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Net surplus as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): (total revenues − total expenses) ÷ total revenues. A surplus above 4% is strong; a thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

Tuition & fees as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.

State appropriations as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Material for public institutions; ~0 for private.

An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.

The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of total revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss; the same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students; every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

Share of first-time, full-time degree/certificate-seeking students who completed within 150% of the program's normal time (about three years for a two-year program), per College Scorecard. The two-year analogue of the six-year rate shown for four-year colleges.

Share of first-time, full-time degree/certificate-seeking students who completed within the program's normal time (100%), per College Scorecard. Reported for two-year and less-than-two-year institutions.

Share of undergraduates aged 25 or older (College Scorecard, 2023-24). Read as context on the student mix: schools serving many working adults look different on persistence and part-time measures than traditional-age campuses, and neither is inherently better. From the College Scorecard 2023-24 data file.

Share of undergraduates enrolled part-time (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Context, not quality: a high part-time share is common at community and commuter institutions and affects graduation-rate comparisons, which are based only on full-time, first-time students.

Median family income of students at this institution (College Scorecard, 2016-17). An affordability and access signal, not a measure of quality: a lower figure typically means the school enrolls more students from modest-income families. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.

Share of students whose families earn under roughly $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2016-17). A direct low-income access signal: a higher share usually reflects a school enrolling more students from modest-income households, and pairs naturally with the Pell recipient share. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file, built from aid-applicant records rather than the full student body, and not republished since.

Share of undergraduates who are women (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context on the student mix, not a measure of quality.

Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.

Students per instructional faculty member (IPEDS, fall 2023). Lower generally means smaller classes and more faculty contact, though the measure mixes undergraduate and graduate teaching and is institution-reported.

Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality; online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.

Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.

Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Transfer-in students as a share of all undergraduates (IPEDS, Fall 2023). A high share means the school depends on transfer pipelines rather than first-time freshmen, which changes both recruitment strategy and melt/retention risk. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

How many institutions of the same type (same Carnegie classification and control, i.e. the schools competing for the same students) sit within roughly 100 miles. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks; a low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting leverage.

The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2019-23, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.

Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age; the U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.

Compound annual growth rate of net tuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student over the tracked years. A high positive rate means the school's real net price is climbing faster than peers, which can strain affordability and yield. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.

Projected cumulative change in degree-seeking undergraduate enrollment roughly five years out, modeled by a least-squares log-linear fit on the school's own undergraduate history (IPEDS fall headcount via College Scorecard, 2016-2024). It uses the full multi-year series, so a single shock year (such as 2020) does not drive the result. Where the reported count jumps by a merger or a campus consolidation brought under one institution, only the years after that jump are fitted; a sharp fall is fitted in full. This is a naive trend extrapolation, not a demographic model: where it projects a change beyond plus or minus 60 percent the fit is treated as out of range and no figure is shown. Banded against the school's peer group; higher means projected growth. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.

Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.

The number of consecutive years, ending with the most recent one, in which this school's undergraduate headcount fell. Zero means the latest year was flat or up. A single down year is ordinary; three or more in a row is the pattern that precedes program cuts and closures, and it is visible in the federal data years before it becomes public. A fall smaller than 2% counts as flat, because year-to-year reporting noise at that scale would otherwise manufacture streaks. Measured on the same window as enrollment momentum: where a merger or consolidation makes the earlier years a different institution, only the years after it are counted. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.

Taken from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the most recent release in which the Department published this element; it is null in every release since. Earnings are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that first enrolled about a decade earlier, so this describes students who entered well before 2020.

Share of borrowers who defaulted within three years of entering repayment (U.S. Dept. of Education official cohort default rate). Shown for the FY2017 borrower cohort, the most recent cohort whose full three-year default window closed before the 2020-23 federal student-loan payment pause. More recent cohorts are reported by the College Scorecard at essentially 0%, but that reflects the payment pause (no payments were due, so almost no one could default), not borrower health, so the pre-pause cohort is the last meaningful reading. Lower is better.

Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within three years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17). Read it as context, not a simple good/bad score: a low rate can mean borrowers are struggling, but it can also mean many graduates have postponed payments while enrolled in graduate or professional school, which is common at selective schools and pushes their rate down. Unlike the cohort default rate, it is not distorted by the 2020-23 federal payment pause. Reported only where enough borrowers exist. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.

Share of students who are working (not still enrolled) ten years after entering this institution, of those whose employment status is known (College Scorecard, 2020-21). A coarse employment signal; it does not capture earnings level or job quality. Taken from the College Scorecard 2020-21 data file, the most recent release in which the Department published this element; it is null in every release since. Earnings are measured in a single tax year for a cohort that first enrolled about a decade earlier, so this describes students who entered well before 2020.

Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within five years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17), a longer-horizon companion to the three-year repayment rate. As with the three-year figure, a low rate can reflect graduates deferring payments while in further schooling rather than financial distress. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.

Share of students earning more than $28,000 a year, roughly what a typical high-school graduate earns, ten years after entering this institution (College Scorecard, 2014-15). The long-horizon companion to the six-year figure and the closest public analogue to the 2025 budget law's program-level earnings-premium test. Share of former students earning more than $28,000, the Department's benchmark for the median earnings of a high-school graduate. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying it; the threshold is not inflation-adjusted.

Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within one year of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2014-15), the earliest point on the repayment curve. As with the longer-horizon rates, a low figure can reflect borrowers deferring payments while in further schooling rather than financial distress. From the College Scorecard 2014-15 data file, the last release carrying the one-year repayment rate. A decade old, and shown because no newer federal figure exists.

Share of student-loan borrowers who had repaid at least $1 of their loan principal within seven years of entering repayment (College Scorecard, 2016-17), the longest horizon reported. Together with the one-, three-, and five-year rates it traces how repayment progresses over time. From the College Scorecard 2016-17 data file. The Department has not published repayment rates since, so this is the most recent figure that exists, not a recent one: it follows borrowers who entered repayment in the early 2010s.

A 0-100 composite of student value relative to the peer group: the average of peer percentile ranks for median earnings ten years out, graduation rate, net price (lower counts as better value) and median debt (lower is better). Built only where at least two components are reported. Higher means more outcome per dollar. Banded against the school's peer group.