Champ's Barber School-Lebanon

Lebanon, PA · official site ↗

Private for-profitLess-than-two-year institution (not classified by Carnegie)
54
Fin. Resilience
Resilience score

vs. 1329 peers in its group

How is this calculated?

Champ's Barber School-Lebanon is a private for-profit institution in Lebanon, PA, classified by Carnegie as “Less-than-two-year institution (not classified by Carnegie).”

It enrolls about 13 undergraduates and is benchmarked here against 1329 peer institutions (Less-than-two-year · Private for-profit).

On Ibex's Financial Resilience score it rates 54 out of 100 within that peer group, a transparent composite of endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per student, and instructional spend per student.

Its strongest standing relative to peers is enrollment loss before deficit (59%, 90th percentile).

Its weakest is median earnings (6 yr) ($16,675).

Peer group

Less-than-two-year · Private for-profit

1329 institutions

No cross-metric risk flags triggered.
What changedlargest year-over-year moves
Pell recipient share ▲ +35.1 pts 52.9% → 88% 2023→2024
Undergraduate enrollment ▼ -32% 19 → 13 2023→2024
Instructional spend / FTE ▼ -22% $4,167 → $3,250 2023→2024
Net tuition revenue / FTE ▼ -20% $16,667 → $13,375 2023→2024

Most recent single-year change in each tracked metric (rates in percentage points). Green = moved in this metric’s favorable direction, red = unfavorable, grey = size or context, not scored. Each row uses the latest pair of years that metric has, and federal collections release on different schedules, so the years differ from row to row: read the years on the row, not just the ranking. A single year is also not a trend, the multi-year series is on each metric’s card below.

How exposed Champ's Barber School-Lebanon is to the structural shifts reshaping higher ed: a composite structural-risk index plus the 2025 federal budget law’s endowment excise tax, Grad PLUS elimination, new Parent PLUS borrowing cap and new Workforce Pell short-term-credential opportunity, and the demographic enrollment cliff. Only signals that apply to this institution are shown.

Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.
60
Elevated
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%. This is a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.
-14.8%
Steep decline

Indicative signals, not forecasts, see each metric’s definition and the methodology. Endowment-tax, Grad PLUS, Parent PLUS and Workforce Pell figures appear only where the institution is exposed, and “nationally” compares against all schools that report each signal.

Turn these signals into action

Seeing exposure is step one. Ibex builds AI agents that monitor and act on exactly these pressures. Explore an interactive demo. Live demos run real workflows, and the rest are working mockups we build to your institution’s data.

What an enrollment loss would do to the budgetTuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the entire cost base stay where they are. It measures the size of the hole a decline would open, not what the institution would end up reporting after it responded.

Tuition and fees fund 87% of this institution’s operating revenue, and it runs a 51.3% operating margin. It could lose about 59.0% of its enrollment before the surplus becomes a deficit, if nothing else changed.

46.7% operating margin after the loss, with costs unchanged

A deliberately simple counterfactual: net tuition per student and total costs stay where the latest IPEDS finance filing put them, so only the tuition line moves. No institution facing this would hold costs flat, which is the point, the figure is the gap that would have to be closed, not a forecast of the margin it would report. A school that responds by discounting harder to hold headcount converts the same problem into a net-price one, and it does not show up here.

Where the money comes from $115,000 total revenue · IPEDS FY2022-23

Tuition & fees is the largest single source at 87% of revenue.

Tuition & fees87.0%
Other revenue13.0%

Where each dollar of revenue comes from, as a share of total positive revenue. Sources are standardized across public (GASB) and private (FASB) reporting. A net investment loss in a down market is shown as 0% and excluded from the mix.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Net tuition revenue / FTETuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student after institutional aid/discounts, what tuition nets.Calculated from filings
Strong
$13,375
70th percentile in peer grouppeer median $11,133
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)1299 peers
Instructional spend / FTESpending on instruction per FTE student, how much of the budget reaches the classroom.Calculated from filings
Average
$3,250
37th percentile in peer grouppeer median $4,158
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)1299 peers
Average net priceWhat students pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly price families pay after grants and scholarships.As filed
Below peers
$24,262
79th percentile in peer grouppeer median $18,505
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)1213 peers
Net price, low-income families (under $30K)What students pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning under ~$30,000. Lower is better.As filed
Below peers
$24,262
81st percentile in peer grouppeer median $17,830
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)1196 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn under about $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). This is what the neediest admitted students pay, often far below the sticker price. Read it beside the overall net price and the high-income net price: a low figure here signals strong need-based aid. Lower is better.
Operating marginOperating surplus or deficit as a share of operating revenue, leaving out investment swings and capital gifts: whether day-to-day operations run in the black.Calculated from filings
Strong
51.3%
89th percentile in peer grouppeer median 16.3%
higher is better
FY2022-231201 peers
Operating result as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): the IPEDS net operating revenue ratio, the same figure the Financial Health Index uses. It leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and additions to endowment, and for private nonprofits counts only unrestricted revenue, so a one-year swing in investment markets or a building grant does not read as an operating surplus or deficit. For-profit institutions: (revenue excluding investment return − total expenses) ÷ that revenue. A surplus above 4% is strong. A thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks. Values beyond ±100% are not shown.
Tuition dependencyNet tuition as a share of operating revenue, how exposed the budget is to enrollment swings.Calculated from filings
87%
37th percentile in peer grouppeer median 91.3%
context, not scored
FY2022-231201 peers
Tuition and fees as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23), the same revenue base as the operating margin, so the two combine correctly in the enrollment-loss scenario. Operating revenue leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and endowment additions, and for private nonprofits counts unrestricted revenue only, so this share can run a few points above the tuition slice of the revenue-mix chart, which divides by every revenue source. For public institutions the base is the IPEDS consolidated figure, which can include component units such as foundations and university health systems, so a public with a large hospital shows lower dependency than its campus budget alone would. Not shown where the operating margin is not shown. Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.Blended index
Elevated
60
FY2022-23 (IPEDS) with WICHE 2024 projections
An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. For-profit institutions report no operating-cushion figure and nearly all of them run close to 100% tuition dependency, so their index rests on at most three signals and reads higher than a nonprofit's; compare a for-profit with other for-profits. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.
Enrollment loss before deficitHow much of its enrollment the institution could lose before running an operating deficit, if it changed nothing else.Modelled by Ibex
Wide cushion
59%
90th percentile in peer grouppeer median 18%
higher is better
FY2022-231186 peers
The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of the same operating revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss. The same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. Where the surplus is larger than all tuition revenue, no enrollment loss alone produces a deficit and no figure is shown. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operating margin after a 10% enrollment lossWhat the operating margin becomes if a tenth of the students go and nothing else changes.Modelled by Ibex
Still in surplus
46.7%
89th percentile in peer grouppeer median 8.1%
higher is better
FY2022-231201 peers
The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Undergraduate enrollmentNumber of degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS fall headcount). A size measure, not a quality signal.As filed
13
2nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 100
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)1302 peers
Pell recipient shareShare of undergraduates receiving a Pell grant, the standard proxy for how many low-income students a school enrolls. Not scored in either direction: it is a measure of who a school serves, and both a high and a low share are defensible depending on the mission.Share of undergraduates on a federal Pell Grant, a proxy for the share from lower-income families.As filed
88%
93rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 57.1%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)1299 peers
First-generation studentsShare of undergraduates who are the first in their family to attend college.As filed
68.8%
96th percentile in peer grouppeer median 52.3%
context, not scored
2016-17 (Scorecard)929 peers
Share of undergraduates who are first-generation college students (College Scorecard, 2016-17). An access signal, not a measure of quality: a higher share often reflects a stronger commitment to serving students whose parents did not attend college. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.
Adult learners (25+)Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older.As filed
68.4%
88th percentile in peer grouppeer median 41.8%
context, not scored
2023-24 (Scorecard)1268 peers
Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older (College Scorecard, 2023-24). Read as context on the student mix: schools serving many working adults look different on persistence and part-time measures than traditional-age campuses, and neither is inherently better. From the College Scorecard 2023-24 data file.
Part-time undergraduatesShare of undergraduates enrolled part-time.As filed
53.8%
88th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0.2%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)1300 peers
Share of undergraduates enrolled part-time (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Context, not quality: a high part-time share is common at community and commuter institutions and affects graduation-rate comparisons, which are based only on full-time, first-time students.
Women (share of undergraduates)Share of undergraduates who are women.As filed
15.4%
6th percentile in peer grouppeer median 92.9%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)1300 peers
Share of undergraduates who are women (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context on the student mix, not a measure of quality.
12-month FTE enrollmentFull-time-equivalent enrollment over the full year, the denominator for per-student finance measures.As filed
8
1st percentile in peer grouppeer median 117
context, not scored
2023-24 (IPEDS)1299 peers
Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.
Student-faculty ratioStudents per instructional faculty member, lower usually means smaller classes and more contact.As filed
20:1
74th percentile in peer grouppeer median 15:1
context, not scored
Fall 20231272 peers
Students per instructional faculty member (IPEDS, fall 2023). Lower generally means smaller classes and more faculty contact, though the measure mixes undergraduate and graduate teaching and is institution-reported.
Fully online studentsShare of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education (online) courses.As filed
0%
50th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 2023 (IPEDS)1273 peers
Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality. Online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.
Applicant-pool diversity shiftProjected change in the non-white share of the home state's public high-school graduating class, class of 2025 to 2037.Modelled by Ibex
+7.1 pts
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.)
Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.
Hybrid (some online) enrollmentShare of students enrolled in some but not all courses online (hybrid), Fall 2023.As filed
0%
46th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 20231273 peers
Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Transfer-in share (undergraduate)Transfer-in students as a share of undergraduate enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
0%
Fall 2023
Transfer-in students as a share of all undergraduates (IPEDS, Fall 2023). A high share means the school depends on transfer pipelines rather than first-time freshmen, which changes both recruitment strategy and melt/retention risk. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Graduate share of enrollmentGraduate students as a share of total enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
0%
Fall 2023
Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Women share of facultyWomen as a share of instructional staff (full- and part-time), Fall 2023.As filed
0%
3rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 87.5%
context, not scored
Fall 20231269 peers
Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Faculty of color shareU.S. faculty of color as a share of instructional staff, Fall 2023.As filed
100%
90th percentile in peer grouppeer median 50%
context, not scored
Fall 20231269 peers
Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Direct competitors within 100 miCount of other institutions within 100 miles. Scored as lower-is-better because it is used here as a competitive-pressure signal for the institution, not as a benefit to students.Number of institutions in the same peer group within 100 miles.Calculated from filings
Below peers
76
84th percentile in peer grouppeer median 27
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)1302 peers
How many institutions in the same Ibex peer group, the schools most likely to compete for the same students, sit within roughly 100 miles. For most schools the peer group is the same Carnegie classification and control. Schools in small classes sit in broader fallback groups by level, sector or region (see Peer groups in the methodology), and for them the count is looser. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks. A low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting power.
Metro-area unemployment rateUnemployment rate in the school's metro area, ACS 2020-24.As filed
Strong
4.3%
18th percentile in peer grouppeer median 5.3%
lower is better
ACS 2020-241289 peers
The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2020-24, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%. This is a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.External projection
Steep decline
-14.8%
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.) projection
Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age. The U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
In-state HS graduatesPublic + private high-school graduates in the school's state, class of 2025.External projection
137,304
57th percentile in peer grouppeer median 111,084
context, not scored
Class of 2025 (WICHE)1293 peers
The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Consecutive years of enrollment declineHow many years in a row undergraduate enrollment has fallen, counting back from the most recent year.Modelled by Ibex
Declining
1 yr
70th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0 yrs
lower is better
2023-24 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)1270 peers
The number of consecutive years, ending with the most recent one, in which this school's undergraduate headcount fell. Zero means the latest year was flat or up. A single down year is ordinary. Three or more in a row is the pattern that precedes program cuts and closures, and it is visible in the federal data years before it becomes public. A fall smaller than 2% counts as flat, because year-to-year reporting noise at that scale would otherwise manufacture streaks. Measured on the same window as enrollment momentum: where a merger or consolidation makes the earlier years a different institution, only the years after it are counted. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Undergraduate race & ethnicity IPEDS 2024-25
Hispanic/Latino69.2%
White23.1%
Black7.7%

Undergraduate enrollment by race and ethnicity, as reported to IPEDS (College Scorecard). “International” denotes nonresident students. “Unknown” means race/ethnicity was not reported.

The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.

Share taking federal loansShare of students taking out federal loans, a borrowing-reliance signal.As filed
92%
97th percentile in peer grouppeer median 54.3%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)1299 peers
Median earnings (6 yr)Median earnings of working former students six years after they first enrolled.As filed
Below peers
$16,675
12th percentile in peer grouppeer median $22,012
higher is better
2020-21 (Scorecard)1030 peers
Median earnings of former students who are working and were federally aided, measured six years after they first enrolled (College Scorecard, 2020-21). A shorter-horizon companion to the ten-year earnings figure. Early-career pay tends to run below the ten-year mark, so read the two together rather than in isolation. From the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the last release carrying it. Earnings measured about six years after entry, so the cohort behind it entered in the mid-2010s.

Every figure on this page carries one of these labels. They are not degrees of confidence: a projection is not a worse number than a filing, it is a different kind of claim, and the distinction is invisible when both are set in the same grey card.

As filedThis is the institution's own figure as filed with a federal collection, or a federal agency's own published figure about it. Ibex has not adjusted it.
Calculated from filingsCalculated by Ibex from figures in the same federal filing, using nothing but arithmetic: a share, a ratio, or an amount per student. It is exactly as sound as the filed numbers it divides.
Blended indexA blend of several other measures on this page, combined by Ibex. The components and how they are weighted are listed in this metric's description. Reasonable people could weight them differently and get a different score.
Modelled by IbexFitted or extrapolated by Ibex from the institution's reported history. This number appears in no federal file: it is a summary of a trend, and it inherits every irregularity in the years it was fitted through.
External projectionBuilt on an external projection about the future, published by a research body rather than measured. Projections are revised as the underlying assumptions change, and this one describes a scenario, not a fact.

Champ's Barber School-Lebanon’s largest fields by completions, with graduate earnings (4 years out) and debt benchmarked against the same field at its peer group. Sparklines show the 8-year completions trend.

FieldCompletions / yrMedian earnings, 4 yrs outMedian debtEarnings premiumRisk score
Personal & Culinary Services–$35,126
93rd pct · 793 peers
–Below benchmark -14%High · 86

1 of 1 top fields shown have median graduate earnings below the PA state earnings-premium benchmark, an indicative flag under the 2025 federal earnings-premium test (effective July 1, 2026).

Earnings-premium status is an indicative estimate: median graduate earnings four years out vs the PA state median earnings of a high-school graduate (undergraduate credentials) or a bachelor’s-degree holder (graduate credentials) from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (2020-24). The official U.S. Department of Education determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.

The risk score (0–100) is an indicative blend of earnings-premium margin and the yearly completions growth rate, higher means a field pays closer to (or below) the benchmark and is shrinking. A directional screen, not an official determination.

Major-level detail (CIP 4-digit)
Personal & Culinary Services – 1 CIP program (4-digit), 1 with earnings
Major (CIP 4-digit)Compl./yrEarn 4yrEarn 1yr% > thresholdMedian debtDebt/earnEarnings premium2 of 3 yrs
Cosmetology and Related Personal Grooming ServicesCIP 1204 ›–$35,126 n=19––––Below benchmark -14%–

Major-level earnings, debt and threshold pass-rates are reported by College Scorecard only where enough graduates exist to protect privacy, so 1 of 1 major shows an earnings figure. The rest read “–”. % > threshold is ED’s own share of graduates out-earning the federal earnings threshold (the do-no-harm pass rate), drawn from the best available measurement window (4-, 5- or 1-year) pooled across all nine College Scorecard Field-of-Study releases. A small chip marks any figure not on the 4-year window, and hovering names the cohort size and source release. 2 of 3 yrs flags fields below the earnings-premium benchmark in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, the statutory trigger under the 2025 test (effective July 1, 2026). Indicative. The Department of Education’s official determination may differ. Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard Field of Study (2014–15 through 2022–23 cohorts + most-recent snapshot), accessed March 2026.

See the interactive dashboard for all fields and credential levels (associate through doctoral). Source: College Scorecard Field of Study.

What is Champ's Barber School-Lebanon's student-faculty ratio?
Champ's Barber School-Lebanon reports a student-faculty ratio of 20:1 (IPEDS, fall 2023), that is, about 20 students for every instructional faculty member.
How much does Champ's Barber School-Lebanon cost?
The average net price after aid is $24,262 (College Scorecard).
Are Champ's Barber School-Lebanon's programs at risk under the federal earnings-premium test?
Indicatively, that field has median graduate earnings (four years out) below the PA state earnings-premium benchmark at Champ's Barber School-Lebanon on the latest reported cohort. Within those field, 1 of 1 individual majors with earnings data fell below the same benchmark, and 0 did so in two of the latest three reported cohort-years, which is the statutory trigger. The 2025 federal test (effective July 1, 2026) can withdraw federal Direct Loan eligibility from a program whose graduates earn less than a typical worker without the credential for 2 of 3 years. This is an estimate using College Scorecard field-of-study earnings against ACS state and national medians. The Department of Education's official determination uses its own cohort definition and may differ.
Which schools are Champ's Barber School-Lebanon's peers?
Champ's Barber School-Lebanon is benchmarked against 1329 institutions in the Less-than-two-year · Private for-profit peer group. All percentiles and medians on this page are computed within that group.

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Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard & IPEDS (most recent releases), with the U.S. Census Bureau (ACS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Projections, field-demand outlook) and WICHE (enrollment-cliff projections). Most figures lag the current academic year by two to three years; earnings and debt come from the 2020-21 file and a few measures from older files, and each card states its own data year. Percentiles and medians are computed within the institution's peer group. Financial Resilience is a transparent composite, see each component above. Compiled by Ibex Insights.