Yeshiva of Kasho
Brooklyn, NY · official site ↗
Private nonprofitFour-year institution (not classified by Carnegie)
72
Fin. Resilience
Yeshiva of Kasho is a private nonprofit institution in Brooklyn, NY, classified by Carnegie as “Four-year institution (not classified by Carnegie).”
It enrolls about 185 undergraduates and is benchmarked here against 37 peer institutions (Four-year · Private nonprofit).
On Ibex's Financial Resilience score it rates 72 out of 100 within that peer group, a transparent composite of endowment per undergraduate, net tuition revenue per student, and instructional spend per student.
That score and the financial health index below are not the same measure and can disagree: the resilience score ranks per-student resource levels against this peer group, while the financial health index scores the institution's own balance sheet and operating result on the CFI scale, independent of peers. A school with modest resources per student can still run a sound balance sheet, and a wealthy one can still post an operating loss.
Its strongest standing relative to peers is average net price ($9,200, 14th percentile).
Its weakest is competing enrollment nearby (5.10×).
Peer group
Four-year · Private nonprofit
37 institutions
No cross-metric risk flags triggered.
Percentile profileoutward = stronger vs peers
Each spoke is this institution’s peer-group standing (0–100) on a headline metric, oriented so outward always means stronger (lower net price scores higher). A balanced large shape signals broad strength. A spiky shape flags specific weak spots.
What changedlargest year-over-year moves
Instructional spend / FTE
▲ +100%
$8,755 → $17,474
2023→2024
Net tuition revenue / FTE
▲ +13%
$14,720 → $16,690
2023→2024
Pell recipient share
▲ +8.5 pts
73.4% → 81.9%
2023→2024
Undergraduate enrollment
▲ +6%
174 → 185
2023→2024
Most recent single-year change in each tracked metric (rates in percentage points). Green = moved in this metric’s favorable direction, red = unfavorable, grey = size or context, not scored. Each row uses the latest pair of years that metric has, and federal collections release on different schedules, so the years differ from row to row: read the years on the row, not just the ranking. A single year is also not a trend, the multi-year series is on each metric’s card below.
Policy & demographic exposure
How exposed Yeshiva of Kasho is to the structural shifts reshaping higher ed: a composite structural-risk index plus the 2025 federal budget law’s endowment excise tax, Grad PLUS elimination, new Parent PLUS borrowing cap and new Workforce Pell short-term-credential opportunity, and the demographic enrollment cliff. Only signals that apply to this institution are shown.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.
60
ElevatedEnrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%. This is a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.
-27%
Severe declineIndicative signals, not forecasts, see each metric’s definition and the methodology. Endowment-tax, Grad PLUS, Parent PLUS and Workforce Pell figures appear only where the institution is exposed, and “nationally” compares against all schools that report each signal.
Turn these signals into action
Seeing exposure is step one. Ibex builds AI agents that monitor and act on exactly these pressures. Explore an interactive demo. Live demos run real workflows, and the rest are working mockups we build to your institution’s data.
Financial Health Index
1.7
on a −4 to 10 scale
Primary reserve 35%0.3 mo
Reserves vs. debt 35%0.01×
Return on net assets 20%7.6%
Operating result 10%10.7%
Composite of four ratios on a strength-factor scale (−4 weak → 10 strong): below 3 falls short of the threshold for financial health, below 1 signals acute stress, and above 6 is strong. Computed from IPEDS FY2022-23, the most recent finance release (it lags the current year by 2–3 years). Branch campuses that report finances at a parent/system level can show distorted ratios. For informational benchmarking, not a credit rating or financial advice.
Enrollment shock
What an enrollment loss would do to the budgetTuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the entire cost base stay where they are. It measures the size of the hole a decline would open, not what the institution would end up reporting after it responded.
Tuition and fees fund 38% of this institution’s operating revenue, and it runs a 10.7% operating margin. It could lose about 28.2% of its enrollment before the surplus becomes a deficit, if nothing else changed.
7.2%
operating margin after the loss, with costs unchanged
A deliberately simple counterfactual: net tuition per student and total costs stay where the latest IPEDS finance filing put them, so only the tuition line moves. No institution facing this would hold costs flat, which is the point, the figure is the gap that would have to be closed, not a forecast of the margin it would report. A school that responds by discounting harder to hold headcount converts the same problem into a net-price one, and it does not show up here.
Revenue composition
Where the money comes from
$6.2M total revenue · IPEDS FY2022-23
Tuition & fees is the largest single source at 37% of revenue.
Tuition & fees37.2%
Private gifts & grants35.5%
Other revenue18.5%
Government grants & contracts8.8%
Where each dollar of revenue comes from, as a share of total positive revenue. Sources are standardized across public (GASB) and private (FASB) reporting. A net investment loss in a down market is shown as 0% and excluded from the mix.
Net price by income
Average net price by family income
After grant & scholarship aid · Scorecard 2024-25
$0–30K$8,505
$30–48K$8,949
$48–75K$10,732
Average annual net price (total cost minus grant and scholarship aid) paid by federal-aid recipients in each family-income band. Lower-income bands often pay less where need-based aid is strong.
Financial Health
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Net tuition revenue / FTETuition revenue per full-time-equivalent student after institutional aid/discounts, what tuition nets.Calculated from filings
Strong
$16,690
72nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $6,537
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)23 peers
Instructional spend / FTESpending on instruction per FTE student, how much of the budget reaches the classroom.Calculated from filings
Strong
$17,474
72nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $10,185
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)23 peers
In-state tuition & feesPublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead. Sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Published in-state tuition and fees before aid (sticker price).As filed
$14,000
78th percentile in peer grouppeer median $9,275
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Out-of-state tuition & feesPublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead. Sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Published out-of-state tuition and fees before aid (sticker price).As filed
$14,000
72nd percentile in peer grouppeer median $9,900
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)18 peers
Avg annual cost of attendancePublished price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead. Sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Average total annual cost, tuition, fees and living costs, before aid.As filed
$21,356
39th percentile in peer grouppeer median $22,355
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)9 peers
Avg monthly faculty salaryWhat the institution pays its faculty. Scored as higher-is-better because it tracks an institution's ability to attract and hold teaching staff. It also tracks local cost of living, so compare within a region before drawing a conclusion.Average monthly salary of full-time faculty (IPEDS), a proxy for faculty investment.As filed
Average
$4,313
53rd percentile in peer grouppeer median $4,170
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)16 peers
Average monthly salary of full-time faculty, as reported to IPEDS.
Average net priceWhat students pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly price families pay after grants and scholarships.As filed
Strong
$9,200
14th percentile in peer grouppeer median $15,962
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)11 peers
Net price, low-income families (under $30K)What students pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning under ~$30,000. Lower is better.As filed
Strong
$8,505
15th percentile in peer grouppeer median $14,013
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)10 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn under about $30,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). This is what the neediest admitted students pay, often far below the sticker price. Read it beside the overall net price and the high-income net price: a low figure here signals strong need-based aid. Lower is better.
Net price, middle-income families ($30K-$48K)What students pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $30,000 to $48,000. Lower is better.As filed
$8,949
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $30,000 to $48,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the middle rung of the income net-price ladder: read it together with the low-income (under ~$30K) and high-income (over ~$110K) net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.
Net price, upper-middle families ($48K-$75K)What students pay after all grant and scholarship aid, averaged over the students in that income band. This is the one price figure that is scored: lower is genuinely better for the family paying it. It still averages over very different aid packages, so treat it as a band, not a quote.Average yearly cost after all grant and scholarship aid for students from families earning roughly $48,000 to $75,000. Lower is better.As filed
Strong
$10,732
28th percentile in peer grouppeer median $11,442
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)9 peers
Average annual net price (cost of attendance minus all grant and scholarship aid) paid by students whose families earn roughly $48,000 to $75,000 a year (College Scorecard, 2024-25). It is the fourth rung of the five-rung income net-price ladder: read it with the low, middle, upper and high-income net prices to see how steeply the school discounts as family income rises. Lower is better.
Operating marginOperating surplus or deficit as a share of operating revenue, leaving out investment swings and capital gifts: whether day-to-day operations run in the black.Calculated from filings
Strong
10.7%
55th percentile in peer grouppeer median 6.4%
higher is better
FY2022-2310 peers
Operating result as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23): the IPEDS net operating revenue ratio, the same figure the Financial Health Index uses. It leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and additions to endowment, and for private nonprofits counts only unrestricted revenue, so a one-year swing in investment markets or a building grant does not read as an operating surplus or deficit. For-profit institutions: (revenue excluding investment return − total expenses) ÷ that revenue. A surplus above 4% is strong. A thin surplus near 0% leaves little margin for shocks. Values beyond ±100% are not shown.
Tuition dependencyNet tuition as a share of operating revenue, how exposed the budget is to enrollment swings.Calculated from filings
37.7%
65th percentile in peer grouppeer median 24.8%
context, not scored
FY2022-2310 peers
Tuition and fees as a share of operating revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23), the same revenue base as the operating margin, so the two combine correctly in the enrollment-loss scenario. Operating revenue leaves out capital appropriations, capital gifts and endowment additions, and for private nonprofits counts unrestricted revenue only, so this share can run a few points above the tuition slice of the revenue-mix chart, which divides by every revenue source. For public institutions the base is the IPEDS consolidated figure, which can include component units such as foundations and university health systems, so a public with a large hospital shows lower dependency than its campus budget alone would. Not shown where the operating margin is not shown. Higher = more exposed to enrollment swings.
Tuition discount rateInstitutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition (IPEDS, private nonprofits only), the tuition-discount rate. This is the share of sticker tuition handed back as aid. A high rate signals heavy price competition for students.Calculated from filings
22.4%
54th percentile in peer grouppeer median 21.3%
context, not scored
FY2022-2314 peers
Institutional grant aid as a share of gross tuition and fee revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB): tuition allowances funded by the school itself (endowment, gifts and other institutional money) ÷ (net tuition revenue + all allowances applied to tuition). Pell, other federal, state and local grants are left out of the numerator because they are not the school's discount. Private nonprofit institutions only. Public (GASB) institutions report tuition differently and are not shown. Also not shown where a school books most of its own aid as scholarship expense instead of as a tuition allowance, because this measure cannot see that aid. The rate covers all students, undergraduate and graduate, so it runs well below NACUBO's widely quoted average, which covers first-time, full-time freshmen only.
State appropriations shareState appropriations' share of total revenue, material for public institutions, near zero for private.Calculated from filings
0%
FY2022-23
State appropriations as a share of total revenue (IPEDS FY2022-23). Material for public institutions, ~0 for private.
Administrative cost shareInstitutional support (central administration, governance, general administration, fundraising, and under FASB the operation and maintenance of plant) as a share of total expenses, private nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the figure is comparable. An informational gauge of administrative intensity, not a measure of waste.Calculated from filings
15.3%
41st percentile in peer grouppeer median 17.2%
context, not scored
FY2022-2316 peers
Institutional support, central administration, executive management, governance, general administration, fundraising and (under FASB rules) operation and maintenance of plant, as a share of total expenses (IPEDS FY2022-23, FASB). Private nonprofit institutions only: public (GASB) institutions report functional expenses on a different basis and frequently consolidate large hospital and auxiliary operations, which makes a comparable ratio unreliable, so they are not shown. Because FASB folds plant operations into institutional support, this runs higher than a narrow 'central-office' figure, and schools with sizable hospital or auxiliary operations show a lower ratio as those costs enlarge total expenses. An informational benchmark of administrative intensity, compared within the peer group, not a measure of waste or quality.
Months of operating cushionMonths of operating expenses covered by expendable reserves, the institution's cash cushion.Calculated from filings
Thin
0.3 mo
61st percentile in peer grouppeer median 0 mo
higher is better
FY2022-239 peers
How many months of operating expenses the institution could cover from expendable reserves (IPEDS FY2022-23 primary reserve ratio × 12). About 5 months, one semester, is the accreditor benchmark for solid footing. Below ~3 months is thin. A negative figure means expendable reserves are themselves negative.
Reserves vs. debtExpendable reserves divided by long-term debt, whether reserves could cover the debt.Calculated from filings
Thin
0.01×
FY2022-23
Expendable reserves ÷ plant-related debt (IPEDS FY2022-23 viability ratio). At or above 1.25×, reserves fully cover long-term debt. Shown blank when the institution carries little or no plant debt.
Return on net assetsChange in net assets over the year, whether the institution grew wealthier.Calculated from filings
Strong
7.6%
61st percentile in peer grouppeer median 6.5%
higher is better
FY2022-239 peers
Change in total net assets ÷ net assets (IPEDS FY2022-23), whether the institution grew wealthier over the year. 2–4% is adequate, and above 4% is strong.
Spent on instructionInstruction as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
25.1%
21st percentile in peer grouppeer median 34.5%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)17 peers
Instruction spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). 'Where the money goes' context, reported here for private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only, where the functional split is comparable. It is not computed for public or for-profit institutions. Higher is not automatically better. Research universities and those with hospitals or large auxiliaries spread spending across other functions.
Spent on student servicesStudent services as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
6.6%
21st percentile in peer grouppeer median 9.9%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)17 peers
Student-services spending (admissions, registrar, student life, counseling) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.
Spent on academic supportAcademic support as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
2.7%
41st percentile in peer grouppeer median 3%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)17 peers
Academic-support spending (libraries, academic computing, deans' offices) divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. Context, not a quality measure.
Spent on researchResearch as a share of total functional expenses (private-nonprofit reporting).Calculated from filings
0%
47th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
FY2022-23 (IPEDS)17 peers
Research spending divided by total functional expenses (IPEDS Finance, FY2022-23 (FASB)). Private-nonprofit (FASB) institutions only. It runs near zero at teaching-focused colleges and sizeable at research universities. Spending-mix context, not a quality measure.
Room & board (on-campus)Published price before any aid. Shown as context, not as good or bad: at most private colleges almost nobody pays it, and a high sticker often sits on top of deep discounting, so a cheaper-looking school can cost a given family more. Compare schools on net price instead. Sticker price is here because it is what gets quoted.Published annual room charge plus board (meal-plan) charge for on-campus residents.As filed
$2,500
2023-24
The school's published annual charge for on-campus housing plus its standard meal plan (IPEDS, 2023-24). This is the largest cost of attendance after tuition and the part families compare most directly across residential offers. Reported only for schools that publish both a housing and a meal-plan charge, or one combined charge. A published charge before any aid, so it is shown as context rather than scored: see the sticker-price note.
Full-professor average salaryWhat the institution pays its faculty. Scored as higher-is-better because it tracks an institution's ability to attract and hold teaching staff. It also tracks local cost of living, so compare within a region before drawing a conclusion.Average salary of full (tenured-rank) professors, 9-month equated, 2023-24.As filed
$55,176
2023-24
Average salary paid to full professors, the most senior instructional rank (IPEDS Human Resources, 2023-24, 9-month equated). It reflects both the school's pay scale and the seniority of its faculty, and it is a sizeable share of academic cost. Banded against the school's peer group.
Financial responsibility scoreED financial-responsibility composite score (-1.0 to 3.0, >=1.5 is passing).Regulator / auditor finding
Strong
3.0
77th percentile in peer grouppeer median 2.4
higher is better
AY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)13 peers
The U.S. Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, a -1.0 to +3.0 measure of an institution's solvency built from its audited finances. 1.5 and above passes, 1.0-1.4 is a zone needing oversight, and below 1.0 fails and can trigger letter-of-credit or cash-monitoring requirements. ED computes it only for private non-profit and proprietary schools, so it is reported only where scored. Higher is safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Structural risk indexAn indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure) blending operating margin, months of cash cushion, tuition dependency and the home-state enrollment cliff. Screens for the financial and demographic strain that precedes closures and mergers, directional, not a prediction.Blended index
Elevated
60
FY2022-23 (IPEDS) with WICHE 2024 projections
An indicative 0–100 structural-risk index (higher = more pressure), an equal-weight blend of the stress signals we measure: thin or negative operating margin, low months of operating cushion, high tuition dependency, and a shrinking home-state high-school-graduate pipeline (enrollment cliff). Averaged over whichever signals are available (at least two required). It screens for the financial and demographic pressures that precede closures and mergers, a directional indicator, NOT a prediction that any institution will close, and not a credit rating. For-profit institutions report no operating-cushion figure and nearly all of them run close to 100% tuition dependency, so their index rests on at most three signals and reads higher than a nonprofit's; compare a for-profit with other for-profits. Built from the FY2022-23 IPEDS finance filing, the most recent one published, combined with WICHE's high-school-graduate projections. The finance side is two to three years old, so a school that has since raised money, cut costs or lost enrollment will not be reflected here. It is a structural signal, not a current diagnosis, and it is not a prediction that any named institution will close.
Enrollment loss before deficitHow much of its enrollment the institution could lose before running an operating deficit, if it changed nothing else.Modelled by Ibex
Wide cushion
28.2%
69th percentile in peer grouppeer median 8.4%
higher is better
FY2022-238 peers
The share of its students an institution could lose before its operating surplus becomes a deficit, assuming net tuition per student and total costs stay where they are. It comes straight from two figures in the same IPEDS finance filing: the operating margin, and tuition's share of the same operating revenue. A school with a 3% surplus that funds 85% of itself from tuition can absorb about a 3.5% enrollment loss. The same 3% surplus at a school funding a quarter of itself from tuition absorbs about 12%. Zero means the institution is already running a deficit. Where the surplus is larger than all tuition revenue, no enrollment loss alone produces a deficit and no figure is shown. It is not a prediction: no institution facing that loss would hold costs flat, and the number is the size of the hole that would have to be closed, not the outcome. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operating margin after a 10% enrollment lossWhat the operating margin becomes if a tenth of the students go and nothing else changes.Modelled by Ibex
Still in surplus
7.2%
55th percentile in peer grouppeer median 3.7%
higher is better
FY2022-2310 peers
The institution's operating margin recomputed after losing one student in ten, holding net tuition per student and total costs constant. Tuition revenue falls with the students. Every other revenue line and the whole cost base stay put. A tenth is the scale of decline the demographic projections already put on several states' high-school graduating classes, so it is a scenario rather than a worst case. Not a forecast: a real institution would cut costs, and this measures the gap it would have to cut, not what it would end up reporting. Built from the operating margin and tuition dependency in the same IPEDS filing. Banded against the school's peer group. Higher is better.
Operational-risk index (official findings)0-100 severity of what federal regulators and auditors have said about this institution. Higher means more official concern.Blended index
Clean
0.0
23rd percentile in peer grouppeer median 8.0
lower is better
ED composite AY2022-23 (Federal Student Aid)13 peers
A 0-100 severity score built only from published federal determinations: the Department of Education's financial-responsibility composite score, its Heightened Cash Monitoring list, and the going-concern, material-weakness, material-noncompliance, modified-opinion and repeat-finding results of the school's Single Audit. It is deliberately NOT a model: every component is something a regulator or an independent auditor put in writing. Components are scored only where they exist, and the score is their weighted average, so a school assessed on two signals sits on the same scale as one assessed on seven. Schools with neither a composite score nor a Single Audit on file are omitted rather than shown as clean: ED does not compute a composite score for public institutions, and no audit on file means nobody looked, not that nothing was found. Read it alongside the structural-risk index, which is the tool's own forward-looking model rather than a record of findings. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Graduation & completion
Graduation rate · first-time, full-time
10.9%
10.9% graduate within 6 years (150% of normal time)
0% on-time, within 4 years (100%)
Counts only students who entered full-time as first-time freshmen and earned a bachelor's here, the conventional headline rate. Excludes part-time entrants and transfer-ins.
Completion rate · all students
0%
0% earned a degree or certificate within 8 years (IPEDS Outcome Measures)
The broader cohort, also counts part-time entrants and transfer-ins, and any credential. More inclusive, so it can run higher than the graduation rate.
Why two numbers? They measure different students over different windows, so they are not directly comparable. The graduation rate is the standard federal headline but tracks only first-time, full-time students through a bachelor's. The all-students completion rate adds the part-time and transfer students it leaves out, over a longer window. Read each for what it covers. Source: U.S. Department of Education, IPEDS Graduation Rates & Outcome Measures, via College Scorecard.
Enrollment & Pipeline
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Undergraduate enrollmentNumber of degree-seeking undergraduates (IPEDS fall headcount). A size measure, not a quality signal.As filed
185
69th percentile in peer grouppeer median 96
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)21 peers
First-year retentionShare of first-time, full-time freshmen who return for a second year, an early signal of student fit and support.As filed
Strong
90.4%
81st percentile in peer grouppeer median 67.6%
higher is better
2024-25 (Scorecard)8 peers
Graduation rate (6-yr · first-time, full-time)Of first-time, full-time freshmen, the share who earn a bachelor's at this institution within six years (150% of normal time), the conventional headline graduation rate. It counts only first-time, full-time students and excludes part-time entrants and transfer-ins, who are captured instead by the all-students completion rate.As filed
10.9%
2024-25 (Scorecard) · cohort of 46
Share of first-time, full-time degree-seeking freshmen who earned a bachelor's at this institution within six years (150% of normal time), per College Scorecard. The number of students in the entering cohort is shown under the figure. Where that cohort is smaller than 30 students no rate is published: a graduation rate over a handful of students moves by whole percentage points per student and is not a result.
Graduation rate (4-yr on-time · first-time, full-time)Of first-time, full-time freshmen, the share who earn a bachelor's within four years (100% of normal time), the 'on-time' rate. It usually runs below the six-year rate, because many students take a fifth or sixth year. The two are not the same students: the on-time rate is measured on a class that entered two years after the one behind the six-year rate, so at a school whose outcomes are moving the newer class can post the higher figure.As filed
0%
2024-25 (Scorecard) · cohort of 46
Share of first-time, full-time degree-seeking freshmen who earned a bachelor's within four years (100% of normal time), per College Scorecard. The number of students in the entering cohort is shown under the figure, and no rate is published on a cohort smaller than 30. This rate and the six-year rate are measured on classes that entered two years apart, so at a school whose outcomes are moving they will not always fall in the order you would expect.
Pell recipient shareShare of undergraduates receiving a Pell grant, the standard proxy for how many low-income students a school enrolls. Not scored in either direction: it is a measure of who a school serves, and both a high and a low share are defensible depending on the mission.Share of undergraduates on a federal Pell Grant, a proxy for the share from lower-income families.As filed
81.9%
97th percentile in peer grouppeer median 37.5%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)19 peers
Completion rate (all students · 8-yr)Of ALL entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, the share who earned a degree or certificate at this institution within eight years (IPEDS Outcome Measures). Broader than the graduation rate, which counts only first-time, full-time students, so the two are measured on different students and are not directly comparable.As filed
0%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Share of ALL entering degree-seeking undergraduates, full- and part-time, first-time and transfer-in, who earned a degree or certificate at this institution within eight years (IPEDS Outcome Measures, via College Scorecard). Broader and more inclusive than the graduation-rate figures, which count only first-time, full-time students entering a bachelor's program, so the two are measured on different groups of students and are not directly comparable.
Part-time undergraduatesShare of undergraduates enrolled part-time.As filed
0%
26th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)21 peers
Share of undergraduates enrolled part-time (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Context, not quality: a high part-time share is common at community and commuter institutions and affects graduation-rate comparisons, which are based only on full-time, first-time students.
Women (share of undergraduates)Share of undergraduates who are women.As filed
0%
14th percentile in peer grouppeer median 33.6%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)21 peers
Share of undergraduates who are women (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context on the student mix, not a measure of quality.
Transfer-out rateShare of students who transfer out. Not scored: it runs high at access-oriented and two-year feeder schools whose students are supposed to move on to a four-year program.Share of students who transfer to a different school within the tracking window. Shown as context, not quality.As filed
65.2%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Share of students who transfer OUT to a different institution within the tracking window (College Scorecard, 2024-25). Reported as context, not a quality measure: it runs high at access-oriented schools whose students routinely move on to another institution, and it should be read together with the completion and retention figures rather than on its own.
12-month FTE enrollmentFull-time-equivalent enrollment over the full year, the denominator for per-student finance measures.As filed
177
77th percentile in peer grouppeer median 68
context, not scored
2023-24 (IPEDS)24 peers
Full-time-equivalent enrollment over the full 12-month year (IPEDS 12-month enrollment, 2023-24). Counts part-time students at their fractional load, so it runs above fall full-time headcount and is the denominator used for per-student finance measures.
Student-faculty ratioStudents per instructional faculty member, lower usually means smaller classes and more contact.As filed
12:1
69th percentile in peer grouppeer median 7:1
context, not scored
Fall 202316 peers
Students per instructional faculty member (IPEDS, fall 2023). Lower generally means smaller classes and more faculty contact, though the measure mixes undergraduate and graduate teaching and is institution-reported.
Fully online studentsShare of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education (online) courses.As filed
0%
42nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 2023 (IPEDS)19 peers
Share of students enrolled exclusively in distance-education courses (IPEDS, Fall 2023). Describes delivery model, not quality. Online-heavy institutions look different on residential measures.
Applicant-pool diversity shiftProjected change in the non-white share of the home state's public high-school graduating class, class of 2025 to 2037.Modelled by Ibex
+0.9 pts
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.)
Percentage-point change in the non-white share of the institution's home-state public high-school graduating class between the class of 2025 (the national peak) and 2037 (WICHE, Knocking at the College Door, 11th ed., public-school race detail). A forward look at who the future applicant pool will be: a positive value means the state's graduating class is projected to grow more racially diverse. Strategic recruiting context, not a forecast of any one school's enrollment, and a college recruits from many states.
Hybrid (some online) enrollmentShare of students enrolled in some but not all courses online (hybrid), Fall 2023.As filed
0%
37th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
Fall 202319 peers
Share of all students taking some, but not all, of their courses at a distance (IPEDS, Fall 2023). This is the hybrid middle ground between the fully online share and the fully in-person share, and it signals how far a school has moved coursework online without going exclusively remote. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Transfer-in share (undergraduate)Transfer-in students as a share of undergraduate enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
4%
78th percentile in peer grouppeer median 1.1%
context, not scored
Fall 202316 peers
Transfer-in students as a share of all undergraduates (IPEDS, Fall 2023). A high share means the school depends on transfer pipelines rather than first-time freshmen, which changes both recruitment strategy and melt/retention risk. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Graduate share of enrollmentGraduate students as a share of total enrollment, Fall 2023.As filed
0%
24th percentile in peer grouppeer median 1.1%
context, not scored
Fall 202319 peers
Graduate students as a share of total headcount enrollment (IPEDS, Fall 2023). It separates research-intensive universities with large graduate bodies from undergraduate-focused institutions. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Women share of facultyWomen as a share of instructional staff (full- and part-time), Fall 2023.As filed
0%
17th percentile in peer grouppeer median 35.8%
context, not scored
Fall 202318 peers
Women as a share of all instructional staff, full- and part-time combined (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). A gender-composition signal for the teaching workforce. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Faculty of color shareU.S. faculty of color as a share of instructional staff, Fall 2023.As filed
0%
22nd percentile in peer grouppeer median 14.6%
context, not scored
Fall 202318 peers
Instructional staff who are American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or two-or-more races, as a share of all instructional staff (IPEDS Human Resources, Fall 2023). Nonresident and race-unknown staff are excluded from the numerator. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Direct competitors within 100 miCount of other institutions within 100 miles. Scored as lower-is-better because it is used here as a competitive-pressure signal for the institution, not as a benefit to students.Number of institutions in the same peer group within 100 miles.Calculated from filings
Below peers
6
86th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)25 peers
How many institutions in the same Ibex peer group, the schools most likely to compete for the same students, sit within roughly 100 miles. For most schools the peer group is the same Carnegie classification and control. Schools in small classes sit in broader fallback groups by level, sector or region (see Peer groups in the methodology), and for them the count is looser. A higher count means a more crowded local market and a harder yield fight, which matters most as the regional pool of high school graduates shrinks. A low count means the school has its catchment largely to itself. Distance is straight-line from campus coordinates. Banded against the school's peer group. Fewer is better for recruiting power.
Metro-area unemployment rateUnemployment rate in the school's metro area, ACS 2020-24.As filed
Below peers
6.8%
78th percentile in peer grouppeer median 5.7%
lower is better
ACS 2020-2425 peers
The civilian unemployment rate in the school's metropolitan or micropolitan area (US Census ACS 2020-24, mapped by the school's federal CBSA code). It is a proxy for local labor demand: a lower rate means a tighter job market, a stronger near-term destination for graduates and a smaller pool of working adults to recruit. It describes the local economy, not the school. Schools outside any metro area are not scored. Banded against the school's peer group.
On-campus crime rateOn-campus criminal offenses per 1,000 students, 2024 (Clery Act).As filed
0 per 1k
2024 (Clery)
Criminal offenses reported on campus in 2024 (murder, manslaughter, the four sex-offense categories, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor-vehicle theft and arson) per 1,000 students, from the school's federal Clery Act filing. Offenses are summed across the institution's campuses and divided by its total enrollment. A higher number does not always mean a more dangerous school: thorough reporting and dense residential campuses raise it. Lower is generally safer. Banded against the school's peer group.
Enrollment cliff (home state)Projected change in the institution's home-state high-school graduates from 2025 to 2041 (WICHE). The U.S. total falls about 13%. This is a directional feeder-market signal, not an enrollment forecast.External projection
Severe decline
-27%
WICHE 2024 (11th ed.) projection
Projected change in the number of high-school graduates in the institution's HOME STATE from the class of 2025 (the national peak) to 2041, per WICHE's Knocking at the College Door, 11th Edition (Dec 2024). The 'enrollment cliff' is the post-2008 birth decline reaching college age. The U.S. total is projected to fall about 13% over this window. A college recruits from many states, so its home-state projection is an indicative directional signal of feeder-market pressure, not a forecast of that institution's own enrollment. A projection, not a measurement: WICHE's state-level forecast of high-school graduates. It describes the pool a school recruits from, not the school's own enrollment.
Shown exactly as the institution filed it. The value falls outside the normal range for this measure, which usually means a reporting quirk rather than a real figure, so read it with care.
In-state HS graduatesPublic + private high-school graduates in the school's state, class of 2025.External projection
206,184
69th percentile in peer grouppeer median 140,304
context, not scored
Class of 2025 (WICHE)36 peers
The size of the school's home-state high-school graduating class in 2025 (WICHE Knocking at the College Door, public and private combined). It is the near-term in-state feeder market, the complement to the enrollment-cliff projection, which shows the direction that market is heading. Context metric, not better or worse. Shown as a position within the peer group, not as a score.
Competing enrollment nearbyUndergraduates enrolled at same-peer-group institutions within 100 miles, per one of this school's own undergraduates.Calculated from filings
Below peers
5.10×
94th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0.00×
lower is better
2024-25 (Scorecard universe)9 peers
For every undergraduate enrolled here, how many are enrolled at directly competing institutions (the same peer group: usually the same Carnegie classification and control, a broader fallback group for schools in small classes) within roughly 100 miles. It is the weight behind the competitor count on the neighbouring card: three tiny colleges nearby and one 40,000-student public are the same number of competitors and a completely different market. A value of 5x means the surrounding same-type market is five times this school's size, so a small shift in where those students choose to go moves this school's class far more than it moves theirs. Straight-line distance from campus coordinates, same 100-mile catchment as the competitor count. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower means more room to grow without taking students from a larger rival.
Consecutive years of enrollment declineHow many years in a row undergraduate enrollment has fallen, counting back from the most recent year.Modelled by Ibex
Not declining
0 yrs
31st percentile in peer grouppeer median 0 yrs
lower is better
2023-24 to 2024-25 (Scorecard)16 peers
The number of consecutive years, ending with the most recent one, in which this school's undergraduate headcount fell. Zero means the latest year was flat or up. A single down year is ordinary. Three or more in a row is the pattern that precedes program cuts and closures, and it is visible in the federal data years before it becomes public. A fall smaller than 2% counts as flat, because year-to-year reporting noise at that scale would otherwise manufacture streaks. Measured on the same window as enrollment momentum: where a merger or consolidation makes the earlier years a different institution, only the years after it are counted. Banded against the school's peer group. Lower is better. The window shown is the one this school's own figure was measured over: it is shorter where the series starts late, ends early, or is cut at a reporting change, so peers are not all measured over identical years.
Completion by income and entry path
Where the Pell gap sitsThe share of students who earned an award within eight years, split at the same time by whether they received a Pell Grant and by whether they arrived with no prior college. A gap that exists for one entry path and not the other points at a different problem from one that runs through both.
eight-year award rate · 2024-25
| Entering group | Pell recipients | Not Pell | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| All entering studentsEveryone who enrolled as a degree-seeking undergraduate, however they arrived. | – | 0%n=39 | – |
| Entered as first-timeStudents with no prior college enrollment. | – | 0%n=38 | – |
Federal Outcome Measures: the share of entering degree-seeking undergraduates who had earned an award eight years later, counting part-time students and transfers that the headline graduation rate leaves out. A positive gap means Pell recipients finished less often. Rates are shown only where at least 30 students entered on that side, because a rate over a handful of students is arithmetic rather than a measurement, so a row can be blank on one side. Race crossed with Pell is not published by any federal collection and is deliberately not estimated here.
Student body
Undergraduate race & ethnicity
IPEDS 2024-25
White100.0%
Undergraduate enrollment by race and ethnicity, as reported to IPEDS (College Scorecard). “International” denotes nonresident students. “Unknown” means race/ethnicity was not reported.
Student Outcomes & Risk
The bar under each rank is the spread across the peer group: the shaded box is the middle half, the pale line is their median, and the gold marker is this institution. Hover for the figures.
Share taking federal loansShare of students taking out federal loans, a borrowing-reliance signal.As filed
0%
34th percentile in peer grouppeer median 0%
context, not scored
2024-25 (Scorecard)19 peers
Full-time faculty shareShare of faculty employed full-time, higher generally means more availability and continuity.As filed
100%
2024-25 (Scorecard)
Where these numbers come from
Every figure on this page carries one of these labels. They are not degrees of confidence: a projection is not a worse number than a filing, it is a different kind of claim, and the distinction is invisible when both are set in the same grey card.
As filedThis is the institution's own figure as filed with a federal collection, or a federal agency's own published figure about it. Ibex has not adjusted it.
Calculated from filingsCalculated by Ibex from figures in the same federal filing, using nothing but arithmetic: a share, a ratio, or an amount per student. It is exactly as sound as the filed numbers it divides.
Blended indexA blend of several other measures on this page, combined by Ibex. The components and how they are weighted are listed in this metric's description. Reasonable people could weight them differently and get a different score.
Modelled by IbexFitted or extrapolated by Ibex from the institution's reported history. This number appears in no federal file: it is a summary of a trend, and it inherits every irregularity in the years it was fitted through.
External projectionBuilt on an external projection about the future, published by a research body rather than measured. Projections are revised as the underlying assumptions change, and this one describes a scenario, not a fact.
Regulator / auditor findingA finding published by a regulator or an independent auditor about this institution. It is a statement someone made in writing, not a measurement Ibex or the school took.
Frequently asked
How financially healthy is Yeshiva of Kasho?
On the NACUBO Composite Financial Index (the −4 to 10 balance-sheet score accreditors and institutional boards use), Yeshiva of Kasho scores 1.7 (Watch), computed from its IPEDS FY2022-23 finances. This is informational benchmarking, not a credit rating.
What is Yeshiva of Kasho's student-faculty ratio?
Yeshiva of Kasho reports a student-faculty ratio of 12:1 (IPEDS, fall 2023), that is, about 12 students for every instructional faculty member.
How much does Yeshiva of Kasho cost?
The average published cost of attendance is $21,356 and the average net price after aid is $9,200 (College Scorecard).
Which schools are Yeshiva of Kasho's peers?
Yeshiva of Kasho is benchmarked against 37 institutions in the Four-year · Private nonprofit peer group. All percentiles and medians on this page are computed within that group.
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Source: U.S. Department of Education, College Scorecard & IPEDS (most recent releases), with the U.S. Census Bureau (ACS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Projections, field-demand outlook) and WICHE (enrollment-cliff projections). Most figures lag the current academic year by two to three years; earnings and debt come from the 2020-21 file and a few measures from older files, and each card states its own data year. Percentiles and medians are computed within the institution's peer group. Financial Resilience is a transparent composite, see each component above. Compiled by Ibex Insights.