutions on grad plus exposure, avg grad plus loan.

Indicative signals, not forecasts — see each metric’s definition and the methodology. Endowment-tax and Grad PLUS figures appear only where the institution is actually exposed; “nationally” compares against all schools that report each signal.

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Seeing exposure is step one. Ibex builds AI agents that monitor and act on exactly these pressures — explore an interactive demo. Live demos run real workflows; the rest are working mockups we build to your institution’s data.

4.7
on a −4 to 10 scale
Financial Health IndexStable

NACUBO Composite Financial Index — the balance-sheet health score accreditors and institutional boards use to gauge financial health; bond-rating agencies track similar ratios. 35th percentile of 21 peers.

Primary reserve 35%25.7 mo
Reserves vs. debt 35%0.96×
Return on net assets 20%7%
Operating result 10%-3.8%

Composite of four ratios on a strength-factor scale (−4 weak → 10 strong): below 3 falls short of the threshold for financial health, below 1 signals acute stress, and above 6 is strong. Computed from IPEDS FY2022-23, the most recent finance release (it lags the current year by 2–3 years). Branch campuses that report finances at a parent/system level can show distorted ratios. For informational benchmarking, not a credit rating or financial advice.

Where the money comes from $69.1M total revenue · IPEDS FY2022-23

Tuition & fees is the largest single source at 45% of revenue.

Tuition & fees45.0%
Investment return25.5%
Private gifts & grants18.8%
Other revenue8.8%
Government appropriations1.2%
Auxiliary enterprises0.6%
Government grants & contracts0.1%

Where each dollar of revenue comes from, as a share of total positive revenue. Sources are standardized across public (GASB) and private (FASB) reporting; a net investment loss in a down market is shown as 0% and excluded from the mix.

Net tuition revenue / FTETuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student after institutional aid/discounts — what tuition actually nets.
Strong
$33,562
67th percentile in peer grouppeer median $28,157
Instructional spend / FTESpending on instruction per FTE student — how much of the budget reaches the classroom.
Strong
$29,406
100th percentile in peer grouppeer median $14,158
Endowment (end of year)Total endowment value at year end — long-term invested wealth that funds operations and cushions shocks.
Strong
$50.2M
74th percentile in peer grouppeer median $13.8M
Avg monthly faculty salaryAverage monthly salary of full-time faculty (IPEDS) — a proxy for faculty investment.
Strong
$13,948
85th percentile in peer grouppeer median $11,300
Average monthly salary of full-time faculty, as reported to IPEDS.
Operating marginNet surplus as a share of total revenue — whether the institution runs in the black.
Strong
16%
79th percentile in peer grouppeer median 3.8%
Net surplus as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): (total revenues − total expenses) ÷ total revenues. A surplus above 4% is strong; a thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks.
Tuition dependencyTuition's share of total revenue — how exposed the budget is to enrollment swings.
45%
11th percentile in peer grouppeer median 72%
Tuition & fees as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.
Tuition discount rateInstitutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition (IPEDS, private nonprofits only) — the tuition-discount rate. The share of sticker tuition handed back as aid; a high rate (the national average is ~56%) signals heavy price competition for students.
Moderate
48.6%
68th percentile in peer grouppeer median 36.1%
Institutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition & fee revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB): allowances applied to tuition ÷ (net tuition revenue + those allowances) — the tuition-discount rate enrollment leaders track, i.e. the share of sticker tuition handed back as institutional aid. Private nonprofit institutions only; public (GASB) institutions report tuition differently and are not shown. The national private-college average is roughly 56% (NACUBO); above ~60% signals heavy price competition.
State appropriations shareState appropriations' share of total revenue — material for public institutions, near zero for private.
0.3%
100th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
State appropriations as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Material for public institutions; ~0 for private.
Administrative cost shareInstitutional support (central administration, governance, general administration, fundraising, and under FASB the operation & maintenance of plant) as a share of total expenses — private nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the figure is comparable. An informational gauge of administrative intensity, not a measure of waste.
15.5%
11th percentile in peer grouppeer median 24.8%
Institutional support — central administration, executive management, governance, general administration, fundraising and (under FASB rules) operation & maintenance of plant — as a share of total expenses (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB). Private nonprofit institutions only: public (GASB) institutions report functional expenses on a different basis and frequently consolidate large hospital and auxiliary operations, which makes a comparable ratio unreliable, so they are not shown. Because FASB folds plant operations into institutional support, this runs higher than a narrow 'central-office' figure, and schools with sizable hospital or auxiliary operations show a lower ratio as those costs enlarge total expenses. An informational benchmark of administrative intensity, compared within the peer group — not a measure of waste or quality.
Months of operating cushionMonths of operating expenses covered by expendable reserves — the institution's cash cushion.
Strong
25.7 mo
88th percentile in peer grouppeer median 17 mo
How many months of operating expenses the institution could cover from expendable reserves (IPEDS FY2022-23 primary reserve ratio × 12). About 5 months — one semester — is the accreditor benchmark for solid footing; below ~3 months is thin. A negative figure means expendable reserves are themselves negative.
Reserves vs. debtExpendable reserves divided by long-term debt — whether reserves could cover the debt.
Adequate
0.96×
31st percentile in peer grouppeer median 1.84×
Expendable reserves ÷ plant-related debt (IPEDS FY2022-23 viability ratio). At or above 1.25×, reserves fully cover long-term debt. Shown blank when the institution carries little or no plant debt.
Return on net assetsChange in net assets over the year — whether the institution grew wealthier.
Strong
7%
65th percentile in peer grouppeer median 5.1%
Change in total net assets ÷ net assets (IPEDS FY2022-23) — whether the institution grew wealthier over the year. 2–4% is adequate; above 4% is strong.
Endowment per FTE studentEndowment per full-time-equivalent student — the FTE-correct measure of endowment wealth per student.
Strong
$47,029
68th percentile in peer grouppeer median $24,557
End-of-year endowment ÷ 12-month FTE enrollment — endowment wealth per full-time-equivalent student. The FTE-correct companion to endowment-per-undergraduate; FTE counts graduate and part-time load, so research universities look less wealthy on this basis than on a headcount basis.
Grad PLUS exposureShare of the school's graduate federal loan dollars that came from Grad PLUS, the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 2026 (FSA Direct Loan data). Higher = more graduate borrowing that will disappear above the new caps.
High exposure
62.7%
percentile in peer group
Share of the institution's graduate federal loan dollars (Grad Unsubsidized + Grad PLUS) that came from Grad PLUS — the program the 2025 budget law eliminates for new borrowers from July 1, 2026, alongside new caps on graduate borrowing. A higher share means more of the school's graduate students rely on borrowing that will no longer exist above the unsubsidized cap. Source: U.S. Dept. of Education / Federal Student Aid Direct Loan Dashboard — primarily award year 2025-26 (year-to-date through Q2, December 2025), the most current federal data; schools not yet reporting Grad PLUS in 2025-26 retain their most recent complete year (2024-25), shown per school. The reliance share is stable across the two vintages. Shown only for schools with Grad PLUS originations; an exposure signal, not a forecast of revenue loss.
Avg Grad PLUS loanAverage Grad PLUS loan per borrower (FSA). The 2025 law caps unsubsidized grad borrowing at $20,500/yr and ends Grad PLUS — this is the average per-student amount that vanishes above the cap. The depth half of the Grad PLUS shock; pair with Grad PLUS exposure (the reliance share).
Above the cap
$38,732
percentile in peer group
Average Grad PLUS loan per recipient (FSA Direct Loan Dashboard — award year 2025-26 year-to-date through Q2, with 2024-25 full-year retained where 2025-26 is not yet reported). The 2025 budget law eliminates Grad PLUS for new borrowers from July 1, 2026 and caps unsubsidized graduate borrowing at $20,500/year — so this is the average per-borrower amount that will no longer be available above that cap. Paired with Grad PLUS exposure (the institution's reliance share), it is the depth axis of the Grad PLUS shock: how much each affected borrower stands to lose. Shown only where Grad PLUS was originated.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers — directional, not a prediction.
Elevated
38
percentile in peer group
An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers — a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating.
Program concentration (HHI)How concentrated a school's annual completions are across academic fields, as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (10,000 = one field, lower = many). Higher means more reliance on a few fields; lower means a diversified program portfolio.
Highly concentrated
10,000
percentile in peer group
How concentrated the institution's degree and certificate output is across academic fields (CIP 2-digit families), as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on the latest year's completions: 10,000 means every completion is in one field; lower means output is spread across many. A higher value means the school leans on fewer fields and is more exposed to demand shifts in them; a lower value reflects a broad program portfolio. Shown for institutions reporting at least 100 annual completions. A structural-diversification signal, not a measure of quality.
12-month FTE enrollmentFull-time-equivalent enrollment over the full year — the denominator for per-student finance measures.
1,067
90th percentile in peer grouppeer median 592
Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2022-23). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%; a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.
Severe decline
-27%
percentile in peer group
Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age; the U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment.
3-yr cohort default rateShare of borrowers who default within three years of entering repayment. Lower is better.
Average
2.9%
67th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.5%
Share of borrowers who defaulted within three years of entering repayment (U.S. Dept. of Education official cohort default rate). Shown for the FY2017 borrower cohort — the most recent cohort whose full three-year default window closed before the 2020-23 federal student-loan payment pause. More recent cohorts are reported by the College Scorecard at essentially 0%, but that reflects the payment pause (no payments were due, so almost no one could default), not borrower health, so the pre-pause cohort is the last meaningful reading. Lower is better.
Full-time faculty shareShare of faculty employed full-time — higher generally means more availability and continuity.
Below peers
33.1%
26th percentile in peer grouppeer median 59%
Field-demand outlook (10-yr)Employment-weighted 10-year BLS job-growth projection for the occupations this school's program mix feeds (U.S. all-occupations benchmark +3.1%). An indicative broad-field demand signal, not a program-specific or placement guarantee.
Below job-market average
+1.8%
2nd percentile in peer group
Projected 10-year (2024-34) change in U.S. employment for the occupations this institution's degrees and certificates feed, blended across its program mix. Built by mapping each CIP 2-digit field to its occupations via the NCES CIP-SOC crosswalk, taking the employment-weighted average of each occupation's BLS-projected percent change, then weighting fields by the institution's latest-year completions. The U.S. all-occupations benchmark is 3.1%, so a higher value means the school's graduates concentrate in faster-growing labor markets. An INDICATIVE field-level signal at broad-field granularity — not a program-specific or graduate-specific projection, and not a placement or earnings guarantee. Structurally diffuse CIP families whose crosswalk maps to 'any job' are excluded from the signal: 05 Area/Ethnic/Gender Studies, 24 Liberal Arts & Humanities, and 30 Multi/Interdisciplinary. Shown where at least 50% of completions fall in fields with a coherent occupational mapping and the school reports 100+ annual completions.

New York Law School’s largest fields by completions, with graduate earnings (4 years out) and debt benchmarked against the same field at its peer group. Sparklines show the 8-year completions trend.

FieldCompletions / yrMedian earnings, 4 yrs outMedian debtEarnings premiumRisk score
Legal Professions & Studies368$109,122
95th pct · 19 peers
Above benchmark +54%Low · 23
Legal Professions & Studies5High · 100

All 1 top fields shown clear the NY state earnings-premium benchmark (indicative).

Earnings-premium status is an indicative estimate: median graduate earnings four years out vs the NY state median earnings of a high-school graduate (undergraduate credentials) or a bachelor’s-degree holder (graduate credentials) from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (2022 ACS 5-year). The official U.S. Department of Education determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.

The risk score (0–100) is an indicative blend of earnings-premium margin and the five-year completions trend—higher means a field pays closer to (or below) the benchmark and is shrinking. A directional screen, not an official determination.

See the interactive dashboard for all fields and credential levels (associate through doctoral). Source: College Scorecard Field of Study.

How financially healthy is New York Law School?
On the NACUBO Composite Financial Index — the −4 to 10 balance-sheet score accreditors and institutional boards use — New York Law School scores 4.7 (Stable), computed from its IPEDS FY2022-23 finances. This is informational benchmarking, not a credit rating.
Are New York Law School's programs at risk under the federal earnings-premium test?
Indicatively, at New York Law School, the single largest field with available earnings data clears the NY state earnings-premium benchmark used by the 2025 federal test (effective July 1, 2026) — median graduate earnings (four years out) exceed those of a typical worker without the credential. This is an estimate using College Scorecard earnings vs ACS medians; the official Department of Education determination may differ.
Which schools are New York Law School's peers?
New York Law School is benchmarked against 21 institutions in the Special Focus: Business & Management · Private nonprofit peer group; all percentiles and medians on this page are computed within that group.

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Source: U.S. Department of Education — College Scorecard & IPEDS (most recent releases), with the U.S. Census Bureau (ACS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Projections, field-demand outlook) and WICHE (enrollment-cliff projections). Figures lag the current academic year by roughly two to three years. Percentiles and medians are computed within the institution's peer group. Financial Resilience is a transparent composite — see each component above. Compiled by Ibex Insights.